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INTERTEXTUALITY IN NOVEL: AN ESCAPE FROM PATRIARCHAL SOLILOQUY

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Abstract

Hypertextuality is one of the intertextual relationships introduced by Gerard Genette. According to him, hypertextuality includes all the relationships which the hypertext has with the previous text, i.e. the hypotext. However, he does not consider the relationship between these two texts to be in such a way that the hypertext is the interpretation of the hypotext. On the other hand, other theorizers including Bakhtin, regard the conversation between texts a way to escape a one-voiced and dominant discourse. From this viewpoint, the intertextual relationships of Sadegh Hedayat's *The Blind Owl*, with Shahrnoush Parsipour's *The Blue Mind* and Abbas Maroufi's *The Body of Farhad* are in such a way that *The Blind Owl* can be regarded as a hypotext for the other 2 novels but these two novels interpret the text differently. The present study aims to examine the intertextual relationships between these 3 novels and explore how a multiple-voiced conversation is formed between them.

Keywords: *Intertextuality; Genette; Hypertextuality; Bakhtin, The Blind Owl; The Blue Mind and The body of Farhad*

Introduction

The Blind Owl, which can be regarded as the first modern Persian novel, has had a direct influence on the novels *The Body of Farhad* and *The Blue Mind*. This influence can be determined using intertextuality theory and identifying the intertextual relationships between the novels. The intertextual relationships between *The Blind Owl* and *The Body of Farhad* can be observed in the expressions, symbols and characters used in Hedayat's novel.

No research has been carried out into the intertextual relationships between *The Blind Owl* and *The Blue Mind* and only Abbas Milani has briefly referred to them in the introduction he has written to *The Blue Mind* (Refer to Milani, *An Introduction to The Blue Mind*, 1993, p. 27). In this novel, in addition to the structural and content-based similarities, with which the present paper deals, there can be found clear signs that Parsipour has been influenced by Hedayad.

On the other hand, intertextuality is not just about being influenced and one of its most main issues is to find the reason for this relationship and to interpret it. From a feminist viewpoint, there are marked differences in the intertextual relationships of *The Blind Owl* with the other two mentioned novels. In what follows, after explaining the intertextuality theory and one of its main types, i.e. the relationship between the hypotext and hypertext, we will examine these differences.

Hypertextuality

One of the theorists in the field of intertextuality is the French critic Gerard Genette. He defines intertextuality as "the co-existence of two or more texts and the actual existence of one text within another" (1997, p. 1). The fifth type of transtextuality which is the main subject of Genette's book *Palimpsests* is hypertextuality. From his viewpoint, "hypertextuality includes any relationship uniting a text B (we'll call it hypertext) to an earlier text A (we'll call it hypotext) and the relationship between these two texts is not in such a way that text B is the interpretation of text A" (1997, p. 5, as cited in Allen, 2001, p. 156). Genette's primary argument about the relationship between the hypotext and hypertext is that the meaning of a hypertext depends on the reader's knowledge of the hypotext which the hypertext has humorously transformed or has imitated for the purpose of adaptation. As Genette shows, hypotexts may undergo the processes of expansion, extension and embellishment (ibid, pp. 156-159). One of the transformations of the hypertext is incentive transformation. As shown by Genette, transforming the incentive existing in the hypotexts can be the subject of groundbreaking studies.

Hypertexts can give characters incentives which they lacked in the hypotext. They can also quell or annihilate an incentive existing in the hypotext (ibid, p. 160).

On the other hand, some feminist theorists have used intertextuality issues to present and expand their views. For example, Yaeger uses Bakhtinian dialogism to explain women's writing as a resistance against patriarchal monologism. This resistance is based on confirmation of "becoming-other" which is directly related to the assumptions of intertextuality and double-voiced discourse (ibid, p. 230). As Bakhtin states, identity is always achieved in relation to the Other (Allen, 2001, p. 144). According to Bakhtin, discourse constantly reflects class, group and national preferences and no word is neutral (Bakhtin and Volosinov, 1986, pp. 60-67). Unlike the single-voiced world which emphasizes the Self and selfishness and wants everything for itself and a totalitarian climate dominates it, the multi-voiced world stresses the Other and sees everything, even human life and entity, in the Other and dialogue with the Other (Gholamhosseinzadeh, 1999, p. 253).

Therefore, intertextuality is a way to create a multi-voiced discourse and escape the totalitarian climate and based on these opinions feminist theorists have found a way to evade the dominant patriarchal discourse. Show alter appears right to insist that theories about women's creativity need to take into account different combinations of discourse in women's writing because the best feminist writing will be created not by resisting but by conversing with the dominant ideologies that attempt to expel women's writing (Miller, 1997, p. 104).

Accordingly, if *The Blind Owl* can be considered a hypotext for the novels *The Blue Mind* and *The Body of Farhad*, while reading these two novels new systems of signifying should be taken into consideration and the incentives expanded, quelled and annihilated should be identified. The two novels in question, i.e., *The Body of Farhad* and *The Blue Mind*, take discourse positions different from that of *The Blind Owl* but Parsipour's method in *The Blue Mind* is quite different from Farhadi's in *The Body of Farhad* and it suggests that the female writer's discourse has been consistent with her female purposes. In what follows, we'll discuss it.

The Intertextual Relationships of The Blind Owl with the Novels The Body of Farhad and The Blue Mind Woman

It can be said that the main reason for the development of intertextual relationships between the three novels is the issue of woman. *The Blind Owl* has been widely examined in terms of its treatment of women. The novel's view of woman is extremist: In *The Blind Owl* woman is either ethereal and angelic or a

whore and devilish. In her first appearance in *The Blind Owl*, woman is like an angel and the writer's primary concern is his inability to preserve this mental image. "No, I couldn't keep this passing beam for myself." (Hedayat, 1973, p. 10). *The Blind Owl's* narrator is unable to keep this beam and it is the very reason of his misery. In another scene when this woman enters the narrator's house and lies on the bed, the narrator is unable to understand her feelings: "Suddenly I felt that I was by no means aware of her heart's secrets and there was no relationship between us." (ibid, p. 19)

The second aspect of woman in *The Blind Owl* is "whore". This woman is also beyond the narrator's understanding and he cannot build a proper relationship with her and in the end kills her. Therefore, one of the main problems of the narrator in *The Blind Owl* is his inability to build relationship with women.

Unlike *The Blind Owl* in which the narrator is a man, the turning point in *The Body of Farhad* is that its narrator is a woman, a woman who from the painting on the pen case in *The Blind Owl* has entered a different text and by existing the paint mode and finding corporeal presence in another time, has broken her silence. This very fact shows the significance of how women are viewed in the novel and because the narrator plays a key role in the story, this view reveals attention to woman's thoughts, emotions and feelings and since this narrator has exited the pen case described in *The Blind Owl*, it's obvious that she wants to recover her forgotten status and disclose what has been overlooked in *The Blind Owl*. The opposing character against woman in *The Blind Owl* is an old peddler who in *The Body of Farhad* changes to one of the minor characters that in different roles seeks to hurt woman and still lacks the ability to understand woman. In *The Body of Farhad*, the story's woman is the protagonist and the main hero. She seeks to find her beloved while the patriarchal society poses a big obstacle (Irani, 2013, p. 4). By choosing this narrator/woman, Abbasi has taken a big step to write a novel with female language and thought but in the end has only managed to show a part of woman's feelings, concerns and problems in different periods of history and the woman/narrator in his novel like the narrator in *The Blind Owl* is still unable to build relationship with the opposite sex. She has a deterministic and reactive spirit and from the outset considers herself subject to the fate which has been determined previously and has made her captive to the patriarchal society from infancy (Irani, 2013, p. 6).

Woman in Maroufi's novel still has the two aspects of etherealness and whoreness of the hypotext *The Blind Owl* and finally at the end of her vain pursuit of her beloved, she says, "There was no one, there was no answer, the room smelt of death, of swollen corpse in a suitcase on the shoulder of a woman..." (Maroufi, 2005, p. 137). She, like *The Blind Owl's* narrator, fails to build relationship with and reach the beloved.

The Blue Mind, as Milani states, somehow includes all the previous works of Parsipour. In this novel, transforming the incentive in the hypotext *The Blind Owl* gives the male and female character incentives that Hedayat's novel lacked. In this novel, woman acts as a proactive character. According to Milani, in relation to men, the story's heroine is always superior or at least equal to men. She reads men's minds, knows the future and understands the past, cannot be humiliated and is by no means submissive (Milani, 1993, p. 20). Moreover, in *The Blue Mind*, the boundary between being ethereal and being whore blurs.

The captain in *The Blue Mind* states the main reason of his evading woman as follows: "You know I always like to see women delicate and fragile. You damage this image in my mind. Although you look both delicate and fragile, there's something that disturbs me... I think you want to take my manly powers." (Parsipour, 1993, p. 520). However, the woman tries to give a satisfactory answer: "I'm not as horrible as you think and I ensure you that I don't intend to take your manly powers at all. In fact, a world without man is a terrifying world. On the contrary, I wish you to be the most powerful man in the world but a man for the present and future not the past" (p. 521). In this novel, the writer considers human to be binary, man/woman, and believes the progress of both is necessary for the advancement of human society (Refer to Parsipour, 1993, pp. 520-522). And in this way the writer attempts to blur the boundaries and create mutual understanding between man and woman.

Image

In *The Blind Owl* there is a central image that is fully described once and then its elements are repeated frequently and sparsely throughout the story. "All the day I was occupied painting on pen cases." (Hedayat, p. 12) "What is strange, however, and what is incredible is that, for some reason, the subjects of all my painted scenes have been of the same type and shape. It always consists of a cypress tree at the foot of which was squatting a bent old man like an Indian fakir. He had a long cloak wrapped about and wore a turban around his head. The index finger of his left hand was pressed to his lips as a gesture of surprise. Opposite him stood a girl in a long black dress, leaning towards him and offering him a morning glory flower. She was leaning because between them ran a stream." (ibid)

The woman in *The Body of Farhad* is this very woman in Hedayat's painting who exists the pen case and loves her painter. In *The Body of Fathad*, Maroufi repeats this scene by giving a new significance to the external structure in *The Blind Owl* and using its elements. This image contributes to the development of the story in a way different from what it does in *The Blind Owl*. The last image in *The Body of*

Farhad is as follows:

“Someone took the suitcase on my shoulder and went away. Wasn’t there a corpse on my shoulder anymore?... The dogs were barking in the distance and near a stream under a cypress tree a bent old man had his finger pressed to his lips as a gesture of surprise, waiting for me to pick a morning glory flower and offer him. Isn’t it sad?” (Maroufi, p. 139). In this image, the man and woman are still standing away from each other and the man is waiting for the woman to offer him a flower and this suggests that there’s no relationship between them.

The same image has been used in *The Blue Mind*. The Woman said, “I used to go into to the closet. I knew there was an opening in there. There was also a stream, and a tree. Then, I used to stand under the tree, put my index finger into my mouth and bite it” (Parsipour, p. 239). This image plays a significant role at the end of *The Blue Mind*. When the woman and captain go to a photographer to have their photo taken, the woman asks for a background for the photo and the photographer brings this very image: “Woman told the captain, “I’ll go to the painting, to the other side of the stream. You sit this side in a way that your body covers the old man so that he won’t be in the photo. Then, I’ll offer you a flower and you’ll take it from me, posing you’re taking it from me (ibid, p. 538). Hence, the woman returns to her place and the captain takes the place of the bent old man and the flower of morning is replaced by a broom. In the closing pages of the book, the woman steps into the painting and the man reaches a new level of self-awareness. Parsipour finds a different function for this image. She gives the old man’s youth back to him and concludes the story differently.

Morning Glory Flower

In the hypotext *The Blind Owl*, morning glory flower is one of the main symbols of the story and the ethereal woman is offering a flower to the old peddler. In the hypertext *The Body of Farhad*, this image is repeated. Therefore, if the morning glory flower is a symbol of love, the girl’s love does not work. “The painter dropped her brush and said “It’s ridiculous. I tried to return to my earlier state but the morning glory flower had slipped out of my hand and the stream had taken it away” (Maroufi, p. 8).

In the hypertext *The Blue Mind*, the morning glory flower makes the woman upset and angry. In this novel, like the novel *The Blind Owl*, the woman can’t give the morning glory flower to the old man. However, Parsipour’s impression of the

morning glory flower is different from that of *The Blind Owl* and *The Body of Farhad*. She somewhere considers the flower a feminine symbol which is intertwined with the soul of nature (Parsipour, p. 433). In the last scene of *The Blue Mind*, when the captain takes the place of the bent old man, he wants to take the flower but his hands are busy with the broom which the woman has previously given him. "The captain said hastily, "The flower... What'll happen to the flower?" The woman replied, "Don't you see. Your both hands are busy with the weapon (broom)." (Parsipour, p. 538) Hence, the morning glory flower loses its function and changes to a broom with which the man has to clean his mind, the house, alley and city and step into a new world.

Killing/Chopping

Killing is one of the man incidents in *The Blind Owl*. At first, when the ethereal woman comes to the narrator's house and dies there, the narrator chops her (Refer to Hedayat, p. 28). The narrator kills the whore too and hence loses both the two aspects of woman. Elsewhere, the old peddler is the very hearse man who takes the woman's body to the graveyard.

In *The Body of Farhad*, the man comes to the woman's house and this time he dies on the bed. *The Body of Farhad's* narrator, like *The Blind Owl's*, chops the corpse and puts it in a suitcase and he faces an old hearse man too. Instead of burying the body of the beloved near the Shah Abdol Azim Shrine or somewhere else similar to it, which occurred in *The Blind Owl*, the woman goes to the train station with the help of the bent old man and gets onto the train. Until the end of the story, the train keeps moving towards an unknown destination, sometimes quickly, sometimes slowly and sometimes it stops and the woman throughout all her life, unsuccessful in his attempt to find her beloved, only carries his body on her shoulder (Maroufi, p. 82). At the end of her pursuit, in front of Hedayat's house, she soliloquizes about the agony of not finding the beloved (Hedayat, p. 137). This woman is the very painting model whose whore aspect attends the painter's house and the story's present time and chops the story's whore painter (ibid, pp. 85-86) (cited by Eskandari, 2013, p. 225).

In *The Blue Mind* we observe a transformed function. In this novel, after the description of the woman's promiscuity, the captain sees a guerrilla, which is a symbol of masculinity, goes towards the woman to cut off her head. The guerilla chops the woman with a sword and the captain chops the guerilla and finds out that he has no reproductive organ. Meanwhile the woman tells him, "This is the comeuppance for a man who not only does not love his anima but also kills her, puts

the most terrible words and sentences into her mouth without asking himself why does she behave like this?; why has she become a whore?; why has she forgotten the picture of the morning glory flower that she had kept in mind since the beginning of life?" (ibid, p. 263) In this way, new concepts and meanings different from those of the hypotext are formed in *The Blue Mind*. Then, the writer describes the result of using these themes and shows how she has employed *The Blind Owl's* incidents to convey her desired concepts and meanings: "The man who has suffocated his anima to gain control over her has inevitably suffocated the creator of his thoughts, of course if he has suffocated her. However, if he chops her, he has definitely chopped the creator's thoughts and can only present them as scattered fragments." (ibid, p. 531)

From chopping, the old peddler, the writer's actions in *The Blind Owl* and their relationship to another story Hedayat, i.e. Mistress Alaviyeh (Alaviye Khanom), *The Blue Mind's* writer in a coherent context draws the general conclusion that killing and chopping are the main reason for the man/narrator's loss of creativity and castration (ibid, pp. 278-279).

Youth and Old Age

The narrator in *The Blind Owl* is in fact the same old peddler who has lost his youth. Similarly, in *The Body of Farhad*, the man is simultaneously both a child and a man and experiences different ages.

Likewise, in *The Blue Mind*, this theme like the other ones previously mentioned, finds a different function. The man in *The Blue Mind* is a young and handsome captain that after distancing himself from his anima, loses his youth apparently. "The captain liked to go to the streets to look for his youth. He thought if he wouldn't find the street, he'd go towards the graveyard. He might find the closet, the woman and that old man. The captain thought if he'd see the old man again, he'll feel well. He might be able to take his youth back from the old man (Parsipour, p. 253). This old man is the same bent old man in *The Blind Owl* who's taken the captain's youth. Parsipour believes that the reason for *The Blind Owl's* getting old and infertility is that he chopped and killed his anima (ibid, p. 355). In fact, everything from *The Blind Owl* reflected in *The Blue Mind* has created a dialogue and has been replied by the female writer.

Conclusion

The novel *The Blind Owl* is a hypotext for the two novels *The Body of Farhad* and *The Blue Mind*. Many of its themes can be found in these two novels. In their intertextual relationships with the novel *The Blind Owl*, both the two novels *The Body of Farhad* and *The Blue Mind* have restructured the text but the method adopted by the male writer, i.e. Maroufi, is different from that of the female writer, i.e. Parsipour. In accordance with the notion of dialogism introduced by Bakhtin as a way to escape the dominant discourse, Parsipour has expanded her female thoughts by creating a dialogue with *The Blind Owl*. In Maroufi's novel, man and woman continue to stay away from each other and there's distance between them. However, in *The Blue Mind*, they come to a relative understanding of each other. In *The Body of Farhad*, the woman is the narrator and reveals her feminine emotions and feelings and relates the story of her own life but most of the themes adapted from *The Blind Owl* are used in the same way. In *The Blue Mind*, the morning glory flower finds a different symbolic function; being chopped, youth and old age are transformed in meaning and described and the captain takes the place of the old peddler and attempts to leave the previous mental world which is based on lack of understanding of woman and reach a new understanding.

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WRITING AS READING ITSELF: A DERRIDEAN READING OF *LOST IN THE FUNHOUSE*

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Abstract

Lost in the Funhouse is like textbook illustration of Derrida's views on language and writing. The book is both a guide for "how not to write" and "how not to define" writing, thus defying an ultimate center. Although the lack of a "proper" theme and heavy metafictional structure makes it "difficult to read", it is a struggle to subvert the definitions of writing. The author deconstructs the conventional form and theme that is believed to be necessary for writing. In this respect, Barth operates through the narratives like Derrida moves through ideas in history, and ending up with the conclusion that interplay is what matters rather than a fixed meaning.

Keywords: *Derrida; Deconstruction; Lost in the Funhouse; Barth; Theory of Language and Difference*

Theory of language and writing in particular has proved to be a fundamental issue in modern times probably because communication at technical, diplomatic, philosophical levels has gained importance. Many of the modern ideas about writing, as about other issues, can certainly be traced back to Plato. Somehow, Plato has constructed a great system of thought, which philosophers inevitably have argued for and against to come up with a system of their own. In other words, though Plato has also synthesized ideas that were in the air before him, his system appears to encompass classical, modern and even post-modern ideas, and writing being one of them.

Plato provides a background of mediocrity even today against which people argue as far as writing is concerned. It was a common idea from Plato to Saussure that writing functions as a documentation of speech, a substitute for it in its absence. As speech has been seen as derivative of the thought, writing, similarly, has been seen as doubly derivative. Along with its secondary value to speech, writing's materiality by itself was completely ignored, since it was only a representation of representation, which is reminiscent of Platonic concept of world of ideas. Saussure, for instance, believes the distinctiveness of language and writing systems, stating that the latter exists for the representing the former (Saussure, 1959, p. 23). He believes that there is an oral tradition independent from writing; hence, "purity" of speech is possible (Ibid., p. 24).

The privileging of writing over speech was the classical understanding. However, Derrida rejects this hierarchy, noting that saying and hearing do not always correspond to each other, and that the speech is derivative. A term coined by Derrida, *différance*, meaning "to defer", and homophone of the word *difference* meaning, "todiffer" illustrates this problem. Derrida asserts that it is not possible to distinguish the two words in speech; therefore, Saussure's attempt to restrict the language to audible word is completely rejected. Therefore, his philosophy of writing undermines the Platonic one and those who agreed with Plato.

In his essay, entitled "Différance" Derrida indicates that the signified always traces to different 'signifieds' while meaning is postponed each time through the constant deferral, which results in an endless chain of signifiers. According to him, there is no linear development and semantic center that totalize and harmonize the meaning; instead, there is "interplay ad infinitum" and "systematic play of differences." Derrida rejects the logocentric sign systems completely. He believes that in the beginning, "man" was the center of the systems and orientation was towards the "humanity." However, after a certain philosophical event, man ceased to be the center of the world, and everything is left to decentralization, giving way

to free play (Derrida, 1978, p. 278). Without a center, language is structured through the differences; therefore, absolute truth is not possible.

The present paper will use Derrida's theories to show the compatibility of the theory as applied to John Barth's book, *Lost in the Funhouse*. *Lost in the Funhouse* is a post-structuralist short story collection, consisting of a maze of stories, in which the author forces the reader to get lost with him. In that sense, the book works like a textbook illustration of Derridean philosophy. In the book, the language's documentary function is completely disregarded. There only remains a Funhouse consisting in a series of the floating signifiers.

Tony Tanner suggests that in Barth's works, signs "become more important than their referents" and that he "plays with them in such a way that any established notions of the relationship between word and world are lost or called into doubt" (Tanner, 1974, p. 240). As Derrida suggests, writing's function is not to transfer sounds into written words, it is a material by itself that functions in the signifying process. Likely, in his work, Barth does not provide a reflection of the real world. Apart from this, he constantly reminds the reader that this fiction is a maze of words and that the signification is an endless process. With his unconventional book, he forces the reader to understand that the world and literature are not necessarily one, and in fact, the reader is called in sometimes to write the text.

With the use of metafiction, it is shown in the *Lost in the Funhouse* that language does not function to represent the world; it functions to prove that it has nothing to do with reality. By drawing attention to the language, the book prevents the reader from getting into the realm of the stories. The text is only a playground; it does not necessarily take the reader, author or narrator to anywhere. It wants to get readers lost in this playground, and indeed enjoy getting lost in this process by undermining the desire to reach a final point.

As has been mentioned above, Derrida (1981) states that language consists of "systematic play of differences," indicating that the sign is not the representation for meaning and that signifying process is a constant difference and deferral of signifiers instead of a final signified. The meaning is an endless game of tracing and it is

constituted by a tissue of differences, in the extent to which there is already a text, a network of textual referrals to other texts, a textual transformation in which each allegedly "simple term" is marked by the trace of another term, the presumed interiority of meaning is already worked upon by

its own exteriority. It always already carried outside itself. It already differs (from itself) before any act of expression (Ibid., p. 33).

This is where intertextuality is come into being: it is the end of the linear structure and the birth of the interwovenness of the texts. *Lost in the Funhouse* is a good example of intertextuality, decentering and language as material rather than a teleological end. The book starts with “Frame Tale” a Möbius strip that suggests, “Once upon a time there was a story that began.” Each turn of the Möbius strip is a retelling of the same story that has already been told. Although it says the same thing, it indicates that it renews itself each time. In his work, *The Play of the Double in Postmodern American Fiction*, Gordon Slethaug depicts the frame tell as follows:

Illustrat[ing] precisely Derrida’s view to identify the structurality of structure, whether in myth, literary form, or idea is thereafter to deny the desire for thematic center or presence. Space encircled by the Möbius strip is a nonlocus, a hole, a loss, the absence of a center or subject, a labyrinth, a universe of discourse where an infinite number of sign substitutions come into discourse where an infinite number of sign substitutions come into play, where nothing contains everything, and where a gap constitutes the subject (Slethaug, 1993, p. 138).

This depiction of a Möbius strip seems to reflect endlessness of signifiers Derrida has suggested. Here, the Möbius strip is not a geometrical shape; it is a symbol of a theory, a symbol that is not absolute in the sense of stability. This shape is crafted out of the material of language; it is not a linear shape but it encloses the texts creating a new start for its each turn. It is both closed and endless. It is an intertext, a combination of the different tissues of all the texts that has been written. Along with its intertextuality, it contains endless possibilities.

Also in the title story, the narrator Ambrose is in a funhouse where he encounters many images of himself reflected on the mirrors; however, there is no center, there is no “ultimate” image of himself that he can rely on. This frustration makes him unable to find a way out of the plight. He feels like “an odd detachment, as though someone else were the Master” (Barth, 1988, p. 81). The signifieds that he believes to own are lost since they give way to endless possibilities. Throughout the story, the narrator interrupts the narrative reminding that the story is not reaching a final point. For instance he says, “There’s no point in going farther; this isn’t going

anywhere; they haven't even come to the funhouse yet." In his story, Barth "risks meaning nothing." Likewise, Derrida (1981) states: "To risk meaning nothing is to start to play, and first to enter into the play of *différance* which prevents any word, any concept, any major enunciation from coming to summarize and to govern from the theological presence of a center the movement and textual spacing of differences" (p. 14). In his book *Derrida and Lacan: Another Writing*, Michael Lewis, explains that:

The process of differentiating is the inscription of traces of the absence of one signifier in and as the presence of another. It is the process of archi-writing or archi-tracing. This will turn out to be all that we can know of that which is beyond language, that which is 'real': a mere (ability to) trace. Derrida is quite explicit that the 'trace' is the 'remnant', the slightest vestige of the real, which is (potentially) a much greater and stranger entity, with many more capacities (Lewis, 2008, p. 118).

While the author "survives through," trace he is also "effaced" through it (Dick and Wolfreys, 2013, p. 52). Ambrose, can only survive by writing: "This is what they call 'passion.' I am experiencing it" (Barth, 1988, p. 84). However, this trace does not make him present in the text: "How readily [Ambrose] deceived himself into supposing he was a person" (Ibid., p. 93). Ambrose is both present and absent in the text. The narrator says: "Is there really such a person as Ambrose[?]"

Lost in the Funhouse is a self-reflexive novel that does not seek verisimilitude. The author constantly reminds himself to the reader, reveals the figures of speech and narrative techniques used in a way that turning clichés and used-upness into a story about story telling. Barth's stories "constitutes a world unto itself, operating under laws of its own making" (Green, 1991, p. 229-242). The story of Echo's linguistic structure is a good example:

One does well to speak in the third person, the seer advises, in the manner of Theban Tiresias. A cure for self-absorption is saturation: telling the story over as though it were another's until like a much-repeated word it loses sense... Tiresias the prophet. What is he doing here? Conversing with Narcissus. How does he know-because he knows everything. ... Tiresias can't espy the unseeable, one may yet distinguish narrator from narrative, medium from message. ... Considerable time has elapsed, it seems,

since seer and seeker, prophet and lost, first met in the cave
(Barth, 1988, p. 98-102).

It may be taking the life as a “raw material” but in Richard Poiriers words, it transforms language into a “world elsewhere” (Quoted in Green, 1991, p. 229-242). Language becomes a new world by itself. John Barth does not seek to convert the experience into a narrative, his effort is to create fiction world that is independent from reality. John Barth suspects that signifiers are able to represent the world and he believes that the playfulness of the words creates its own creative realm.

Lost in the Funhouse dismisses the fear that fiction is not able to reflect fully, because it is not its objective in the first place. John Barth interrupts the regularity of sentence pattern to break the myth of realism. He makes fun of the effort that aims to achieve realistic fiction and makes use of this as a subject. The stories are about “the possibility of humanizing play of language” (Ibid.). It is like fictionalizing the *Différance* process; making a story out of the endlessness of signifiers. This process itself emphasizes the value of form and language “for its own sake” (Ibid.). This technique is frequently used in the title story:

En route to Ocean City he sat in the back seat of the family car with his brother Peter, age fifteen, and Magda G — ‘ age fourteen, a pretty girl and exquisite young lady, who lived not far from them on B — Street in the town of D —, Maryland. Initials, blanks, or both were often substituted for proper names in nineteenth-century fiction to enhance the illusion of reality. It is as if the author felt it necessary to delete the names for reasons of tact or legal liability. Interestingly, as with other aspects of realism, it is an illusion that is being enhanced, by purely artificial means. Is it likely, does it violate the principle of verisimilitude, that a thirteen-year-old boy could make such a sophisticated observation? A girl of fourteen is the psychological coeval of a boy of fifteen or sixteen; a thirteen-year-old boy, therefore, even one precocious in some other respects, might be three years her emotional junior.

John Barth suggests that “owing to the floating nature of language, meanings are untenable” (Tsai, 2003, p. 37-62). In *Lost in the Funhouse*, attempts for realistic depiction are frequently presented as problematic. For instance, in the book it goes: “To say that Ambrose’s and Peter’s mother was pretty is to accomplish nothing;

the reader may acknowledge the preposition, but his imagination is not engaged. Besides, Magda was also pretty, yet in an altogether different way” (Barth, 1988, p. 75). His half way depictions like “the brown hair on Ambrose’s mother’s forearms gleamed in the sun like” and “the smell of Uncle Karl’s cigar smoke reminded of” (ibid, p. 74) indicate that the effort for achieving verisimilitude is vain.

Barth’s concerns are not only about the techniques used to achieve verisimilitude. He thinks “floating nature of language” also results from the lack of correspondence between the sign and the signified. As Derrida indicates, the signs only mean in relation to each other by differing and deferring; there is no absolute meaning of the signifiers. Likewise, Ambrose experiences this problem: “It was to be my fate to wonder at that moniker, relish it and revile it, ignore it, stare it out of countenance into hieroglyph and gibber, and come finally if not to embrace at least accept it with the cold neutrality of self-recognition . . . Knowing well that I and my sign are neither one nor quite two.” Derrida has a similar saying: “I love this name [Derrida], which is not mine of course (Branningan and Robbins, 1996, p. 219).

Moreover, just as Derrida does, the book lays bare the problem of speech’s authority over writing. The story “Petition” illustrates the difference between life and language. In the story, there are Siamese twins, and the one attached on the backside writes a petition to the King to help him to get detached from his brother:

I am slight, my brother is gross. He’s incoherent but vocal. I’m articulate and mute. He’s ignorant but full of guile; I think I may call myself reasonably educated, and if ingenuous, no more so I hope than the run of scholars. My brother is gregarious: he deals with the public; earns and spends our income . . . For my part, I am by nature withdrawn, even solitary: an observer of life, a meditator, a taker of notes, and a dreamer if you will (Barth, 1988, p. 62).

The Siamese twins, metaphorically refers to the written and oral manifestation of the language. Tony Tanner interprets that the “incoherent brother is like life itself, constantly shrugging off the attempts of language to circumscribe it within particular definitions. Language, in the form of the articulate brother, would be happy to pursue its inclination to ponder its elegant patterning in pure detachment from the soiling contacts of reality” (Tanner, 1974, p. 254). Such a distinction between life and language implicit in the relationship between the two brothers seems to correspond to Derrida’s comparison between “speech” and “writing” (Green, 1991, p. 229-242).

In Derrida's thoughts, writing has been viewed as "clambering pick-a-back on the more authentic use of language" while speech [is seen as] language in action (Ibid.). The incoherent brother experiences life, he even has an intercourse with the other brother's love, Thalia, while the petitioner brother follows him and experience everything secondarily only by watching. The correspondent in "Petition" must follow after his more active brother the speech as it has been dictated. However, the petitioner believes he has an advantage. "I can see him without seeing me; can therefore study and examine our bond, however to dissolve it, and take certain surreptitious measures to that end, such as writing this petition. Futile perhaps; desperate certainly" (Barth, 1988, p. 63). Writing contains the speech; however, it is not dependent on it. It has a world by itself. Writing is not dependent on speech; speech is dependent on writing to stay alive. According to Green (1991), Barth's story dramatizes Derrida's characterization of writing as separate and secondary, but, through its very existence as a work of literary art ... it also overcomes the specious opposition of speech and writing. Language in "Petition serves as both "elegant patterning" and direct expression, an affirmation of both art and "life." More importantly, the need to affirm imaginative writing in this way--to overcome the "fear" so well represented by the story's protagonist--becomes the true subject of the story (p. 229-242).

As the forgoing has shown, *Lost in the Funhouse* is like textbook illustration of Derrida's views on language and writing. The book is both a guide for "how not to write" and "how not to define" writing, thus defying an ultimate center. Although the lack of a "proper" theme and heavy metafictional structure makes it "difficult to read", it is a struggle to subvert the definitions of writing. He deconstructs the conventional form and theme that is believed to be necessary for writing. In this respect, Barth operates through the narratives like Derrida moves through ideas in history, and ending up with the conclusion that interplay is what matters rather than a fixed meaning.

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EXTERNAL FORCES ON AFRICA'S DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract

The argument for Africa's advancement has primarily been discussed on various fronts and amply tied to democracy and development. This notwithstanding, such discourse has neglected the evolutionary process of our political history and development. The need for this review article however, is to reinvigorate the need for African leaders and political actors as well as their foreign counterparts to pay attention to some of the recurrent issues that has stifled the growth of the African continent in particular. In addressing the issues from past to present, attention has been paid to the colonial legacy as well as the question of colonization, history, definition and structure among others.

Keywords: *Colonization; Democracy; Development; Neo-Colonialism; Aid; Modernization and Dependency.*

Introduction

For more than four centuries the West has continuously dominated Africa's over 700 million people (*Daily Graphic* 2002, 7.) Over 2,000 years ago Pliny said, "out of Africa, always something new" (*West Africa* 2001, 6). Today we get the impression that modern Europe would prefer to say, "Out of Africa, always something bad." There are, of course, plenty of bad things happening in Africa and many of them are entirely the fault of Africans (Okwudiba 1999). But then many of Africa's current problems have their roots in the continent's relations with Europe over the last 300 years and in this regard, unfortunately, the Europeans seem unable to accept with good grace the impact of their imperial control (*West Africa* 2001, 6).

Nnoli, in the first two chapters of the book, *African Public Administration*, attributes African problems to colonial inheritance (Okwudiba 1999, 56). The system of public administration in the countries that were colonised by the United Kingdom had its origins in the creation of machinery by Britain, which consolidated her colonial administration in her dependent territories in Africa (Adu 1999, 56). The early service was concerned with pacification of the territories, maintenance of law and order, and collection of revenue. Up to the Second World War, the civil service was hardly concerned with economic and social development. The initiative in the economic and social development came from missionaries, immigrant populations e.g. settlers and ordinary peasants. Missionaries were especially prominent in the provisions of social services such as health and education. The civil service was simple in structure, but was racial in character, reliant on automatic recruitment into senior post from Britain.

Drawing on the case of Cameroon, half of which was administered by the French and the other half by the United Kingdom, Adu offers us a concrete comparison of the two systems of colonial administration. The civil service structure in Francophone Africa, he concludes, was as coarse as its British counterpart was gentle. These differences are attributed to differing social and educational backgrounds of the officers of the two services. It is argued that British recruits could identify themselves with the gentry, while the French were middle class in origin. Also, the two national traditions of the services differed from one another. Britain believed in local rule while France believed in centralisation. On the eve of the Second World War, the two services began to resemble each other (Adu 1999, 68).

It is suggested that the centralizing strategy was heavily influenced by sources outside the continent: the doctrine of elite superiority in consolidating and sustaining the social order; the promises of rationalism, science and money for the transformation of underdeveloped societies; certain interpretations of the experience of continental Europe relating to the emergency of the state, modernisation and bureaucratisation;

and a heritage of colonial administration which emphasized the executive vis-à-vis other essential political institutions (Adu 1999, 69).

Secondly, it is further suggested that the strategy at independence was carried out through a number of sub-strategies or policies. The most important of these included: (a) replacing competitive politics by one or no party system in the name of “national unity and stability”; (b) forming unified bureaucratic structures exclusively accountable to the central government; (c) undermining the role and significance of local government, including traditional, ethnically related groups as well as modern institutions of true local government; (d) maximization of executive authority at the expense of such other institutions such as the legislature, judiciary, regional governments, press and private organisations; and regarding the national budget as the primary source of funding for the development agenda, and to be raised out of the largest economic sectors: either agriculture or mineral extraction (Adu 1999, 69). Yet to have a better understanding of these issues, there is the need to look at the question of colonization, definitions, history and structure. The others include the impact of colonization on the contemporary Africa’s democracy and development, ethnic consciousness and uneven development, neo-colonialism, aid and trade, monopoly and privatization, globalization, modernization as well as dependency theories.

Colonization: Definition, History and Structure

Two powerful images provide competitive models regarding African pre-colonial organisation. The first image is one evoked by Pistol in Shakespeare’s *Henry IV* when he opens up with “I speak of Africa and golden joys (Hopkins, 1985, 27). This is the model which also informs Nyerere’s depiction of African society. He writes that “people lived together and worked together... the results of their joint effort were divided unequally between them but according to custom... family members thought of themselves as one...” (Nyerere 1970, 1). The organizational model evoked by the above image is one characterized by small organizations of equal members living and working together on the basis of clearly understood and totally accepted rules and customs. Of necessity, such organizations were non-hierarchical, based on face-to-face relationships. It is an image of well behaved and motivated organizational members who are peaceful.

If the above image is pretty much in line with the theories of the 18th century French philosopher, Jean Jacques Rousseau, there is another which is very much in line with the ideas of the 18th English political theorist, Thomas Hobbes. This is the image first formed by European explorers and later popularized by European slave traders and masters and later by the colonial state and early scholars of African

societies, especially anthropologists. The most extreme spoke of the Africa of animals and jungle men; of primitive people “with minds in which the irrational elements predominate” (Mair 1990, 8). The more moderate spoke of stateless societies of people who were primitive but only in their “ways of doing things” (Mair 1990, 8). If natives were constantly at each other in a war of all against all in the extreme viewpoint, the moderates depicted a society characterized by “an apparent anarchy” (Mair 1990, 9). There was, according to this view, an attempt at rule making and enforcement but the rules were fuzzy, covered only a few activities, and were constantly broken.

In search of more empires in order to boast their superiority, the ruling class of the developed capitalist nations extended their domination over the whole world. So by hook or by crook, they seized foreign countries. In Africa, as a follow up of the Berlin Treaty, the whole African continent was carved out and colonized. By political, military, economic and ideological means, the colonialists established their absolute power in the African colonies, ruling them as their subordinate parts of their own metropolitan empires.

It has been argued that the tasks of the colonial state were mainly two. First, it aimed at establishing capitalist relations of production in the African colonies in such a way as to guarantee monopoly or super profits to the capitalists of Europe, particularly of the colonising powers. Secondly, as Okwudiba noted, was to “conquer and subdue the peoples of the African colonies in such a way as to make it easy and cheap to exploit their material and human resources” (Okwudiba 1996, 63). This means that just as the capitalist states in Europe maintained domination over the non-capitalist classes, the colonial powers in Africa exercised domination over the African people as a whole. Similarly, while the European state regulated the operation of the capitalist mode of production in favour of the ruling bourgeois class, it is argued, so also the state in Africa “had first to create the capitalist mode of production, made it dominant in the society and then made it yield super profits for the European capitalists” (Okwudiba 1996, 63).

This, according to Okwudiba's analysis, is the two fold task of the colonial state that defines the character both of the colonial state and the present day Africa (Okwudiba 1996, 63). This analysis focuses more actively and more extensively on the economic, social, cultural and political life of the people of Africa” (Okwudiba 1996, 63). The objective of all this intervention was, of course, to keep the colonial people in such subjugation as to enable the maximum possible exploitation to their labour and resources. And as such, the state power of the colony was designed to maintain this pattern of economic and political control.

The Impact of Colonization on the Contemporary Africa's Democracy and Development

It is of certainty that we argue that some of Africa's problems are deeply rooted in the colonial experience. According to Richard Sandbrook, the problem lies in the fact that the "imperial powers failed in various ways to erect a sturdy base for responsive and effective postcolonial states" (Sandbrook 1993, 42). On his part, Okwudiba points out that we cannot isolate the present political, ethnic and economic problems that Africa is facing from the historical condition stemming out from colonialism.

Okwudiba further argues that the type of colonialism that took off during the later part of the nineteenth century was the result of changes which had taken place in the form of "capitalism in the advance capitalist societies" (Okwudiba 1996, 62). For example, the industrial advance in nineteenth-century Europe, the growth of large scale industry, and of concentrations of economic power in the hand of a relatively small number of major companies and banks led to a change in the pattern of relations between the European powers and the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America inclusive (Okwudiba 1996, 63).

The territories created by imperialism were, in a dual sense, artificial entities, and this has produced severe problems in state building. First, their political style at independence did not evolve organically out of local traditional politics, but rather colonial imperialists imported Western models of state organization into Africa. Colonialism, as it were, was an almost fleeting experience in most of Africa, too transitory to institutionalize alien political structures and norms. Secondly, both the colonies and protectorates were artificial in the sense that the imperialists did not pay attention to cultural and linguistic differences in carving out national boundaries. It is true, as Sandbrook notes, that diverse and sometimes hostile peoples were grouped together within common borders (Sandbrook 1993, 42). These differences were, albeit not intentionally done, by colonial-induced, social, economic and political change. Therefore, Sandbrook concludes that the "legitimacy crisis and ethnic tensions that bedevil postcolonial politics must be understood in the context of the colonial epoch" (Sandbrook 1993, 42).

For the fact that colonial capitalism was not particularly dynamic or creative force also contributed to the contemporary crisis. Imperialism dragged, prodded and enticed Africans into a market economy, but mostly participated only marginally. Economic change was the formation of the modern capitalist class, which gave birth to small bourgeoisie. Considering the external origin of political institutions in Africa may give more insight into the colonial problem of which Africa now faces. Let us

consider state. Generally, state structures are most likely to win popular support if they evolve organically rather than being imposed from outside. Sandbrook argues that there was hardly any organic link between the political institutions prescribed in constitutions and the indigenous institutions of the pre-colonial period (Sandbrook 1993, 43). Used in the sense of centralized authorities capable of imposing their wish in any territory through an administrative, judicial and coercive apparatus, states, in modern Africa, as a matter of fact, did emerge in pre-colonial Africa (Wickens 1981, 220). One of the necessary conditions for the formation of a state is economic surplus. This existed in pre-colonial Africa, needless to give the full details of the formation of states in pre-colonial period. However, it is, equally important to state that states were financed either through a settled and prosperous agriculture, the proceeds of plunder (which often took the form of slaves or cattle), from revenue derived from long-distant trade. Taxes on imports and exports, precious metals, ivory, slaves or cash were forms of tribute imposed by the rulers to their subjects. The rulers (usually kings and chiefs) in return would provide internal order, defense, protection and regulation of the land, and the construction of public works among other things. Each state comprised different traditions and every state interacted with outsiders freely and friendly.

Essentially Africa evolved a variety of traditional political structures. But, as it is the case, most of the countries created by colonialists contained several traditional societies, each of which valued its own political traditions, myths and symbols. This made state-building very difficult since it was impossible to draw upon a single-traditional model in devising the modern state's institutions. Any government that decides to adopt the indigenous political institutions and traditions of one community above others would face a total declaration of war against the excluded groups, since every group cherishes its way of life.

Ethnic Consciousness and Uneven Development

The assertion of ethnic identities has in many countries replaced ideological differences as a major source of domestic conflict. Ethnicity is not, of course, a precise concept and those who march under a particular ethnic banner usually have in common a bundle of attributes—a shared history, language, religion and culture and usually also a common racial origin (itself an imprecise term).

Ethnic identities and the clash of ethnic groups are not new of course, but the rise of ethnicity as a political force worldwide is recent, at least in its current form and intensity. Moreover, the end of the Cold War could well mean that the politics of ethnicity will increase in intensity in the years ahead. The same process

of globalization that has undermined state power threatens to “unleash subterranean cultural pluralism” (Mitelman 1991, 10). Ethnicity thus poses a challenge to global peace and stability, but the search for a new basis for community and group identity should also be seen as an opportunity—an opportunity for more self-determination, for people to choose the policy under which they live, an opportunity to enlarge personal and group freedoms. Recognizing the importance of group identity, we shall argue in this section that the ethnic problems that besiege Africa in the recent years are “colonial roots of the contemporary crisis” (Sandbrook 1993, 42).

Apart from the obvious fact that colonialism lumped together heterogeneous people in common territories, it also awakened people’s ethnic consciousness, though unintentionally done (Crawford 1982, 75). That is, the idea of basing administrative boundaries and local government on cultural-linguistic lines, as the colonial powers did, fostered ethnicity. A divisive sense of separateness was promoted by the formation of local Native Authorities in British Africa to administer land rights and certain taxes (Sandbrook 1993, 49). For example, it has been argued that one of the major causes of the ethnic clashes experienced in Rwanda-Burundi started immediately after the independence in 1960 when the political elite in these two countries used ethnicity in their struggle for power and state resources. They also used violence as a means of promoting ‘ethnic’ group consciousness. From the 1970s onwards, each new episode in the history of Hutu-Tutsi violence strengthened the negative perceptions each side [has] of the other (Glynne 1997, 19).

Another important factor worth mentioning was the uneven regional impact of modernization as introduced by colonial rule. Some regions prospered through the development of cash crops, while others did not. Railway construction, for example, contributed to the agricultural development in the areas where the line traversed. Towns and urban employment emerged in the homelands of certain groups, thus favoring their economic advance.

Regardless of the pre-colonial social system, imperialism introduced novel bases of social stratification, of which economic change was a major determinant (Sandbrook 1993, 52-53). Once entrenched in a territory, the colonial power then saw it necessary to exploit whatever economic potentials existed. Each imperial government endeavored to collect enough revenues to cover its expenses and involve at least a few metropolitan companies in lucrative business. Thus, African countries became major mineral and agricultural exporters. In general, cash crops were the main source of revenue in most territories.

Also, the establishment of school in some areas (mostly in the coastal areas) gave some ethnic groups an enviable head-start with western education; thus creating

a gap between those who benefited from the education and those who were regarded as backward because they did not benefit from the western education. Uneven development therefore brought ethnic consciousness: those holding the advantage struggled to retain it, while the unprivileged one fought for equal share of the cake. And this brought the dichotomous “we-they” mentality which existed during the struggle for independence as well as postcolonial era.

Ethnocentrism in one sense is a purely modern creation and connotation. Sandbrook argues that in the pre-colonial era the sense of shared identity and interest that defines the term was often absent and non-existent (Sandbrook 1982, 51). For example the bitter rivalry between the Kenyan *Luo* and *Kikuyu* or the bitter and unfortunate rivalry that exists between the *Hutu* and *Tutsi* in Rwanda-Burundi or even between *Nanumba* and *Kokomba* in Northern Ghana is severally a twentieth-century phenomenon. In fact, prior to imperial manipulation, in the case of Kenya, neither constituted a distinct ethnic group. Instead they saw themselves as localized agricultural communities who spoke a mutually intelligible *Bantu* language and shared common cultural beliefs and practices such as female and male circumcision. The point is that colonial rule fulfilled three conditions which, consciously or unconsciously, fostered tribal consciousness of African people (at least among the Luo and Kikuyu): the cultural-linguistic grid of district administration, uneven development and African political competition. In all, it is noted that despite the many changes that were introduced, post-Independence African bureaucracies continued to function according to the logic of their colonial inheritance.

Neo-Colonialism: Definition, History and Structure

The most drastic account of domination from abroad on Africa is found in theories of international dependency or, in Africanist vocabulary, neo-colonialism. According to the understanding of this approach, the evolving interests of capital at the core of the global economy is either entirely blocked or permanently subordinated (Rodney 1992, 16.)

On the cause of Africa's position in the global market, the opinions of some political and economic analysts differ. Some writers such as Irving Markovitz argued that Africa's emergent bourgeoisie was a political class that owned its control of economic means to the occupancy of the state office (Markovitz 1997, 45). Others drew attention to the point that dependent states, such as Africa, display weak organisational capacities to confront the developed countries in the global market (Gutkind 1996, 77).

While some neo-Marxist scholars argue that, upon independence, national development was not the top priority of the African political class, of which the root of underdevelopment could be traced, others content that “development dictatorship” was the political regime that was common in the neo-colonial Africa and therefore responsible for Africa’s underdevelopment because with such system development cannot take place (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, 28).

But whatever be the case, it will not be denied that international factors clearly impinge on the formation, consolidation and the development of African states, as intend to argue in this section. Kwame Nkrumah opens the first chapter of his book, *Neo-colonialism*, by seeing Africa as a paradox that illustrates and highlights neo-colonialism to the core. His argument: “all the products that come from above and below the soil continue to enrich, not Africans predominantly, but groups and individuals who operate to Africa’s impoverishment” (Kwame Nkrumah 1970, 1). In using the word “neo-colonialism” then, Nkrumah was actually right when he used it to cover all the activities of the former imperial powers operating in their formal colonies after the independence. And today in Africa, likewise in any other developing countries, new-colonialism even “flourishes as never before.” (*West Africa Magazine* 2002, 24) This is to say that Western domination over Africa, which is reinforced by international institutions, is as strong as ever. What Nkrumah said as early as 1965 still lives among Africa today? In the introduction to his book, *Neo-colonialism*, Nkrumah, writes:

The neo-colonialism of today represents imperialism in its final and perhaps its most dangerous state. ...Old-fashioned colonialism is by no means entirely abolished. It still constitutes an African problem, but it is everywhere on the retreat ... In place of colonialism as the main instrument of imperialism we have today neo-colonialism. The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. [But] in reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside (Nkrumah 1970, 1).

The institutions that direct Africa’s economic system and political policy are referred to by Guy Arnold as “our old friends, the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, the EU and sometimes the United Nations and the Commonwealth, the *International Finance Corporation and the International Development Association*” (*West Africa Magazine* 2002, 24). All these organisations and associations are significantly having US capital as their major backing. Arnold argues that despite the efforts by Africa, the

former metropolitan powers and USA have managed over the years to fashion these institutions to perpetuate their control over the economically weak countries. These major powers, he argues further, continue manipulating Africa to their ends while “pretending to help the continent overcome its formidable problems” (*West Africa Magazine*, 2002, 24). Foremost among the countries that constitute neo-colonialists is USA, which many years ago exercised its power in Latin America; other countries are the so-called developed countries.

Neo-colonial powers impose big tariffs on finished goods from Africa, so that it does not survive in the international market. On visiting the cocoa farm at Nankegi in Ghana's Eastern Region on February 2002, Clare Short, the then Tony Blair's Secretary for International Development, told journalists that Paris was “reluctant to remove barriers that impose huge tariffs on finished goods from Africa” (*West Africa Magazine* 2002, 11). She explained further that although Britain backed the proposal “to remove the barriers, [but] it is a conspiracy from France and the EU to lock Africa into poverty and at the same time Europe preaches free trade” (*West Africa Magazine* 2002, 11). The EU, with its common agricultural policy, ensures that outsiders are kept at bay. Agricultural subsidies to countries within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (including EU member states) amount to \$320 billion a year, an amount which is roughly the equivalence of the entire gross domestic product of Africa. And on this and others, Short declares that “the world is not in the mood to deal with Africa's [problems] at the moment” (*West Africa Magazine* 2002, 11).

Neo-colonialism also takes the form that allows government policies in the neo-colonial state to be secured by payments towards the cost of running the state, by the provision of civil servants in “positions where they can dictate policy, and by monetary control over foreign exchange through the imposition of a banking system controlled by the imperial power (Kwame Nkrumah, 1970). Of all these, the overall result of Neo-colonialism, Nkrumah points out, is that foreign capital will be “used” for exploitation rather than for the development of the less developed parts of the world. Investment under neo-colonialism increases rather than decreases the gap between the rich and the poor countries of the world” (Nkrumah 1970, 239). He proposes that neo-colonial developing world needs to prevent the financial power of the developed countries being used in such a way as to impoverish the less developed ones, because for him, any state that is under neo-colonialism is not the master of its own destiny.

According to Nkrumah, neo-colonialism is the worst form of imperialism, by which he means that neo-colonialism for those who practice it, is simply “power without responsibility”; while for those that suffer from it, neo-colonialism means “exploitation

with redress” (Kwame Nkrumah, 1970). During the old-fashioned colonial era the imperial powers were obliged, at least, to explain and justify their actions at home before taking them abroad for implementation. In the colony people could talk and report back any violent or opposing move made by the colonial representative to the colonial headquarters. In the case of neo-colonialism, no room for such opening was granted. His could also explain why neo-colonialists enjoy postponing social issues that are meant to eliminate the problems of world poverty. Neo-colonialism pretends to be capable of raising the living standards of those to whom it is practised. But the actual fact, as Nkrumah pointed out long ago and at which developing countries still witness, is that the economic object of neo-colonialism “is to keep those standards depressed in the interest of the developed countries” (Nkrumah 1970).

Aid and Trade

The ultimate purpose of development is to expand the capabilities of people, to increase their ability to live long and healthy lives, to enable them to cultivate their talents and interests, and to afford them an opportunity to live in dignity and with self-respect. The means by which this is achieved may be diverse—by increasing the stock of physical capital, introducing new technologies, changing institutions, altering incentives. Equally important, and sometimes more important, are investments in human capital—the provision of education and training, the creation of employment and opportunities to acquire skills while on the job, the provision of primary health care and adequate nutrition, expenditure on research and on seeking out new sources of information (UNDP, 1990).

During the Cold War, unaligned countries of the Third World were seen as potential allies by both the First and Second World. Therefore, the United States and the Soviet Union went to great lengths to establish connections in these countries by offering economic and military support to gain strategically located alliances (e.g., United States in Vietnam or Soviet Union in Cuba or United Kingdom in Africa). By the end of the Cold War, many Third World countries had adopted capitalist or communist economic models and continued to receive support from the side they had chosen. Throughout the Cold War and beyond, the countries of the Third World have been the priority recipients of Western foreign aid and the focus of economic development through mainstream theories such as modernization theory and dependency theory (Brian and Tomlinson, 2003, 307-321).

By the end of the 1960s, the idea of the Third World came to represent countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America that were considered underdeveloped by the West based on a variety of characteristics (low economic development, low life expectancy,

high rates of poverty and disease, etc.). (Wolf, and Leslie 1987, 1311-1327). These countries became the targets for aid and support from governments, NGOs and individuals from wealthier nations. One popular model, known as Rostow's *Stages of Growth*, argued that development takes place in five stages (Traditional Society; Pre-conditions for Take-off; Take-off; Drive to Maturity; Age of High Mass Consumption) (Rostow 1960). Walt Whitman Rostow argued that Take-off was the critical stage which Africa is missing or struggling with. Thus, foreign aid was needed to help kick start industrialization and economic growth in these countries (W W Rostow, 1960).

However, despite decades of receiving aid and experiencing different development models (which have had very little success), African countries' economies are still dependent on developed countries and are deep in debt. There is now a growing debate about why African countries remain impoverished and underdeveloped after all this time. Many argue that the current methods of aid are not working and are calling for reducing foreign aid (and therefore dependency), by replacing it with trade (Griffin 1991, 65). Historically, development and aid have not accomplished the goals they were meant to and currently the global gap between the rich and poor is greater than ever (Sandbrook 1982, 42-43).

Talking about the world economy, the Group of Eight plays an important role. Although the Group of Eight (G-8) can hardly be described as an institution of international governance, the G-8 is the closest thing we have at present to a forum where global economic issues are discussed and policies agreed. This clearly is unsatisfactory. The G-8 is a club of rich countries representing a minority of the world's population. It has no authority or indeed inclination to speak for the rest of the world or take their interests into account.

Compounding the problem of absent or ineffective international institutions are structural features of the world economy that inhibit "trickle down" processes of human betterment. First, there is the high degree of international inequality in the distribution of income. Second, there are enormous differences in the technology available to rich countries and poor countries. Third, there is the relative lack of mobility of labour internationally as compared to the much higher degree of mobility nationally. Thus low income labour is unable to migrate readily from poor countries to rich and thereby ensure, on a global level, that the returns to equivalent skills and efforts are equalized. Fourth, there is at best only a weak tendency for capital to move from rich countries to poor. Most capital movements are from one rich country to another and thus do nothing to spread the benefits of growth to the lowest income people in the lowest income countries. Official development assistance between 1960 and 1985 varied between 1.9 percent of the GDP of developing countries in 1961 and

1962 and 0.8 per cent in 1985. Never of great significance to the developing world, the flow of foreign aid relative to the self-generated resources of developing countries has declined slowly but steadily for over a quarter of a century and is likely to continue to fall for the foreseeable future. Indeed one consequence of the end of the Cold War may be an accelerated decline in aid (Griffin, 1991).

In principle foreign aid could be a major source of capital, fuelling the growth of developing countries and helping to promote human development. Aid in practice however has failed to live up to the expectations of its advocates and disillusionment now is widespread. It is impossible to demonstrate statistically that foreign aid programmes as actually administered have had a positive effect on growth. Nor can one demonstrate that aid has been distributed equitably, the largest amounts per capita going to the poorest countries. Within countries, it cannot be demonstrated that most of the aid had been of direct benefit to poor people. Thus the connection between foreign aid and the human development of poor people is at best tenuous.

Some foreign aid has of course made a net addition to the stock of capital in developing countries and some has added to human capital and thereby contributed to human development. But the evidence now is clear that much foreign aid, once all direct and indirect effects are taken into account, has resulted in an increase in unproductive consumption, the amassing of monetary reserves and capital flight and perhaps in a decline in the productivity of investment. If long term foreign assistance intended to alleviate poverty and promote human and economic development is to have an honourable future, major reforms in how it is provided and used will be necessary.

The most important issue linking human development and international capital revolves around the role of foreign aid. Foreign aid includes the highly concessional loans and outright grants to developing countries from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and other rich countries, channeled both bilaterally and through multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank and the Regional Development Banks. It is often taken for granted that foreign assistance actually assists developing countries. Often, this is not the case. The Committee for Development Planning reflects an emerging consensus when it states that far too much aid serves no developmental purpose but is used instead to promote the exports of the donor country, to encourage the use of (imported) capital-intensive methods of production or to strengthen the police and armed forces of the recipient country (The Committee of Development Planning 1990, 38).

Of serious consequence is that if genuine loan is given, the obvious high rate

that is attached to it makes it become another form of neo-colonialism. This was evident when donor countries threaten to cut aids to Africa if homosexuality is not legalised. Reacting to the threat by the United Kingdom to cut aid to Ghana if the country failed to recognise the gay right, former president of Ghana, John Atta Mills said the UK could not impose its values on Ghana because homosexuality is against the religious and cultural values of Ghana and he would never legalise homosexuality. Uganda also rejected the threat, with an official accusing the UK of showing a bullying mentality. Reacting to a comment quoted from *The Wall Street Journal* that, even if genuine aid is given, the underdeveloped world has no potential to develop and this would be like “pouring money down a bottomless well, weakening the donor nations without effectively curing the ills of the recipients”, Nkrumah replied that the argument is true in the sense that the less developed world “will not become developed through the goodwill or generosity of the developed powers. It can only become developed through a struggle against the external forces which have a vested interest in keeping it undeveloped” (Nkrumah 1970).

The whole story of ‘aid’ is aptly more than what it might seem to be, for there is other conditions which hedge around it. These financial institutions have the habit of forcing would-be borrowers to submit to various offensive conditions. These conditions include supplying information about their economies and submitting their policies and plans to be reviewed by the World Bank; accepting agency supervision of their use of aid or loans; the conclusion of commerce and navigation treaties; agreements for economic co-operation; the right to meddle in internal finances, including currency and foreign exchange; to lower trade barriers in favour of the donor country’s goods and capital; to protect the interests of private investments; determination of how the fund are to be used; forcing the recipient to set up counterpart funds; to supply raw materials to the donor countries; the use of the majority of such funds to buy goods from the donor nation or use the funds to award contract to the donor nation, and many other conditions (Nkrumah 1970, 243).

Significantly, the only type of ‘aid’ which the neo-colonial masters consider as safe and therefore willing to give is what Nkrumah referred to as “military aid.” According to him, economically advanced countries become generous only, and only, when the less developed countries are brought to a state of economic chaos and misery. The ‘aids’ given will be monitored so that they are ‘properly’ utilized destruction of neo-colonial State–Africa. Concretized in African context today, practically all the territories that are presently fighting have the support of neo-colonial powers, directly or indirectly. The bitter truth here is that the neo-colonial masters are creating market for their products by artificially creating war. This means that the absence of war will result in low supply of weapons and drugs, thereby affecting the suppliers’ economy.

Indeed it has been estimated that the retail value of trade in illegal drugs exceeds international trade in oil and is second only to the weapons trade (LaMond 1991, 3).

A report by the Campaign against the Arms Trade reveals in 1999 that African countries received arms worth £52 million in deals with various British firms, and that this figure was more double in 2000 with £125.5 million deal; the figure continues to increase and it is expected to top extensively in the few years ahead (*West Africa Magazine* 2002, 25). So what is given as 'aid' is not but a way of promoting their market. Or, as it has been argued that the supplying of ammunitions and drugs to Africa is another way of exploiting the continent of its rich mineral resource: the supply of weapon to RUF in Sierra Leone, for example, would be exchanged with diamond; the same thing applied to UNITA in Angola, which had greatly enjoyed the support of USA to fight against the former Marxist-Leninist regime, and host of many countries in Africa today (Sandbrook 1995, 101). As one economist remarks: "it is pleasant to feel that you are helping your neighbours, and at the same time increasing your own profits" (Benharm 1991, 56). It is worthwhile to note that the technique used by the foreign power is to supply "money, aircraft, military equipment of all kinds, and the strategic and tactical command from General Staff down to officer 'advisers', while the troops of the puppet government bear the brunt of the fighting" (Nkrumah 1970, 243).

While agreeing that much aid in the past has been wasted, there is evidence that when donor and recipient act responsibly, foreign aid can indeed be of benefit. The first thing that needs to be done is to depoliticize aid by bringing it under the control of a supranational authority operating under clearly defined and agreed principles. These principles should include both the mobilization and allocation of aid funds. It may be too much to expect that the leading donor countries would agree to channel all foreign assistance through a supranational authority, but it should be possible to reach agreement to channel most foreign aid through such an authority while leaving individual countries free to supplement multilateral assistance with bilateral programmes if they wish to do so. This would not be a radical departure from present practice although it would change the balance decisively in favour of multilateral assistance. By and large, Africa, through its African Union (AU) should learn how to be "able to resist unfavourable term imposed by WTO, offer information and support to individual countries as well as initiate development" (*Daily Graphic*, 2002, 7).

Monopoly and Privatization

The emergence of neo-colonialism in Africa brings about the emergence of monopolies and the consequent limitation in free enterprise competition associated

with pre-monopoly capitalism. The monopolies that dominate the economy of the neo-colonial societies of Africa are basically foreign multinational companies. They are usually giant enterprises which operate in various countries and produce various complementary products at the same time (Okwudiba 1996, 67). Notable among the companies, operating in Nigeria for example, are Gold oil, Mobil oil, Shell oil, Dumez, Julius Berger Construction Company, Sanyo Electronics, Peugeot Automobile, Pfizer, etc. With this consideration, it is argued, Africa contributes greatly to the development of Western countries through the profits that are made in Africa by these multinational companies and then repatriate to Europe to create new enterprises, jobs etc, thus leading to development (Okwudiba 1996, 68).

Also the advanced capitalist nations ensure that most of “the trade of the African countries are with them, that the major adversary of these countries, the communist powers, share very minimally in this trade, that the aid and monetary transactions of African countries are with the advanced western powers, that the ethnic, rules, regulations and procedure for the conduct of business activities follow the lines laid down during the colonial era and which favour the West” (Okwudiba 1996, 67-68). At last, it is obvious that African countries find it extremely difficult to escape being within the western camp in the global struggle between the opposing social systems. Rating it to his vision on African unity, Nkrumah contends that the developing small states need to combine efforts together otherwise they will “be compelled to sell their primary products at prices dictated by the developed nations and buy their manufactured goods at the prices fixed by them (Nkrumah 1970). He argues further that as long as the neo-colonialism can prevent political and economic conditions for optimum development, the Third World countries, either under neo-colonialist control or not, will not be able to create a large enough market to support industrialization. More so, they will lack the financial capacity to force the developed countries to accept their primary product at a fair price.

The pressures upon African countries to conform to economic criteria set by the West continue unabated. Such conditions such as that Africa “must privatize to qualify for aid; they must improve their human right record; they must allow Western organizations to monitor their elections; they must be democratic in the Western multiparty tradition” (*West Africa Magazine* 2002, 24). The West insists upon these conditions as though only calamity must be the alternative; and yet throughout the now almost forgotten Cold War such conditionalities were rarely mentioned and never enforced. Tanzania has, for example, has almost privatized its 400 parastatal corporations, with the result that outside investors are beginning to return and the country “has become the blue-eyed boy of the IMF” (*West Africa Magazine* 2002, 24).

Okwudiba deals with one of the most preferred instruments of state economic policy in the sixties, seventies, and eighties, which are state owned enterprises (Okwudiba 1999). Basing his focus on the countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in East Africa, Okwudiba traces the origins of state enterprises in East Africa to the colonial period, and the colonial state. The sector underwent tremendous expansion after independence. Reasons for this expansion are many and varied including economic nationalism, ideology, and capital cost minimisation for transitional corporations. A review of their performance reveals a mixed picture with many of them experiencing serious structural, managerial and operational problems. Together with Asfaw Kimssa, they both agree that solutions to most of the problems including privatization have not been easy to implement. Kimssa goes further to say that privatization will cause denationalization of the African economies, excessive capital outflows, high unemployment and increasing inequality and justice (Kimssa 1999, 66).

Mamadou Dia echoes the observations of the World Bank study on adjustment in Africa, which claim that adjustment supported policy reforms in African countries have generally been more successful in improving their macroeconomics than their public and financial sectors. He goes on to argue that “the social, economic and political crisis of post independence sub-Saharan Africa can be largely attributed to a crisis of institutions, resulting from a structural disconnect between the indigenous institutions and management practices characterizing civil society, and modern institutions and governance” (Mamadou, 1999, 66). He argues further that this disconnection has created a “crisis of legitimacy and accountability that affect governance and the performance of public administration, as well as the development of an indigenous private sector and African entrepreneurship” (Mamadou, 1999, 67). It could be added that recognizing Africa’s crisis as one of institutions, demands changes on all fronts. Indigenous institutions must be willing to initiate change and move away from conservatism toward innovation.

Globalization

There is scarcely anybody in Africa who would talk of the last 300 years, including the periods from 1957 when Ghana for instance gained independence, in language flattering either to colonialism or to governments that have taken over power since political independence. World Bank and IMF officials who see wrong only in the policies of African governments choose to forget that their own fingers have written the various documents on which these policies—from important substitution to now export orientation—were based. It is also a measure of their intellectual dishonesty, or ideological brainwashing, says Yash Tandon, that they cannot see the connection between globalisation and Africa’s poverty (Yash, 1999, 9).

For example, much of the discussion about the scourge of HIV/AIDS in Africa was centred on the availability of anti-retroviral drugs. These drugs were prohibitively expensive for most Africans if purchased from the major Northern pharmaceutical companies, but might be cheaper if imported from India or Brazil. But whether expensive or cheap—that is, whether life or death determinative for Africans—depended in our globalised world of today on the policies and decisions of the World Trade Organization and its most powerful member states, which, of course, are the headquarters of the major pharmaceutical industries. “Globalization” is one of the most widely used and least clearly defined of the terms in political and economic discourses today.

We shall use the term “globalization” to refer to the phenomenon of increasing integration of nation states through economic exchanges, political configurations, technological advances and cultural influences, which are the integrating factors of globalisation today.

Economic exchange includes cross-border trade in goods and services, capital flows and financial investments. Today almost three trillion US dollars moves around the world every day, seeking not the best production but the best return on speculation. Of the one hundred largest economic entities in the world, fifty of them are nation states and fifty are transitional corporations (CAFOD Briefing Paper, December 2000, 15).

Political configurations are the new or renewed structures of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation, the blocs of the European Community, the North American Free Trade Area, etc. These are not democratically elected governments but have considerably more power than any such governments. For example, the expanded “trade related” mandate of the WTO now touches areas like intellectual property, employment policies, environmental regulations, etc.

Technological advances include the rapidly growing utilization of electronic communications (phone, internet—e-mail, Facebook, Twitter, Viber, WhatsApp, etc) and the increasing ease of transportation. We live in an information age, we live in a “borderless age,” we live in a very fast age.

Cultural influences are obvious in the “westernization” of so much of popular culture in music, clothes, life styles, etc. As of 2005, the single largest export industry for the United States is not aircrafts, automobiles, computers, but entertainment—Hollywood films and television programmes (UNDP, 2006, 33).

The structures that are the foundations of globalisation as we experience it today, and that guide its future development, are important to identify. Here let us speak of only a few of the more important structures and then identify their impact on Africa.

Globalization as currently experienced is, in its major direction, an incarnation of neo-liberalism (Latin American Provincials of the Society of Jesus 2007, 281). In its extreme, this ideology is a kind of “economic fundamentalism” that puts an absolute value on the operation of the market and subordinate people’s lives, the function of society, the policies of government and the role of the state to this unrestricted free market. Neo-liberal policies support economic growth as an end in itself and use macro-economic indicators as the primary measurements of a healthy society. It assumes almost a religious character, as greed becomes a virtue, competition a commandment, and profit a sign of salvation. Dissenters are dismissed as non-believers at best, and heretics at worst. Problems with the operation of this ideology—even such massive problems as the collapses experienced a few years ago in Asian economies—are seen not as “mortal sins” but as mere “falls from grace” that deserve more penitential practice of the exercises that are demanded by the ideology (Mihevc, 2005, 21-42).

Even before trade in basic goods and services, by far the largest component of globalization is the movement of money across borders. This is disconnected capital, institutionally managed money that moves with the speed of a mouse click on a computer, putting money into a situation for quick return, pulling it out equally speedily for a safe return. The severe problems experienced by the “Asian Tigers” were largely due to the rapid and uncontrolled movement of capital (Mihevc, 2005, 21-42).

Trade is usually under the guidance of the creed of “free trade.” Because of the technological advances in communications and transportation, goods produced in one country move rapidly into other countries, frequently disrupting traditional productive patterns in the second country. One can think simply of the decline in the automobile industry in the United States because of the competition from Japan and China. Trade relationships may be “free” but whether or not they are “fair” depends on factors of power, size, experience, skills, etc. And in our world of today, these factors are very a-symmetrical.

We all have heard of, indeed, experienced, “cultural imperialism,” the imposition of values and styles of life by dominant forces. One commentator has referred to the contemporary process of globalization as the birth of the “McWorld” — a cultural integration of fast music (MTV), fast computers (MacIntosh) and fast food (McDonald’s) (Benjamin Barber, 2012, 24). Cultural imperialism is not a

new phenomenon, but it assumes alarming proportions when driven by the new technologies and profit propensities of the dynamics of globalization. A Jesuit economist, Xabier Gorostiaga, refers to the “predominance of geo-culture over the geo-political and the geo-economic” (Xabier 2006, 9). Traditional cultural values such as family, community, respect for life, hospitality, etc., come into strong confrontation and do losing battle with the values communicated through Western music, movies, videos, cable and satellite television, advertisements, and the idolized figures of entertainment and sports.

With the end of the Cold War, there has been a significant change in the geo-political structures shaped by the East-West conflict. A bi-polar world has given way to a design for a “New World Order.” But the political dimensions of this new order are themselves subject to the economic influences of available markets, accessible resources, and technological arrangements etc. The point made several years ago by Pope John XXXIII, that development of global economic relationships has outstripped the development of political governance structures to promote the global common good, (Pope John XXXIII 1963, 135-136) is more than ever true today.

We may be familiar with the expression, the “champagne glass economy,” a picture of the globe emerging from the UNDP Human Development Reports that the richest 20% of the world's population receives 86% of global income, while the poorest 20% receives just 1%. (UNDP 2006, 3). This is a picture of the globe in which the huge majority occupies only the narrowest stem of the glass while the tiny rich minority enjoys the broad bowl of affluence. In this champagne glass, we all know where the majority of Africans fit! The assets of the three richest people are more than the combined GNP of all the least developed countries; the assets of the 200 richest people are more than the combined income of 41% of the world's people; a yearly contribution of 1% of the wealth of the 200 richest people could provide universal access to primary education for all (UNDP 2006, 38). Is globalization then good for Africa's future? Not in its present form that has been exaggerating the gap between Africa and the so-called developed world.

Second, the current structuring of globalisation creates an increasing marginalization of Africa in the very process of integrating it into the global economy. For there is a stark disparity between rich and poor in the global opportunities offered in trade, investment and technologies. This marginalization has increased dramatically in recent past, and shows no signs of decreasing. As the UNDP 2006 Report commented:

Some have predicted convergence. Yet the past decade has shown increasing concentration of income, resources and wealth among people, corporations and countries....

All these trends are not the inevitable consequences of global economic integration – but they have run ahead of global governance to share the benefits (UNDP 2006, 3).

A third observation deals with the growing environmental threat to Africa. This comes from a particularly disturbing aspect of globalization, the phenomenon of global warming. As it were, this phenomenon is caused mostly by carbon dioxide emissions from automobiles, power plants and industries that are, of course, most heavily concentrated in the so-called developed countries. Most pollution in the world is caused by economic activities in the developed countries, (Walley 2001, 182.) but the developing countries can be expected increasingly to add to the problem as their economies become ever more industrialized and urbanized and as their agriculture comes to rely more and more on chemical based technologies. Greater consciousness in rich countries of the hazards to health of some industrial processes and greater concern about the deterioration of the environment have led them to impose relatively strict health, safety, waste disposal and environmental regulations. One response has been an attempt to shift to poor countries the costs of industrialization in the rich ones. Examples include efforts to dispose of contaminated nuclear waste in developing countries, shipments of urban generated garbage to developing countries (such as the chemical factory that exploded and caused death, blindness and intense suffering in Bhopal, India). While it would be wrong to oppose transfers of economic activities from rich countries to poor, or to impose identical health, safety and environmental standards worldwide, it would be equally wrong to condone an economic system under which what is unacceptable in the back yards of the rich is dumped unceremoniously in the front yards of the poor.

According to the United Nations Environmental Programme, the effects and impacts of global warming in Africa is frightening, with the rising levels of disease, famine and poverty.

According to Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) global warming will condemn millions to hunger as crops decline in Asia and Africa. Prof. Robert Winston, one time World Bank Chief Scientist and Chairman of IPCC, noted that the earth is getting warmer than at any other time during the last 10,000 years. He echoed that global warming is now the greatest threat to mankind, but singled out Africa as the lowest rate of emissions. But then, “sub-Saharan Africa, along with low-lying small Island states in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, are the most vulnerable to climate change because widespread poverty limits their capabilities to adapt to a continuing changing climate” (*West Africa magazine* 2001, 11). We have had clear proof of that with the former USA president, President George Bush’s blunt rejection

of the Kyoto Protocol agreements to limit harmful emissions. Reports show that USA is the highest pollution of the environment (*West Africa magazine* 2001, 11).

But as unsuccessful globalisation might appear to be in Africa, however, it could still work perfectly and be of benefit to Africa if it is modified. On this ground, Peter J. Henriot, suggests what he calls *Alternatives to Globalisation*. (Peter J. Henriot, Edward P. DeBerri, and Michael J. Schulthesis, 1992). To this, Peter Henriot suggests a three-fold path *globalisation of solidarity, globalisation of concern and globalisation from below*.

Modernization and Dependency Theories

Modernisation and dependency are theories which specify the concept of development. These theories reveal valid explanations for both development and underdevelopment of developed and developing countries. According to Matunhu, modernisation is about Africa following the developmental footsteps of Europe (largely the former coloniser of Africa) (Matunhu 2011, 65-72). He expounds that, according to modernity, policies intended to raise the standard of living of the poor often consist of disseminating knowledge and information about more efficient techniques of production. On his part, Mar defines modernisation as a process of transforming from traditional or underdeveloped society to a modern western societies way of life (M. S. Mar, 2008). From the definitions, modernisation is a developmental process which was derived from the steps followed by western countries when they were doing their development.

As a compliment to modernisation is dependency. Dependency is a historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favours some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economics so much that it presents a situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy (Ferraro 2008). From the definition, dependency theory attempts to explain the present underdeveloped state of many nations in the world by examining the patterns of interactions among nations and by arguing that inequality among nations is an intrinsic part of those interactions. In this respect, it is possible to refer to Modernization theory and Dependency theory which, being quite different, still have certain similarities in their views on the modern world and relationships between developed and developing countries. Also they aim to explain development but using different angles.

Modernization theorist Rostow reveals that, modernization theory has five major stages that a traditional society has to pass through to become a modern society.

In this theory it is assumed that all countries pass through these stages in order for them to reach a stage of being developed. Therefore, the Rostowian theory (named after its inventor, Walt Whitman Rostow) identifies these five stages which the less developed has to follow.

Firstly it is the *Primitive Society Stage* which is characterised by subsistence farming and barter trade. The Second is the *Preparation for Take-off* which is characterised by specialization, production of surplus goods and trade. Transport infrastructure is developed to support trade. In addition the stage encourages savings and investment. The third state is the *Take-off Stage* where industrialization increases and the economy switches from agriculture to manufacturing. The fourth stage is regarded as the *Drive to Maturity* where the economy diversifies into new areas and there is less reliance on imports. And the last stage is *Period of Mass Consumption* where the economy gears on mass production and service sector becomes increasingly dominating. In general, modernization led to the introduction of hybrids, the green house technology, genetically modified (GMO) food, use of artificial fertilizers, insecticides, tractors and the application of other scientific knowledge to replace traditional agricultural practices (Matunhu 2011, 66)

According to Sharmila dependency theory is the relationship between two or more countries assumes the form of independence when some (dominant ones) can do this as reflection of the expansion. Therefore the relationship between these countries is not equal. The dependency theory views developing countries as is politically conservative because they view developing countries as undeveloped because they lack the qualities that developed nations have. Moreover dependency theory states that, there is the core, semi periphery and the periphery. The core consists of developed countries, semi periphery is the newly industrialized countries like Brazil and the peripheries are developing countries (Sharmila 2008, 34).

Dos Santos as well as Rodney agree that since dependency assumes that development depends on the relationship between center and the periphery where the center or the core are the first world and developed nations while the periphery refers to the third world and developing states, dependent states, therefore, should attempt to pursue policies of self-reliance to avoid unfair relationship between the periphery and core. This is based on the argument that, Africa deprived by Europe of political and economic decision power, and lacking sustained investment funds, trod the reverse path, and then sinking deeper and deeper into non development and poverty (Matunhu 2011, 66).

As Matunhu reveals, Modernization impoverished Africa through colonialism and imperialism by the West and this trend is with us today as the East takes its turn

to deplete the continent's resources such as oil and minerals. Africa needs to outgrow poverty and underdevelopment but this, according to him, may not be possible as long as we still believe in the power and strength of modernity at the expense of promoting new theories for Africa's development (Matunhu 2011, 70). Modernization and Dependency theory stand on the ground that Western countries are the world leaders due to their higher level of development, which affects practically all spheres of life, including economic, political, social, and even cultural life. As a result, there exist a strong link between developed and developing countries. This may be true in the sense that, the modernisation theory mentions the development gap between developing and undeveloped countries by revealing that, developing countries must go through various stages to reach fifth stage of high consumption where the developed countries are found. Also dependency theory reveals the gap by postulating that, there are developing countries which are found at the periphery and developed countries at the core. This clearly shows that both theories acknowledge a development gap between developing and developed countries (Matunhu 2011, 70).

Both Modernization and Dependency theories underline that the relationships between developed and developing countries is unequal and there exists a kind of dependence of developing countries on developed ones. Also, both theories underline the dominant position of Western countries in the modern world and leave little room for the alternative ways of the development but the western one, which is viewed as the only way of the development of the future world in the context of the global economy. It is worthy of mention that both theories are ethnocentric in a way because they practically ignore the possibility of the alternative development of developing countries but, instead they insist that the development of western countries will still be on top! (Matunhu 2011).

So, poverty in the Third World is not 'traditional' or accidental. It is a necessary companion to the richness of the developed world. The expansion of the industrial world deformed the rest of the world. Joshi Sharmila, historian Eric Williams, for example, argues that the slave trade between Africa and the Caribbean islands was responsible for the emergence of a commercial middle class in Britain and eventually for Britain's industrial revolution. Slaves were taken from Africa to the Caribbean; their unpaid and coerced labour produced such profitable commodities as sugar or cotton, which were taken to Europe for huge profits. This provided the conditions for 'take-off' for Britain's industrial revolution (Sharmila 2008, 40).

These examples show the dependency approach: the actual creation of underdevelopment at the cost of development. West African societies were uprooted by centuries of the slave trade; in the Caribbean the plantation system (set up to meet

the needs of the colonists) met no local needs and impoverished workers. Mines in the Third World produced bauxite, tin, iron and other metals and minerals for the industries of the West. All of this depended on cheap indentured or slave labour. Many of the regions of the world were left with skewed, impoverished economies and devastated populations while the now-developed countries gained prosperity.

Matunhu, Ellis and Biggs suggest that underdeveloped states need to design policies which are meant to raise the standard of living of the poor which consist of disseminating knowledge and information about more efficient techniques of production. Modernisation agriculture process which includes encouraging farmers to try new crops, new production methods and new marketing skills be viewed as a good example. This is because modernisation is about exchanging of older agriculture practices with something more recent (Sharmila 2008, 85).

Poverty reduction policies and strategies have tended to be influenced by the theories of development. Modernistic polices and strategies tend to be top-down in approach. They see development of Africa as the responsibility of the metropolitan states. Thus, development strategies and finances are produced, packaged and sent to Africa by the economically powerful states. The beneficiaries of development support are usually marginalised. The dependency theory attributes rural poverty to the continuous pillage of human and nonhuman resources from the satellite to the metropolis. The same pattern is discernable between the modern and the traditional communities. The underdevelopment of Africa is indeed a result of cultural collision between two different development spheres – the West and Africa. The former, because of its strategic and technological advantage over Africa, it was able to choke and subdue Africa's culture and value system. In the process, Africa lost its right to determine its way to development. To develop, then, Africa needs to detach itself from the western mentality of modernisation and dependency. Thinking that, by destiny, Africa is designed to perpetually depend on the West for survival (dependency), and that if it must develop at all, it must follow the western style of development (modernisation).

Conclusion

As a parenthetical conclusion, there is the need to reaffirm that Africa has experienced four stages of outside penetration on the continent by forces which have had negative social consequences on the African people's integral development. This outside penetration has occurred over the past five hundred years as argued: Firstly, as slavery, during which the continent's most precious resources, African women and men were stolen away by global traders for the benefits of Arab, European

and American countries. Secondly, as *colonialism*, when British, French, Belgium, Portuguese, Italian and German interests dictated the way that map-boundaries were drawn, transportation and communication lines were established, agricultural and mineral resources were exploited, and religious and cultural patterns were introduced.

Thirdly, as *neo-colonialism*, the form taken by outside political pressures and economic forces that set trade patterns, investment policies, debt arrangements, technology introductions, political alliances, etc. Fourthly, as globalization characterized by the attachment and integration of the economies of the world through trade and financial flows, technology and information exchanges, and the movement of people.

On the forefront are the issues of modernization and dependency. Modernization advocates that if Africa must develop it must follow the pattern of the developed world. In other words, if the developed world did A, B, C, D, to succeed, Africa too must follow suit by doing the same A, B, C, D. But this theory forgets that Africa is a unique entity with unique characteristics. Meaning that what works for the Western world may not necessarily work for Africa. Dependence theory thinks that the perennial poverty in Africa is as a result of her continual dependence on the Western world for survival. The Western world would also want this to continue because the advancement of Africa means economic imbalance in the developed world. This historical situation dates back to the slave trade, and still living among Africa up to this moment. But the identification of these problems does not mean that Africa in general does not contribute to her problems. This article however serves as a sequel for studies into the internal forces against Africa's democracy and development.

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COUNTRY FUNDAMENTALS AS A FORM OF MARKET SELF-REFERENTIALITY

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Abstract

The origin of the Eurozone crisis lies neither in unsustainable borrowing nor in arbitrary demands of creditors. Rather, its origin lies in the effects of seemingly arcane technicalities to which sovereign debt issuance is subject. To show this, this paper proposes a set of terms equipped to analyze the effects of these minuscule technicalities. The notion of country fundamentals could be replaced with that of a fundamental to show that a country is not subject to market assessment when borrowing, but rather subject to market lending pressures forcing it to adopt certain policies even in the absence of outright imposition. Moreover, the paper argues for the notions of flow-stock conversion and liquidity-solvency conversion. The former allows the conversion of sovereign debt as a fiscal instrument to sovereign debt as an asset, thus embedding it into sovereign debt market dynamics. These, in turn, play out as pressure upon the country through the liquidity-solvency conversion turning portfolio restructurings into fiscal solvency shortages. Finally, the paper analyzes countries as intra-market hedges and extra-market hedges to illustrate the extent of market pressures upon countries: to recapitalize banks, countries need to issue more debt, doubling down on the pressure from the liquidity-solvency conversion.

Keywords: *Country Fundamentals; Eurozone Crisis; Flow-Stock Conversion; Liquidity-Solvency Conversion; Sovereign Debt and Sovereignty*

Introduction

With the recent troubles facing Greece, threatening its membership in the Eurozone, it has come to be reinforced that the Eurozone crisis is here to stay (Wearden and Fletcher 2015). To most, the origin and duration of the crisis are explained by the recklessness of European peripheral governments – particularly Greece – whose unwillingness to reform, sustained prior to 2009 by a corresponding market willingness to lend regardless, has now come to threaten to structural integrity of the Eurozone itself (ECB 2010; Belke 2011). Others have criticized this approach, arguing that the Eurozone crisis is a crisis of growth, originating on bank balance sheets and protracted by austerity (Shambaugh 2012; Blyth 2015).

This paper positions itself between the two approaches, albeit closer to the latter. I argue that the origin of the Eurozone crises lies neither in governments' fiscal practices as such, nor in deliberate actions of European banks. Sweeping claims from both sides – morally pernicious recklessness of Southern European governments; a 'bait-and-switch' by the European banking system (Blyth 2015: 73) – are equally problematic. I maintain that a nuanced and precise discussion of the political effects contained in sovereign debt technicalities exposes more about the origins of the Eurozone crisis than sweeping claims from either side.

By the same token, I propose in this paper a terminology which I maintain is better equipped than that of critical or mainstream views on the crisis to expose the minuscule power effects contained in sovereign debt technicalities. These create a political dynamic to which both creditors and debtors are subject – though the latter, to be sure, to a more substantial extent. The given terminology of studies on sovereign debt ('moral hazard', 'contagion', 'time horizons', 'fundamentals', and so forth) cannot be used because it suggests the exact opposite of what I aim to show: namely, that the legal and economic conditions of sovereign debt issuance are indeed a wholly apolitical affair.

This paper therefore introduces and discusses three sets of terms, building upon one another to gradually expose the full extent of what is contained in supposedly minuscule technicalities on European primary and secondary sovereign debt markets. In the first section, I criticize what I call here the 'representational perspective' in which sovereign bond interest rates are set by markets in reaction to the economic soundness of sovereigns, i.e., to country fundamentals (debt-to-GDP ratio, inflation, productivity indexes, and so forth). I concur with the literature that certain phenomena on sovereign debt markets – particularly so-called 'flights' from one asset class to another – are not sufficiently explained by this representational

notion. Neither do I agree that they constitute arbitrariness on the side of the creditors, however – as is sometimes argued (e.g., LiPuma and Lee 2004). Rather, I argue that a technicality is at work here. Sovereign debt works in two distinct ways: as a fiscal instrument for the debtor, and as an asset for the creditor. I argue that the latter requires markets to subject debtors to what I call the flow-stock conversion. As a fiscal instrument, sovereign bonds are issued as a promise to be repaid. As an asset, however, this repayment must be assumed to be guaranteed. Countries are therefore, when subject to market lending, operationalized by the demands of this lending in a precise technical form. They come to be shaped by the demands of debt repayment – not in an arbitrary form, but precisely along the lines imposed upon them by the asset function of their bonds. Countries are therefore converted into what I propose to call fundamentals.

In the second section, I continue the analysis by arguing that the power mechanism by which countries are converted into fundamentals is once again less arbitrary than critics assume. Its precise form is what I call a liquidity-solvency conversion, by which liquidity withdrawals from a certain asset class – sovereign bonds of specific countries or country groups – come to be converted to solvency problems. Mark Blyth is right, I maintain, in saying that the Eurozone crisis was not due to country spending, but liquidity withdrawals – yet, the precise form of these withdrawals indicates less arbitrariness and more technicality than he assumes (2015: 51-94). In the third section, I extend the implications of the concepts proposed here to the notion of crisis itself: the pre-2008 boom and post-2008 bust of European liquidity is neither a question of governmental excess, nor of market irrationality. I argue that it is rather due to a structural oscillation in the relation described here as country-fundamental conversion, and that this oscillation is not significantly explained within the crisis/normality paradigm. Fundamentals, as proposed here, are wholly internal to sovereign debt markets, which is to say that no aberration from normality – no crisis – can be discerned.

Flow-Stock Conversion

In this first section, I reconstruct the internal logic of sovereign bonds as an asset class, and observe their relation to sovereign debtors and creditors: the issuing country and its financiers. On the one hand, sovereign bonds are usually interpreted to be representational instruments: sovereign bond interest rates are set by markets in reaction to the country's economic fundamentals (Eaton 1993: 141). Thus, the present section examines the representational perspective of sovereign bonds. I show here, however, that this perspective is in fact the reverse of how sovereign bonds actually work. Sovereign bond issuance serves to finance government policies,

whose economic effects in turn influence country fundamentals (ibid: 140-141). Moreover, “[t]he existing literature is unanimous in finding that spreads of euro area government bond markets reflect liquidity and credit risks, and are mainly driven by a common factor,” an “international risk aversion.” (Manganelli and Wolswijk 2009: 194) This means that market lending can be said to have an influence on country fundamentals, shedding doubt on the representational perspective.

First, markets lend expecting repayment, thus reducing policies to their fiscal impacts and thus to likelihoods of continued debt service prioritization. In the Eurozone in particular, it has been found that “credit markets (...) exert disciplinary pressure on governments with a shift [after EMU, S.E.] to debt-service ratio as the most relevant measure of creditworthiness.” (Lo Conte 2009: 363; cf. Belke 2011) Second, market lending transposes actual or observed economic fundamentals to projected performances, inferring sovereign debt risk premia from these projections (Eaton 1993: 166-169; Eichengreen 2003: 87). Risk premia denote interest rate mark-ups relative to the interest rates demanded for a benchmark bond – in Europe, usually Germany’s 10 year bond (Lo Conte 2009: 353). Finally, market lending influences fundamentals by rearranging governmental stakeholders, often turning government official’s attention from one set of national or domestic stakeholders to another, or to an international level. Stiglitz (2010: 36) characterizes the multi-tiered stakeholder structure of sovereign bonds as the decisive aspect in the match or mismatch between legal and political aspects of sovereign debt.

Uniting these perspectives is a prioritization of the asset function of sovereign debt (its role on creditor portfolios) over their fiscal function (financing the debtor’s government). In the European context, the goal of the transposition of country policies to sovereign bond interest rates is for the bonds to perform as debt securities on banks’ portfolios (Lo Conte 2009: 341-342). European sovereign debt securities are assets eligible to be held as tier 1 positions under Basel II regulations as incorporated in the European context by the European Capital Requirements Directives CRD III (up to 2013) and CRD IV. Such tier 1 capital ensures that a financial actor – in this case: a bank – can covering a sufficient amount of operative losses before requiring a bailout (Moseley 2013: 653). In a leveraged operation, a financial actor holds only a fraction of the capital advanced – by a factor called ‘leverage ratio’ and specifically defined by the European Banking Authority (BIS 2013) – while borrowing the remainder from other financial actors. Since repayment of the latter funds depends on the outcome of the investment, only the former is safe in case of a market downturn. Assets belonging to the tier 1 capital category therefore have to be particularly safe to guarantee the basic existence and well-being of the financial actor. Designating them as tier 1 capital therefore means, from a

regulatory perspective, that any sovereign bond held by a bank is eligible to be used as collateral in a leveraging operation (cf. Epstein and Habbard 2013: 330).

However, this function depends on a crucial presupposition: sovereign bonds, which in reality are a flow of payments from the debtor country to its creditors, to be considered a stock. This is a temporal transposition. Sovereign bond purchases by creditors depend on “the extent that government default is anticipated.” (Guerreri et al. 2012: 188) By virtue of this anticipation, the flow of sovereign debt repayments is converted to a stock for the purposes of sovereign debt as an asset. This flow-stock conversion converts actual into projected payment flows. The expectation by which sovereign bonds can perform their role as stable assets – as tier 1 capital – is that repayment by their issuer, the debtor country, is guaranteed. This seems reasonable since the issuer is a sovereign entity (Eaton 1993: 140). The sovereignty of the debtor allows investors to expect it to exercise its coercive powers to tax or, at least, to invoke its credit ratings to borrow internally (Mundell 1996: 77, 110; Panizza 2010: 91-107). For this reason, sovereign bonds can serve as tier 1 assets: it is reasonable to assume their stock function to be fulfilled at all times.

By the same token, however, repayment depends to a certain extent on the willingness of country officials to prioritize debt servicing – or even to repay debt at all (Eaton 1993: 166). Indeed, one of the aspects of sovereign borrowing most often discussed in the literature is that, for lack of enforcement mechanisms, a sovereign default is always just one politician’s moral hazard away (Eichengreen 2003: 93; Panizza et al. 2009: 659). To maintain the flow-stock conversion, then, it is necessary to ensure debt service prioritization. For example, in its second adjustment programme for Greece in 2012, the European Commission stated it “welcomes the intention of the Greek authorities to introduce over the next two months in the Greek legal framework a provision ensuring that priority is granted to debt servicing payments.” (European Commission 2012: 6) At other, perhaps more ‘normal’ times, debt service prioritization is ensured by the threat of cutting the country off capital market access (Eaton 1993: 151-152; Eichengreen 2003: 78-79).

This illustrates that the assumption that sovereign bond interest rates represent the performances and policies of their issuing governments is necessary, however risky its foundations. It allows the flow-stock conversion which in turn allows the use of sovereign bonds as debt securities. It is only because this asset class is issued by a sovereign entity that markets can assume this sovereignty to be exercised to guarantee debt repayment, allowing the projection of this payment flow as a stock. Yet, this means that the country’s sovereignty is structured by an operationalization of the country by creditors. These transpose government policies

onto a different level – changing the stakeholder structure, changing the assessment criteria, changing the benchmark. They introduce phenomena irreconcilable with mere representation. Such phenomena include financial spillovers (Guerreri et al. 2012: 185), influences of “perceived overall financial risk” (Botta 2013: 423), as well as “market sentiment” in interest rate setting (Lo Conte 2009: 344). All of these support the hypothesis of a prioritization of the asset function of sovereign bonds – creditor interest – over their fiscal function – debtor interest.

A brief survey of the literature vindicates the hypothesis. Any country can be subject to demands backed up or possibly enforced by the ever-present possibility of capital flight, i.e., the withdrawal of funds (Eaton 1993: 149; Wolf 2002: 38-52). Backed by this pressure, creditors can demand risk premia (Lo Conte 2009: 346). Markets can also monitor the debtor country’s policies with regard to the likelihood of successful debt servicing (Eaton 1993: 164; Eichengreen 2003: 76). Moreover, creditors have opportunities to hedge against risk – in the case of debt repayments, futures are particularly relevant (Lo Conte 2009: 347). Outside of Europe, this is further reinforced by the denomination of sovereign bonds which, independent of the country of issuance, are usually denominated in U.S. dollars – which poses additional conversion risks and current account pressures for governments servicing their debt, but makes investment and allocation of debt securities easier for international portfolios (ibid: 343). In European sovereign bond markets, the common denomination of debt securities in Euros has the same effect on Southern European countries, as will be discussed below (Lane 2006: 53; Belke 2011: 685; Coeuré 2013). At times, as seen above, this is formally reinforced (European Commission 2012: 6).

Thus, the conversion from sovereign bond repayment flows to their projected guarantee certainly benefits the creditors (Stiglitz 2010: 35-69). The terms by which a sovereign bond is transposed to its asset or stock function are not set by the country issuing the bonds. Neither, however, are they arbitrarily set by creditors. They are a technicality: a transposition of actual to projected performances, expectations, and intertemporal optimization problems (Panizza et al. 2009: 680). Their precise terms – and hence their precise effects – must be examined in more detail.

Fundamental and Liquidity-Solvency Conversion

A closer reading of the flow-stock conversion yields further insights into its more hidden, seemingly mundane and technical effects. To uphold the idea of a representation of a country’s policies and economic growth by sovereign bond interest rates is crucial to the flow-stock conversion, as seen above. More is at stake,

however: namely the effect of sovereign debt technicalities on the sovereignty of countries issuing sovereign bonds. In the flow-stock conversion discussed above, the sovereignty of the debtor country is harnessed as a payment guarantee. Thus, when it issues sovereign debt, a country is thus no longer a sovereign country endowed with the ability to renege on payments and ultimately to default (independent of the consequences of that decision). The priority of the country-market relation is reversed: markets have power as creditors, while a sovereign debtor *country* becomes the fundamental of sovereign *bonds*. I propose to conceptualize this as a *fundamental*, containing both aspects of the flow-stock conversion, as opposed to the notion of country fundamentals.

In the representational perspective, country fundamentals are measurements of actual and projected performances of the economy of the debtor country. These economic measurements – mathematical formulae comprised of coefficients indicating GDP per capita, current account balance, debt relative to GDP, the composition of debt, and future forecasts based on inflation coefficients – indicate the fiscal well-being of the debtor country and hence its riskiness as an investment: its projected ability to repay debt (Panizza et al. 2009: 685 Fn 50). In the stronger sense proposed here, however, fundamentals are more than mathematical formulae. Rather, these formulae have effects upon the country: it comes to be operationalized by its creditors in order to repay its debts. Thus, the mathematical tools ostensibly assessing country fundamentals for interest rate adjustments are in reality effects splitting and transposing the country.

The fundamental restructures its corresponding country to prioritize debt servicing. In turn, this imposes restructuring upon the country. Even when no Troika is involved as in the Greek or Irish cases, the fundamental reorganizes the country to focus on improving specific economic indicators: its growth vis-à-vis its debt/GDP ratio; its socio-economic trajectories such as technological and educational progress vis-à-vis inflation. It does so by subjecting the country to benchmarking – in the European case, benchmarking against Germany (Holman 2004: 715; Manganelli and Wolswijk 2009: 215-216; Pusch 2012: 6). The seemingly arcane technicality of how country fundamentals in the classical sense are assessed thus becomes vitally important politically since its terms are at once the benchmarking targets imposed upon the debtor country through its fundamental.

What the debtor country can do with the funds derived from the fiscal function of debt issuance is thus closely monitored and influenced by its creditors. In an orthodox perspective, close monitoring is necessary since elected officials tend not to prioritize debt servicing (Eaton 1993: 159-160; Mundell 1996: 115).

From a critical perspective, such ‘close monitoring’ is often performed violently, either by outright imposition (as seen above for the Greek case), or by the gyrations of international capital markets (Strange 1998; LiPuma and Lee 2004). This paper takes a middle position: I propose to examine the mechanism behind this using the term *liquidity-solvency conversion*.

To illustrate this, one must consider the concept of ‘contagion’ on primary sovereign bond markets. If the sovereign bond interest rate merely reacted to country fundamentals and their sustenance or depletion by more or less rational elected officials, as the representational perspective claims, contagion between sovereign bonds would be impossible. The fundamentals of one country could not have a direct effect on those of another. Even if they are subject to simultaneous macroeconomic shocks, the interest rates of the countries’ sovereign bonds would *ex hypothesi* move in the same direction, independently. Only when a financial shock occurs in both countries, interest rate co-movement occurs – yet this co-movement has no relation to fundamentals (Manganelli and Wolswijk 2009: 193-194; Guerreri et al. 2012: 184).

Such co-movements in the Eurozone are indeed causally related, as capital moves from riskier Southern European sovereign bonds to less risky German and U.S. bonds (Shambaugh 2012: 216). Prior to 2009, European peripheral current account deficits rose continually (Lane 2006: 53). In the crisis, however, the volume of cross-country financial account movements into GIPSI countries in particular markedly deteriorated, leading to rising interest rates (Nowak 2012: 6). Attributing this to individual country fundamentals assessed by market movements is certainly possible. In the Greek case, this development is due to a steep decline in the service-related balance of payments, dropping by 21 per cent from 2007 to 2008 – largely a result of the extreme focus of the Greek economy on tourism (Visvizi 2012: 18). However, financial account movements were similar for all peripheral European countries (Lo Conte 2009: 344; Pusch 2012: 2). This indicates a common origin in the ‘market sentiment’ mentioned above.

Yet, ‘market sentiment’ as an analytical category misses substantial aspects of the effects in question since it is an insufficiently precise description of what I propose to call liquidity-solvency conversion: a pattern of lending withdrawals forcing country fundamentals into specific cross-country benchmarking, resulting in risk premia co-movements (Belke 2011: 678). These co-movements were independent of the actual macroeconomic differences of European peripheral countries. They crossed different types of booms and busts (Ireland’s banking sector, Portugal’s public debt, and Cyprus’s financial sector have little in common), different types of

distress (Spain's pre-2008 credit overextension was mainly private, Greece's mainly public), and different sizes of economies (Italy and Greece being on the extreme ends of this spectrum). What occurred was a liquidity shortage on sovereign debt markets which I maintain was turned into a solvency problem for the countries exposed to it as they attempt to roll over debt. An example is the case of Italy in 2011 (Shambaugh 2012: 169). The Italian government had not been regarded as insolvent prior to 2011 (Belke 2011: 685; Bastasin 2012: 288). That summer, however, markets inferred a possible insolvency from the refinancing difficulties Greece and Portugal, Ireland and Spain were facing, and withdrew their liquidity – thus imposing upon Italy the very insolvency they feared to take place (Bastasin 2012: 287).

I maintain, however, that this liquidity-solvency conversion did not just occur in this one case. Its effects are more far-reaching. Through it, markets gain the power to restructure debtor countries along the operational lines of their corresponding fundamental. This, in turn, means that the precise technical features of each respective fundamental have precisely discernible effects upon their corresponding countries. Through their fundamental, country governments are operationalized as actors whose primary duty is to prevent default, to service debt and to instill market confidence that it will continue doing so over the bond's maturity range. Market judgment on anticipated debt servicing constitutes a lending threshold, as markets only lend to governments from whom they expect repayment. The means by which governments repay old debt, however, stem to substantial extents from market lending. Above a certain debt-to-GDP ratio, taxation would not even theoretically suffice to repay all sovereign debt. Thus, debt servicing depends substantially on the ability of debt roll-over – which is to say that a liquidity withdrawal reduces a government's ability to repay old debt, putting it into arrears which lead to a further liquidity withdrawal, and so forth (Shambaugh 2012: 179). Market anticipation of debt servicing thus determines the extent to which actual debt servicing can be provided.

It is crucial to examine what this entails for the concept of the fundamental – and hence the pressures a country faces when operationalized as such. Based on the structural analysis offered above, a fundamental can now be identified as a self-referential structure which is entirely internal to markets. Lending to countries relies on the assessment of a fundamental as sound, i.e., the credibility of a credible commitment to uphold fiscal solvency. This, in turn, presupposes debt roll-over ability, i.e., market liquidity. A country's solvency – i.e., its fundamental's ability to maintain fiscal soundness – relies on market liquidity, an exogenous variable the country has no control. It relies on financial market conditions: expansion or contraction, boom or bust insofar as investment behavior is concerned; contagious

dynamics on bond markets. Market actors' claims to assess country fundamentals really mean to say that they assess liquidity conditions: they assess themselves.

The Eurozone crisis exemplifies this. Here, sovereign bond market liquidity is transnationally integrated since currency risk is removed in European Monetary Union (EMU) (Schüler 2002; Lo Conte 2009: 347; Manganelli and Wolswijk: 215-216). This leads to the indiscriminate portfolio movements discussed above – 'market sentiment' or 'panic' (De Grauwe and Ji 2013). For example, in times of pre-2008 'yield panic' (Hau and Thum 2009: 716), lending to GIPSI countries was considered to be within reasonable risk parameters. After 2009, market distrust radiated outward from Greece to other GIPSI countries and beyond, without much consideration of the specifics of the country in question.

By contrast, the solvency of a government remains its national fiscal responsibility (Lane 2012: 49-50; cf. Holman 2004: 728). As explained above, this has its origin not in national sovereignty per se, but rather in the technical feature of sovereign bond issuance discussed above as flow-stock conversion: the country's sovereignty is harnessed as a repayment guarantee. Market imposition of the fundamental therefore makes the country responsible not only for debt servicing, but also for restructuring its economy to sustain good fundamentals. In addition, as seen in this section, a global liquidity crunch brings a country's debt roll-over capabilities under distress, threatening the most important aspect of fundamentals (the debt-to-GDP ratio) by removing the funds necessary to service debts and by shrinking GDP. By virtue of the liquidity-solvency conversion, this is then interpreted by markets as a sign of domestic and fiscal distress (Strange 1998; Wolf 2002: 38-52; Schiaffino 2013: 457-462).

Intra-Market Hedges and Extra-Market Hedges

Yet more escalations are contained in the ripple effects of seemingly minuscule and benign sovereign debt technicalities. A third layer of conversions is added to the country-fundamental transposition at this point. Reinforcing the flow-stock conversion and its concomitant liquidity-solvency conversion, this third layer determines the exact extent of pressures to which a country is subject when it becomes a fundamental – and the concomitant pressures upon financial actors lending to the debtor country. The Eurozone crisis is illustrative here: often described as a sovereign bond crisis, it is really an interbank market crisis imposed upon countries via the liquidity-solvency conversion which also – an aspect often neglected in the critical literature – cyclically exacerbates the banking crisis.

The description of the Eurozone crisis begins on bank portfolios. European banks hold sovereign bonds as tier 1 capital. Of their total assets in 2009Q4, 16 per cent were government debt securities (Lucarelli 2011: 208). This results in the vulnerabilities discussed above: if European governments are unable (or unwilling) to repay their debts, these assets are terminated, and the European banking system is unable to continue lending – in the worst scenario, banks may not even continue to exist (Shambaugh 2012: 159). By no means was that a remote possibility: at the height of the Greek phase of the crisis, in June 2010, European banks were exposed to more than 200 billion Euros in Greek debt securities (Lucarelli 2011: 208). Certainly, in a conventional perspective, this makes governmental behavior a source of danger for bank portfolios: the country's extra-market sovereignty (ability to renege on payments) continues to haunt the fundamental's intra-market sovereignty (guarantee of debt repayment).

For legal reasons, this came to be particularly relevant in the Eurozone crisis. As stated above, the European Capital Requirements Directive in effect during the Eurozone crisis (CRD III) designates sovereign bonds eligible to be tier 1 capital assets without restrictions (EU Regulation 575/2013, Art. 214, Sect. 2[a]). Thus, when the European public – and its global counterparts – demanded large banking institutions to deleverage after the 2007/2008 crisis, European banks ironically came to be exposed to sovereign risk (Barroso and Van Rompuy 2011; EBA 2011). The extent of this deleveraging process was significant. Throughout Europe, the ratio of bank loans to bank deposits went down significantly, from 138 per cent to 126 per cent according to ECB figures – a “steady decline” which “points to a corresponding substantial reduction in the banking sector leverage.” (ECB 2013) Across the European banking system as a whole, tier 1 capital ratios have increased from 8 per cent in 2008 to 12 per cent in 2012 (Lawton 2013).

This also increased the vulnerability of European banks to the sovereign assets they held (Isidore 2012). By the same token, countries came to be embedded into the dynamics of a European banking crisis through their fundamental – the demands of the flow-stock conversion given force by the liquidity-solvency conversion (Blyth 2015: 73). To explain the extent of this, a second function of countries with regard to their sovereign debt must be explored.

Countries are fundamentals, thus serving their function to stabilize banks' portfolios as tier 1 capital assets. Sovereign bonds are not the only means to stabilize banks' portfolios, however; the same stabilizing function can be performed by the credible commitment of sovereigns to bailouts: recapitalizations and asset relief. In both ways, the fundamental performs a hedging function for its banking system. Moreover, it is made to remain under market supervision while fulfilling its duty

to recapitalize or bail out banks by the liquidity-solvency conversion. Thus, in the post-2008 bailouts of European banks, governments issued debt securities to raise money for bailing out their banks. This was subsequently operationalized by these very banks as an increase in sovereign debt loads, leading to lending withdrawals, and so forth (Lucarelli 2011: 209). Once again, however, wholesale critiques of these practices (particularly those critiques invoking ‘greed’) neglect crucial details whose analysis uncovers the precise way in which these effect come to play out.

Countries serve as fundamentals in two ways – portfolio stabilization through debt security issuance, as well as bailouts: recapitalization and asset relief. The fundamental thus reconstitutes the country as a double market entity: as an intra-market hedge in the former sense (stabilizing portfolios by issuing tier 1 capital); as an extra-market hedge in the latter sense (bailing out banks). To serve as intra-market hedges, as discussed above, countries have to fulfill the economic demands of creditors such that the flow-stock conversion can occur. Thus, countries have to be ‘fiscally sound’ in order to serve as fundamentals. Yet, what *soundness* of fundamentals denotes is decided by the creditors. Their decisions are enforced by the liquidity-solvency conversion, by which European banks (in this case) have the power to withdraw liquidity and blame the resulting fiscal shortage on governmental insolvency.

Countries are therefore embedded into market dynamics in a special sense. Their double position as market entities (intra-market hedges) and yet as guarantors of market structure as a whole (extra-market hedges) is set according to market dynamics. Here, the relation between country, fundamental, and sovereign debt is subject to the notion of crisis. As extra-market hedges, countries have an obligation to bail out banks (Acharya and Steffen 2013). However, the terms of this obligation are set by the banking system and are caught up in the self-referential nature of the fundamental discussed above, since countries derive the funds to bail out banks from market liquidity – i.e., from banks (Botta 2013: 427). Thus, the bailout is subject to contradictory conditions set by the financial institutions it rescues.

First, while straining its finances because it bails out banks, the country must also remain fiscally sound because it remains benchmarked by financial institutions on the level of the flow-stock conversion. It must maintain “counterinflationary credibility.” (Wolf 2002: 44) That is, the country must attempt to issue debt – incurred to save banks – at interest rates set by banks. For these to be at low levels, however, the country must maintain a low debt-to-GDP ratio (ibid: 43; Botta 2013: 427-428). In lieu of suddenly expanding its GDP, the country’s ability to remain ‘sound’ will therefore be influenced by the amount of debt it has to service. This leads to a self-referentiality of bailouts: a direct result of the self-referentiality of the fundamental

as a market entity. When it is said that countries bail out banks, this really means that countries tap into market funding to disburse it to banks. This is triply convenient for creditors. The debt issued by governments serves them as intra-market hedge (as tier 1 asset). Secondly, the conditions of issuance (the fundamentals in question as well as interest rates) are set by them. Thirdly, the bailout serves as extra-market hedge (Acharya and Steffen 2013).

In the country's responsibility to fulfill its role as intra- and extra-market hedge, the size of its commitments is the independent variable vis-à-vis the country's ability to fulfill its responsibility. The lengths to which this can go can be seen in the bank bailouts immediately prior to the Eurozone crisis. Here, this is particularly evident, as these bailouts showed a clear size mismatch. European banks' portfolio sizes often exceed the total fiscal capabilities of their corresponding countries. Not only was the total asset size of the European banking system three times as large as the European real economy in 2007 as well as 2013 (Shambaugh 2012: 162; Lawton 2013); the largest European banks are also often bigger than the entire GDP of their home country – let alone fiscal capability. The Dutch ING group, German Hypo Real Estate or Portugal's Espirito Santo group are examples of this (Hau and Thum 2008; Goncalves 2014). The Dexia group, for example, whose activities extended far beyond Europe, particularly into U.S. subprime markets, had to be recapitalized in 2008 and 2011 by Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg together, because its size exceeded any of the three countries' capabilities (Guillén 2012: 50; Acharya and Steffen 2013).

This size mismatch allows a conclusion about the nature of the European debt crisis. What presents itself as a 'crisis' of government solvency is really a crisis of liquidity converted into one of solvency. It is neither the result of market irrationality nor of governmental overborrowing. Nor was the European crisis caused by investor irrationality. Such irrationality presupposes the possibility of rational (or irrational) market assessment of preexisting country fundamentals to gauge the rationality or irrationality of the investment (Lux 1995). Such preexisting fundamentals, however, do not exist, as I have shown earlier. They are in reality a self-referential market projection serving as a transmission belt for market demands onto countries. Markets may thus well be irrational – but it is not possible to establish when they are and which aspects of self-referential liquidity are the result of such irrationality. Likewise, the crisis cannot be a question of governmental overborrowing prior to 2008. This would require that the representational theory holds – that government solvency is the independent variable of country fundamentals and hence investments – which I have shown here not to be the case.

Combining these findings finally allows a hypothesis regarding the nature of

crisis.' If, as shown here, market investments are ultimately self-referential, neither the pre-2008 expansion shock nor the post-2008 contraction shock in the Eurozone can be an aberration from normal mechanisms since these are much contained in the overall self-referentiality of the market structure at hand. This is to say that neither of them can be 'crisis' conditions. They cannot be a result of state moral hazard because fundamentals preceding market conditions do not exist. By the same token, they cannot be a result of market moral hazard since the object of market investment are not a country's fundamentals – but the country operationalized as a fundamental, i.e., as caught up in market self-referentiality. That the country is thus structured by the fundamental means that the country cannot be the measuring rod of the fundamental's oscillations – and hence that sovereign bond interest rates cannot be measured against anything given. There is no standard, hence there is no aberration; there is thus no normality and hence no crisis.

Conclusion

I have argued here that the origin of the Eurozone crisis lies neither in unsustainable public and private borrowing of European peripheral countries prior to 2009, as some argue, nor in the unreasonable and/or arbitrary demands of their creditor, as others have maintained. Rather, its origin can be found in the effects of minuscule and seemingly arcane technicalities to which sovereign debt issuance is subject. To show this, I have proposed a set of terms which, I maintain, are better equipped to analyze the effects of these minuscule technicalities as other, more common terms are. I have proposed to replace the notion of country fundamentals (plural) with that of a fundamental (singular) to show that a country is not subject to market assessment of its independent policies when it is being lent to, but rather subject to market lending pressures forcing it to adopt certain policies even in the absence of outright imposition. To better describe the precise nature of market pressures in this case, I have proposed the notions of flow-stock conversion and liquidity-solvency conversion. The former allows the conversion of sovereign debt as a fiscal instrument to sovereign debt as an asset, thus embedding it (and its corresponding country) into sovereign debt market dynamics. These, in turn, play out as pressure upon the country through the liquidity-solvency conversion turning portfolio restructurings into fiscal solvency shortages. Finally, I have proposed the notion of countries as intra-market hedges and extra-market hedges to illustrate the precise extent of market pressures upon countries: to recapitalize banks, countries need to issue more debt at market interest rates, doubling down on the pressure from the liquidity-solvency conversion.

The conclusion of this paper is that countries come to be inscribed into market dynamics over which they have no control – and moreover, that these market

dynamics are wholly self-referential. How generalizable beyond the Eurozone crisis is this finding? At minimum, it seems that the concepts propose here allow a more precise account of 'crises' outside of the Eurozone if similar regulatory conditions obtain. In particular, it appears that the twofold function of sovereign bonds as fiscal and portfolio instruments is universal, and that international financial actors often use sovereign bonds as tier 1 capital (Guerreri et al. 2012: 182). An example for a more general use of the concepts proposed here could be a more dynamic notion of counterinflationary credibility. As the fundamental oscillates, and with it the country's fiscal capacities, the incentive structure of political actors oscillates as well. In times of liquidity boom, a far broader amount and range of expenses are within what is credible as commitments to low inflation. Without the crisis hypothesis, it is not irrational, nor morally hazardous, to use this fiscal space. Conversely, neither is the deployment of fiscal restrictions by markets under conditions of liquidity shortage. At a minimum, a dynamic view thus entails the abandonment of the notion of 'crises' of sovereign debt, and possibly of financial 'crisis conditions' in general – insofar as what has been shown here is likely to apply for other real economic fundamentals of other classes of assets as well.

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LANGUAGE LEARNING BELIEFS AND STRATEGIES: A BOSNIAN EFL CASE

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Abstract

Correlation studies (Li, 2010; Chang & Shen, 2010) between the clusters of survey items as originally suggested for *The Beliefs About Language Learning Inventory - BALLI* (EFL version; Horwitz, 1988) and *Strategy Inventory for Language Learning - SILL 7.0* (Oxford, 1990) report generally weak and moderate positive correlation coefficients. The above survey instruments were administered to fifty freshman students of Bosnian linguistic and cultural background at International University of Sarajevo. Correlation tests partly confirmed results reported by Li (2010) and Chang and Shen (2010) but with more similar correlation coefficients with respect to the later authors. The results partly reflect universal features of the foreign language learner and indicate that the theory of reciprocity between the two research constructs should be focused on findings about other forms of human intelligence.

Keywords: *Language; Learning; Beliefs; Strategies; BALLI; SILL; Correlation.*

Introduction

Learner-centered educational models assume that every learner is unique. Assuming that learners' personal perceptions define their goals, a learner-centered teacher always attempts to match the content and manner of presenting it with the learner and her/his needs (Zmuda, Curtis, & Ullman, 2015; Conti, 2004). Accordingly, it is assumed that the study of learners' beliefs about language learning and language learning strategies will contribute to better understanding of the learner and improve the practices driven by learner-centered education frameworks.

Language learner strategies associated with cognitive, metacognitive, and affective components are believed to underlie language learners' behaviors and beliefs. These strategies argue the provision of crucial information about learner behavior and beliefs as necessary for a successful foreign or second language teaching design (Horwitz, 2013, 1988; Oxford, 2013, 1990; Wenden, 1998, 1991). The need for such information is supported by positive correlations between language learning beliefs and strategies (Chang & Shen, 2010; Li, 2010).

Hence this study explores the relationship between the beliefs and strategies as reported by university students of Bosnian linguistic and cultural background. The results partly confirm previous research findings and also provide important implications for further research.

Literature Review

It is not surprising that defining and studying the phenomenon of beliefs about learning is both challenging and diverse. The verb 'to believe'—classified as a stative verb of cognition, emotion, and sensation—is used to express a mental state or attitude towards somebody or something (Huddleston & Pullum, 2002). In other words, the concept of belief is semantically complicated. In addition, the act of learning as expressed in various educational frameworks may also be defined in numerous ways. Consequently, the notion of learning belief is difficult to define in the narrow sense and must be defined with reference to overlapping or similar notions.

Barcelos (2000) examines the relationship existing between 'beliefs' and 'knowledge' and 'beliefs' and 'actions'. Relying on Dewey (1906/1983), Hickman (1998) and Boisvert (1998), she concludes that while "beliefs may present obstacles for reflective inquiry, [...] they may also trigger reflection" (Barcelos, 2000, p. 36), because beliefs and knowledge seem to correlate with the link between subjective

experience and inquiry. In linking beliefs with actions, Barcelos (2000) argues that the relationship is reciprocal.

Wenden (1998) associates ‘beliefs and knowledge about learning’ with the term “metacognitive knowledge” (p. 515). Inspired by Flavell (1979), Wenden (1998) explains that metacognitive knowledge can be classified as ‘person knowledge’, ‘task knowledge’ and ‘strategic knowledge’. Relying on Wenden’s classification, it could be argued further that learning beliefs stand for learners’ general beliefs about learning processes, specific beliefs about themselves as learners, beliefs about the nature of a learned subject and beliefs about the ways of mastering the learning process.

Horwitz (1988) put forward a very strong argument when she said “If beliefs about language learning are prevalent in the culture at-large, then foreign language teachers must consider that students bring these beliefs with them into the classroom” (p. 283). In support of this argument, she draws on the results of a survey that included eighty students of German, sixty-three students of French, and ninety-eight students of Spanish. All students were in first semester language courses at the University of Texas (Horwitz, 1988). Horwitz’s (1988) survey was designed “to assess student opinions on a variety of issues and controversies related to language learning” (p. 284). The instrument she designed is *The Beliefs About Language Learning Inventory – BALLI*. It is used by dozens of researchers across the world and has become “[t]he most widely used questionnaire” (Barcelos, 2000, p. 45) for research about beliefs in language learning. The study has also revealed that learners hold variegated beliefs about language learning.

Horwitz (2013) later remarked that the BALLI “is not a single scale so the items should not be added together or averaged” (p. 261). However, earlier BALLI studies assessed students’ beliefs “in five major areas: 1) difficulty of language learning; 2) foreign language aptitude; 3) the nature of language learning; 4) learning and communication strategies; and 5) motivations and expectations” (Horwitz, 1988, p. 284). It should be noted that Nikitina and Furuoka (2006) statistically supported Horwitz’s choice of belief areas.

While the link between beliefs about language learning and foreign language producing behaviors may seem a little vague, research has pointed out that the link can be shaped by several complex mechanisms such as reflective practice and metacognition. One set of the agents assumed to play a very important role in this link was studied under the name of *language learning strategies*. Language learning strategies were found “to deal with the receptive domain of intake, memory, storage, and recall” (Brown, 2000, p. 127). This finding may indicate their existence in both

forms of action and thought.

According to Weinstein and Mayer (1983) learning strategies are “behaviors and thoughts in which a learner engages and which are intended to influence the learner’s encoding process” (p. 3). Oxford (1990) explains that learning strategies are commonly defined as

operations employed by the learner to aid the acquisition, storage, retrieval, and use of information” (p.8). Oxford (1990) found that this definition does not fully reveal the concept of learning strategy and suggests that it would be useful to extend the definition by referring to learning strategies as “specific actions taken by the learner to make learning easier, faster, more enjoyable, more self-directed, more effective, and more transferrable to new situations (p.8).

Learning strategies have also been studied under different names: namely, “learning skills, learning-to-learn skills, thinking skills, and problem solving skills” (Oxford, 1990, p. 2). Thus hypotheses, theories, and empirical findings which attempt to unveil the role of cognitive processes lie at the core of learning strategy research. For example, Sternberg’s triarchic theory of human intelligence (1985) is a very important reference point, if it is assumed that learning strategies manifest as actions, operations, or decisions that shape learning behaviors. Sternberg’s theoretical model describes how human intelligence functions; how mechanisms of learning, planning, monitoring, problem solving, decision making and implementing interrelate (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2012). In this sense it provides theoretical ground for interpreting the concept of learning strategies as deliberate self-employed acts with the aim to shape both learning processes and outcomes.

Wenden (1991) implied that two of the three factors that regulate the use of learning strategies are learner profile related. She states that learners’ “background knowledge about subject matter content, [...] about learning the nature of the materials to be learned and the product or outcome that the learner or teacher has in mind” (p. 31) shape the use of strategies. The corollary is that this type of reasoning identifies learning strategies as key mechanisms in ‘autonomous or self-regulated learning’ models. In the *Strategic Self-Regulation* (S2R) model of language learning, the learning strategies are defined as “deliberate, goal-directed attempts to manage and control efforts to learn the L2 (based on Afflerbach, Pearson, and Paris, 2008)” (Oxford, 2013, p.12).

Rubin (1975) initially defined learning strategies as “the techniques or devices which a learner may use to acquire knowledge” (p. 43). The author later offered a binary classification (Rubin, 1981): ‘the direct learning strategies’ and ‘the indirect learning strategies’ (Griffiths, 2004). Hsiao and Oxford (2002) report that Rubin’s (1981) dichotomy “along with the non-L2 work of Dansereau (1985) and others, led to Oxford’s (1990) direct and indirect L2 learning strategies” (p. 370). Oxford’s (1990) taxonomy of language learning strategies classifies the strategies across six categories: memory, cognitive, metacognitive, compensation, social, and affective. It is argued that O’Malley and Chamot’s (1990), Rubin’s (1981) and Oxford’s (1990) classifications “have made an important contribution to and have advanced our understanding of how strategies can be systematically categorized” (Hsiao & Oxford, 2002, p.377).

Barcelos (2000) claims that beliefs about language learning and language learning strategies are correlated (see Abraham & Vann, 1987; Elbaum, Berg, & Dodd, 1993; Riley, 1997; Yang, 1992; as cited in Barcelos, 2000). Calling on Riley (1997) and Abraham and Vann (1987), Barcelos (2000) explains that beliefs influence actions through strategy preferences which serve as links between the two. In addition, she reminds us of the arguments advanced by Yang (1992), Murphey (1996), and Riley (1997), which implied that beliefs are influenced by strategies/ actions (Barcelos, 2000).

Chang and Shen (2010) surveyed three hundred and seventeen students in two Taiwanese high schools. The authors wanted to explore the relationship between the beliefs about language learning and language learning strategies. They administered BALLI to identify the beliefs held and the SILL, *Strategy Inventory for Language Learning* developed by Oxford (1990) to identify what strategies were relied on. The strongest coefficients they found are stated as follows:

Based on the result of Pearson correlation, the current study displays a moderate association ($r = 0.444$, $p = .000$) between participants’ beliefs about language learning and their use of learning strategies. When each subcategory of the BALLI and the SILL, was examined the result of Pearson correlation also indicated a significant linkage in each subcategory of the BALLI and the SILL. Among these significant correlations, the first subcategory in the BALLI, “Foreign Language Aptitude”, had the strongest relationship with compensation strategy ($r = .231$, $p = .000$). The second subcategory in the BALLI, “Difficulty of Language

Learning”, had the highest correlation with memory($r = .427$, $p = .000$), cognitive and affective strategy ($r = .387$, $p = .000$). The last subcategory in the BALLI, motivation, had the most notable correlation with overall SILL($r = 0.422$, $p = .000$) and three SILL subcategories: cognitive strategy ($r = .387$, $p = .000$), metacognitive ($r = .455$, $p = .000$), social strategies ($r = .340$, $p = .000$). (Chang & Shen, 2010, p. 6)

Li (2010) administered the SILL and ‘Language Learning Belief Questionnaire’ (see Lu, 2003; as cited in Li, 2010), which is partly composed of the BALLI items, to two hundred and fourteen second-year English majors from four vocational and technology colleges in China. Li (2010) attempted to diagnose the subjects’ beliefs about language learning and language learning strategies. She also tried to diagnose the correlation between the beliefs and strategies using the Pearson test as presented in Table 1 below:

Correlation between language learning beliefs and strategies in Li (2010, p. 862)

		Memory	Cognitive	Compensation	Meta-cognitive	Affective	Social
Language Aptitude	r	.133	.271**	.180**	.223**	.126	.227**
	sig	.052	.000	.008	.001	.066	.001
Difficulty of Language Learning	r	.125	.226**	.052	.171*	.153*	.129
	sig	.068	.001	.448	.012	.025	.059
Nature of Language Learning	r	.040	.066	.069	.171*	.169*	.139*
	sig	.564	.336	.312	.012	.014	.042
Learning and Communication Strategies	r	.165*	.285**	.302**	.306**	.368**	.319**
	sig	.016	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Motivation and Expectations	r	.159*	.129	.083	.224**	.156*	.170*
	sig	.020	.059	.228	.001	.022	.013
Mother-tongue Reliance	r	-.098	-.163*	.008	-.059	-.047	-.100
	sig	.154	.017	.912	.390	.495	.144

*:Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

** :Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Li (2010) concludes that the “results were primarily in line with other studies (Horwitz, 1987, 1988; Wenden, 1987; Abraham & Vann; 1987, Yang, 1992; Wen &

Johnson, 1997)” (p. 864).

Saeb and Zamani (2013) surveyed two hundred and sixty-two Iranian high-school students administering the BALLI and the SILL. The questions they tried to answer were whether “high-school students differ in their use of language learning strategies from students [who are at the same time] attending English institutes” and whether “high-school students’ beliefs about language learning [are] different from those of students attending English institutes” (Saeb & Zamani, 2013, p. 81). They found a statistically significant difference between the two groups: namely:

There was a statistically significant difference between high-school students and students attending English institutes regarding their use of language learning strategies, $F(6, 257) = 7.25, P = .000$; Wilks’ Lambda = .85; partial eta squared = .14... The MANOVA results revealed a statistically significant difference between high-school students and students attending English institutes in terms of their beliefs about language learning, $F(5, 256) = 7.02, P = .000$; Wilks’ Lambda = .87; partial eta squared = .12. (Saeb & Zamani, 2013, pp. 82-83)

When the results provided by Chang and Shen (2010) and Li (2010) are compared some slight differences appear (see Table 2).

Comparison of strongest correlation results between language learning strategies and beliefs about language learning obtained by Chang and Shen (2010) and Li (2010)

		Memory	Cognitiv e	Compe n-sation	Meta- cognitiv e	Affectiv e	Social
Chang and Shen(2010)	Language Aptitude	r		.231			
		sig		.000			
	Difficulty of Language Learning	r	.427	.387		.387	
		sig	.000	.000		.000	
	Motivation and Expectations	r		.387	.455		.340
		sig		.000	.000		.000
Li (2010)	Language Aptitude	r		.271	.180		
		sig		.000	.008		
	Difficulty of Language Learning	r	.125	.226		.153	
		sig	.068	.001		.025	
	Motivation and Expectations	r		.129	.224		.170
		sig		.059	.001		.013

As it can be observed the significance of statistical results and correlation coefficients vary. The biggest differences were found to be between the metacognitive strategies and motivation, the affective strategies and difficulty of language learning, and the social strategies and motivation. Overall, Chang and Shen (2010) report stronger correlation coefficients. It might be speculated that the contextual factors were the reason for the different results. Chang and Shen (2010) conducted the survey with Taiwanese high school students, while Li (2010) surveyed Chinese college students. Saeb and Zamani (2013) statistically confirmed that educational settings and learning experience affect both learning strategy choices and beliefs about language learning held by participants. The correlations, however, between these two concepts need to be further clarified and statistically tested. This research project will attempt to provide further insights about the strength of correlation between beliefs about language learning and language learning strategies.

Instruments, Participants and Data Analysis

Two instruments were used in this study: *The Beliefs about Language Learning Inventory-BALLI* (Horwitz, 1988) and the *Strategy Inventory for Language Learning-SILL 7.0* (Oxford, 1990). Fifty subjects participated in the study: twenty-one females and twenty-nine males. All participants were of Bosnian cultural and linguistic background, proficient in English (as measured by the Institutional Proficiency Test) and enrolled in the freshman year at International University of Sarajevo. The data was collected on several occasions during the Spring Semester 2015 using original instruments after the authors' consents were obtained. The data was analyzed using the SPSS software. Since the number of participants was not very high (due to the nature of the educational setting), the quality of the research sample was examined using the Shapiro-Wilk test, visual inspection of their histograms, normal Q-Q plots and box plots, and Pearson and Spearman tests

Results

The Shapiro-Wilk's test ($p > .05$), visual inspection of their histograms, normal Q-Q plots and box plots showed that the language learning strategy scores approximated a normal distribution for both females and males in all the clusters of scores except the scores of affective and social strategies as declared by males.

The above mentioned tests showed that the language learning beliefs scores approximated a normal distribution for both females and males in clusters of beliefs about the difficulty of language learning, the nature of language learning and motivation and expectations. However, the scores for foreign language aptitude as declared by females were found to be kurtotic. Learning and communication

strategies as declared by females were found not to be normally distributed by the Shapiro-Wilk's test ($p = 0.01$). Finally, Pearson and Spearman tests provided following results in Table 3.

Correlations between Beliefs about Language Learning and Language Learning Strategies

	Memory	Cognitive	Compensation	Metacognitive	Affective	Social
Language Aptitude	$r_{ss} = .259$ $p = .069$	$r_{ss} = .180$ $p = .211$	$r_{ss} = .030$ $p = .835$	$r_{ss} = .316^*$ $p = .025$	$r_{ss} = .193$ $p = .180$	$r_{ss} = .093$ $p = .521$
Difficulty of Language Learning	$r = -.008$ $p = .959$	$r = .142$ $p = .325$	$r = -.015$ $p = .918$	$r = -.046$ $p = .753$	$r_{ss} = .105$ $p = .468$	$r_{ss} = -.120$ $p = .406$
Nature of Language Learning	$r = .205$ $p = .154$	$r = .206$ $p = .151$	$r = -.017$ $p = .909$	$r = .366^{**}$ $p = .009$	$r_{ss} = .219$ $p = .126$	$r_{ss} = .369^{**}$ $p = .008$
Learning and Communication Strategies	$r_s = .291^*$ $p = .040$	$r_s = .454^{**}$ $p = .001$	$r_s = 0.248$ $p = .083$	$r_s = .477^{**}$ $p = .000$	$r_s = .496^{**}$ $p = .000$	$r_s = .292^*$ $p = .040$
Motivation and Expectation	$r = .286^*$ $p = .044$	$r = .347^*$ $p = .013$	$r = .262$ $p = .066$	$r = .343^*$ $p = .015$	$r_s = .442^{**}$ $p = .001$	$r_{ss} = .324^*$ $p = .022$

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Discussion

The results obtained through this study seem to be similar to those obtained by Chang and Shen (2010) in comparison to the results provided by Li (2010) (see Table 4). Particularly interesting here is the consistency of the correlation coefficients between beliefs about 'motivation and expectations' and all six categories of language learning strategies in all three studies.

Chang and Shen (2010) did not provide all the correlation coefficients in their report. In addition, some of the coefficients provided by Li (2010) and this current research were found not to be statistically significant. It is difficult, therefore, to make accurate comparisons of the correlation coefficients. However, almost all the coefficients indicate weak and moderate positive correlations between beliefs about language learning and language learning strategies as classified by Horwitz (1988) and Oxford (1990). The implications of this finding are nevertheless far-reaching if the variance they share is calculated.

Comparison of correlation results between language learning strategies and beliefs about language learning obtained by Chang and Shen (2010), Li (2010), and authors of this research

			Memory	Cogni- tive	Compen- sation	Meta- cognitive	Affective	Social
Chang and Shen (2010)	Language Aptitude	r			.231			
		sig			.000			
	Motivation and Expectations	r		.387		.455		.340
		sig		.000		.000		.000
Li (2010)	Language Aptitude	r	.133					
		sig	.052					
	Nature of Language Learning	r				.171		.139
		sig				.012		.042
	Motivation and Expectations	r		.129	.083	.224	.156	.170
		sig		.059	.228	.001	.022	.013
Authors of this research	Language Aptitude	r	$r_s = .259$			$r_s = .316$		
		sig	.069			.025		
	Nature of Language Learning	r				.366		$r_s = .369$
		sig				.009		.008
	Motivation and Expectations	r	.286	.347	.262	.343	$r_s = .442$	$r_s = .324$
		sig	.044	.013	.066	.015	.001	.022

If the correlation coefficients are squared (r^2), the shared variance oscillates approximately between 4 and 20%. In other words, approximately 4 to 20% of language learning strategy choice can be accounted for by beliefs about language learning held, and vice versa (Dancey & Reidy, 2011; 1999). The 20% resulted from a few strong coefficients identified (e.g. correlation between beliefs about *motivation and expectations* and *metacognitive strategies* was found to be positive ($r = .455$, $p = .000$, see Chang and Shen, [2010]) — so 20.7% of the variance between them could be found to account for each other ($r^2 = 0.207$). However, other obtained coefficients appear to be lower. These statistics highlight the complexity of both the phenomena of beliefs and strategies.

As attitudes do, beliefs also project an individual's interaction between cognition and emotion, which shapes the levels of both conviction and doubt about ways, persons, things, or concepts. Consequently, attitudes and beliefs are difficult to distinguish because they both may be described as predispositions to actions, and they both may be incompatible with the actions. Describing the difference between the terms, Barcelos (2000) refers to Rokeach (1968) who "explained the difference

between the two terms by stating that *beliefs are predispositions to action*, whereas an attitude is a *set of interrelated predispositions to action organized around an object or situation*" (p. 7). The distinction has also been implied by George and Jones (1997) who defined 'values' as "person's beliefs about what is good or desirable in life" which operate as "long-term guides for a person's choices and experiences" (as cited in Arnold et al. p. 242). What these definitions suggest is that attitudes project beliefs, and beliefs, together with feelings, compose attitudes.

While discussing language-learning strategies and their associations with good and bad learners, Gass and Selinker (2001) conclude that research on this paradigm is still preliminary and that "a next obvious step in the evolution of the research paradigm would be the undertaking of longitudinal studies that attempt to link learning strategies, which are thought to be helpful to an individual, to the interlanguage output these individuals produce (p. 369). Gu (2010) found that "the intensity of interest in language learning strategies in the 1980s and the 1990s and the high expectations from theorists, researchers, teachers, and learners have left many people frustrated, especially because of the conceptual fuzziness and elusiveness of the LLS [language learning strategies] construct" (as cited in Oxford, 2013, p. 10). The author suggests that new researchers create "innovative research paths" and avoid answering "old research questions" (Gu, 2010; as cited in Oxford, 2013, p. 10).

Conclusion

Although language learning beliefs and strategies are generally positively correlated, the results indicate that the overall relationship between them is not strong. Therefore, any theorizing about their reciprocity should include other findings about theories of human intelligence. For example, the interacting processes between the learners' personal and situational characteristics, the learners' choosing between reflecting or non-reflecting on the interacting processes, and the ongoing interrelations between personal skills, knowledge and attitudes. Together these factors might or might not be contextually restrained. Such a connection has been addressed by several scholars (Mezirow, 1991; Jarvis, 2003; 1987; Cross, 1981; McClusky, 1963; Knox, 1986; and Knowles, 1990). The relatively low shared variances between language learning beliefs and strategies, which are not frequently highlighted in similar studies, should not be disregarded.

The results reported in this research correspond more closely with Chang and Shen (2010) than those of Li (2010). Indeed Chang and Shen and Li's research projects are very similar to the current research. The similarity of results partly highlights universal beliefs and values of the foreign language learner, which is

sometimes overlooked by learner-centered educational practices. In addition, it implies that instructors' success in deliberate modification of either learners' beliefs or strategies will also depend on other contextual factors. Therefore acting on one mechanism to change the other might not be enough. The learner displays behaviors, takes actions, and makes decisions in order to learn. Types of behaviors, actions and decisions will take different paths to different outcomes. Finally when all contextual variables which mark the teaching-learning exchange are considered, learning situations, behaviors, actions, and decisions may seem to be too diverse to classify, and too challenging to dissect. But they are also too visible and important to ignore.

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DOUBLE EFFECT AND BLACK REVENGE IN LESSING'S *THE GRASS IS SINGING*

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Abstract

A white woman's murder by a black man, as depicted in Doris Lessing's *The Grass Is Singing*, incorporates the revengeful act of an abandonment-neurotic black servant against a white female master with tactile delirium in the course of a paradoxical relationship of love and hate. The final homicide and the consequent act of surrender by Moses, the murderer, convey his paradoxical attitude toward his white master-beloved. This attitude begins with hatred, intensifies with mutual affection, and ends in murder. Focusing on the interracial revenge that takes place in the novel under study, the authors of this paper argue that Moses' motivation in killing Mary originates from the ambivalence of his state of living under colonization and his learnings in Christianity, struggling with the Double-Effect Reasoning inaugurated by and in defense of black honor or negritude. As such, Moses' sense of guilt and his subsequent surrender are the consequences of traditional and colonial internalization of sin, already present in him as a native of his revenge or honor-based society, influenced by Lobengula's rule in which the criminal submits to punishment willingly, as well as missionary teachings. Through an interdisciplinary link between the Double-Effect Reasoning and the psychoanalytical perspective to the black problem promoted by Frantz Fanon, *The Grass Is Singing* thus seems to exempt Moses in his crime against the white race, represented by Mary, as well as to justify Moses self-surrender in defense of negritude and black honor.

Keywords: *Doris Lessing; Colonization; Double Effect; Black Ethics and Black Revenge.*

Introduction

Double-Effect Reasoning (DER), the Principle of Double Effect (PDE), the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) or the Rule of Double Effect (RDE) (Cavanaugh xx), is often used in discussing the permissibility of an action which incorporates a serious harm or death of a human being as a side effect of achieving a good end. Such harm is sometimes merely a “foreseen side effect” or “double effect” in bringing about a good end, although it is impermissible to cause the same harm intentionally as a means to the same good end (McIntyre, 2011: 8). Aquinas, following St. Augustine, is credited with introducing DER in the *Summa Theologica*, defending homicidal self-defense which happens unintentionally (McIntyre, 2011: 8 & Cavanaugh, 2006: 1):

Nothing prevents one act from having two effects, of which only one is intended, the other being *praeter intentionem* [outside the moral intention]. Now moral acts receive their character according to that which is intended, not, however, from that which is *praeter intentionem*, since this is accidental. (Cavanaugh, 2006: 3)

Aquinas expands this idea to justify the foreseen-but-not-intended murder of an aggressor. Later elaborations of the principle focus on the general distinction between “causing a morally grave harm as a side effect of pursuing a good end” and “causing a harm as a means of pursuing a good end” (McIntyre, 2011: 9). In general, DER is used to analyze “exceptional cases” in which a good end cannot be actualized without a bad effect (Cavanaugh, 2006: 46). Examples include hard cases of murder, euthanasia, abortion, and terror bombing.

One of such hard cases is revenge: killing or causing harm to an opponent for a former insult or harm, physical or spiritual. But killing is not permissible, being immoral intrinsically. However, it is revenge as a “retributive punishment” (Kaufman, 2013: 95), which makes use of DER to justify the harm against the opponent. “Retributive punishment” combines revenge with legal punishment to legalize the punishment of an opponent for an immoral action (Cavanaugh *Passim*). Hence, the punishment of a murderer by jurisdiction in favor of the victim’s family instead of the latter’s personal revenge against the murderer. Related to this issue is “moral psychology” or “action theory” which investigates the what-ness of an action by focusing on its mental features such as “knowledge, belief, desire, will, intent, ends, and means.” Therefore, the question is what makes an act of killing unjust? The agent’s intention is of utmost concern. There is a distinction between “intending to kill or gravely harm” and doing something with the inevitable-but-not-intended

death or grievous harm to the innocent (xix).

An even harder case, and the subject of this study, is interracial revenge in communities filled with tensions between black and white people. It was most evident in colonial Africa where black slaves suffered under white cruelty, and, therefore, black revenge was not infrequent. In such oppressive societies, black revolt and rage were inevitable.

Involved in such violence was Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, which suffered from the “minority rule” of whites who were often brutal. Native workers were assaulted mostly because of their resistance against racism and the economic pressures under which they had to obey white masters (McCulloch, 2000: 36). The white population in the “racist regime of Rhodesia” was physically and emotionally harsh against the black majority (Kirton, 2010: 45). Settlers in South Rhodesia treated their Kafir laborers as dogs, “to be beaten and cuffed at will” (Hensman, 1900: 169). Occasionally treating certain black individuals fairly, Settlers loathe them in general “to the point of neurosis” (Lessing 92). It is very probable in such circumstances that the black race rises to defend its honor and negritude.

As a literary documentation of interracial tensions, Lessing’s *The Grass Is Singing* (1950) incorporates the murder of a white woman by a black servant as the inevitable interracial violence between black and white people in its South Rhodesian version. As Schlueter says, the heart of the book tells about settlers who refuse to accept natives as human (1973: 9). The murder of Mary Turner, a woman with tactile delirium, by Moses, an abandonment-neurotic black servant, conveys a series of tensions developed into interracial homicide. The question is whether a black man is justified in killing a white woman, the former oppressed and the latter oppressor; one the suffering colonized, the other the cruel colonizer. DER is the medium through which the present study tries to justify such violence. As such, the issue is rendered under the moral-philosophical DER and the postcolonial ethics developed by Franz Fanon to investigate morally and psychologically into Moses’ development of mind in killing Mary and his willing surrender.

Discussion

The Grass Is Singing is one of those novels that, as Alkali et al. introduce them, show “to the world how the genre of African literature is ‘an unparalleled laboratory’ discovering new issues” (2013 :237). The novel “is very Rhodesian” as it is based on the life of the region in which Lessing grew up (Lessing and Ingersoll, 1994: 131), as well as on the life of someone she knew (ibib. :112). Hence, Lessing’s fictional documentation of interracial violence. ‘Murderer Mystery’ is the initial

words of the novel which lead us to investigate into Moses' motivation in killing his white female master.

The mutual psychological bond developed between Mary and Moses ends up in the former's murder by the latter. Thus, the murderer's motivation is of utmost importance, especially when it is that of a muscular black man against a white delicate blue-eyed woman. The case shows its complex side when the murderer refrains from escaping and awaits the police to surrender. Accordingly, two sides of the case consist of Moses' motivations in homicide and surrender.

Moses' motivation in murder may initially arise from maltreatment by the white master, especially ignited after the face-whipping scene happened six years before the murder. When Moses is recruited as the houseboy, two years has already passed from the scene where Mary whipped Moses in the face when he stopped working to drink water. But by the time of his selection as the houseboy, Moses is free of that primary contempt against Mary and there seems to be "nothing in his attitude to suggest that he remembered the incident" (Lessing, 1973: 175). Moreover, "about four years" pass before Moses finally murders Mary (220), during which a rather intimate relationship develops between them. There thus must be another reason for his homicide. Peering into Moses' character before and during meeting Mary helps us understand his motivation in killing her. The following sections highlight this issue.

Moses' Negritude

Moses has been in "Mashonaland" (Lessing, 1973: 14). "Mashona" seems to be a nickname that the native King Lobengula Khumalo (1845–1894) gave the region under his order (Knight-Bruce, 1985: 9). It became part of Southern Rhodesia by 1923 and even before that the region was under the leadership of Lobengula, usually called Matabele in English, who deemed that, in his kingdom, disobeying any social responsibility were punished with death (Dodds *Passim*). As Lessing says,

The laws were strict: everyone knew what they could or could not do. If someone did an unforgivable thing, [...] he would submit fatalistically to punishment, which was likely to be impalement over an ant-heap on a stake, or something equally unpleasant. 'I have done wrong; and I know it,' he might say, 'therefore let me be punished.' Well, it was the tradition to face punishment. (1973: 14)

Such rules were rooted in the native conceptions of fearlessness and courage. Men in Mashonaland/Mashona were famous for their “courage” (Knight-Bruce, 1985: 9), “strength of character” (ibid. :26). Once in Mashonaland, the Anglican Bishop Knight-Bruce (1853-96) observes that natives of the region were a “subject race” under Lobengula. Thus, their spirit of courage was gone; but there was the possibility of its revival if they were properly treated. Having the sense of cowardice, they were ashamed; but they had still retained “a good deal of savage brutality” (Knight-Bruce, 1985: 9-10). Moses, having lived in Mashonaland, either as a native or settler, might have inherited some of these features. His bodily strength and demeanor reveal his differences from other natives, as he is “decent” (Lessing, 1973: 191), “a good boy” who “works well” (ibid. :220), and a courageous man against insults.

Moses has also been a “mission boy” who knows “too much” (ibid. :191). Mission boys in South Rhodesia were educated based on Christian principles, and thus we can say Moses has some Christian beliefs learned in English. According to Fanon, black schoolboys identified themselves with the explorers, the bringers of civilization, the white men who carried “truth to savages—an all-white truth.” The young Negro’s identity was thus a subjectively adoption of the attitudes of a white man (2008: 114). Moses’ knowledge of English and his Christian training, as part of his new identity, are therefore revealed in his speaking in the language of his masters and his background as a mission boy.

On the other hand, with the development of Christianity in Africa, Africans forgot the functionality of their traditional prayers to their own deities. However, the efficacy of Christianity was also under doubt; when politics entered the scene, Christianity was considered as a peaceful way of keeping colonialism alive. Thus, Africans lost their faith in the religion they could not fully cope with. They now looked back “with admiration” to their old traditions and rituals that Christianity made them forget (Fry, 2000: 111). In a famous native song in South Rhodesia, the land is depicted “as a rich and fertile land” raped by white colonizers, while in essence it is a woman married to the black man. Black men are in fact the true “husbands” of the land and its “great heroes of the past,” and Lobengula is the true king. The past is therefore recalled to solve the present problems (ibid. :112). As a solution to the present problems of the black people in Africa, Fanon thus calls for such “return to the past” (Loomba, 2005: 153). African tribes were somehow “revenge” or honor-based” cultures in which the victim or his relatives were responsible for revenging the wrongdoer (Kaufman, 2013: 96-97), since to act otherwise was a proof to their lack of courage (ibid. :124).

As a native of pre-modern African tribes, Moses has grown up in such system in which the revenger tries to restore his honor. It is in this condition that Moses enters an ambivalent state of being incorporating the tensions between colonial-and-not-pure Christianity and his negritude and tribal honor. As a good mission boy, he is taken to be different from other black servants. As Bhabha says, "It is precisely in that ambivalent use of 'different' — to be different from those that are different makes you the same — that the Unconscious speaks of the form of Otherness" (1994: 117). Du Bois too explains such black condition as "double consciousness", to be the other in a world in which the colonized is "inferior and uncivilized" (1999: ix). Thus the Negro lives in an ambiguous condition which is "extraordinarily neurotic" (Fanon, 2008 :148). Every neurosis thus derives from the "cultural situation" of the individual (ibid. :117-118). Consequently, learning in mission schools and working for the white has already established a special outlook towards the colonizer in Moses' mind.

Encountering the white society, Moses experiences what he did not expect; "instances in which the educated Negro suddenly discovers that he is rejected by a civilization which he has nonetheless assimilated" (Fanon, 2008: 69). As a black man he is useful only in case of good working. This is demonstrated by Lessing telling us that, "Dick did not like mission boys, they 'knew too much,' in any case they should not be taught to read and write: they should be taught the dignity of labour and general usefulness to the white man" (Lessing, 1973: 191). The development of such "dependency behavior" in the Negro is beneficial for him until he makes attempts at equalization with the European. It thus follows that the European becomes angry with the Negro pursuing equality with him and causes the Negro to replace his "rejection of dependence" with "inferiority complex" (Fanon, 2008: 69).

Initially not so drowned in a relationship with Mary, Moses is ready to leave her when she is too cruel to him, while at the end he cannot bear being dismissed, especially when he observes that Tony, as a white man for the romantic place of whom he has been serving all these years, is taking his place as Tony puts "his arm round Mary's shoulders" ordering Moses to leave the house (Lessing, 1973: 233). What hurts the black man most is to discover that in the realm of masculinity he occupies the black hole. The "abandoned" or "betrayed" black man feels "clamorous" under such identification. Equality with the white man is beneficial merely before asking for it; afterwards it proves dishonorable and insulting to the Negro. This is the path along which the black man "passes from psychological dependence to psychological inferiority" (Mannoni, 1964: 84). The Negro thus suffers identity crisis through such feeling of insecurity (ibid.: 61–62). Therefore, feeling abandoned by Mary and rejected by the white society, Moses develops abandonment-neurosis, discussed below.

The Black Man and the White Woman: Moses vs. Mary

Moses experiences problems in the process of his negritude, and that is because of his encounter with the white woman. White women and black men are regarded as paradigms of white and black races respectively (Harding, 1986: 178). Thus, any tension between the two points at striking issues between the colonizer and the colonized in general. As mentioned above, settlers in South Rhodesia treated their native laborers as mostly dogs to be beaten. But they dismissed the fact that the natives of Lobengula's kingdom of Southern Rhodesia had such strong jealousy for the "chastity of their white women" (Hensman, 1900: 169). Never in contact with the natives since her childhood, Mary encounters black servants and laborers following the already established norms in the white society. She, like "every woman in South Africa," was "forbidden to walk out alone" because "they were nasty and might do horrible things to her" (Lessing, 1973: 70). Mary has been acculturated in her fear of the "black peril" (Fanon, 2008: 157), the proximity of African men to European women. Mary is already racist then, believing in the superiority of the whites over the blacks. While Dick, as the white man, rarely plays the master, Mary is contemptuous and cruel to black laborers because she does not "believe in treating them soft" (Lessing, 1973: 142). Halstead identifies the first type of racism among many as the "*pre-reflective gut racism*" (1988: 142), the intense hatred of people of a different race or culture resulting in "dominance, superiority, and aggression against certain members of society" (Kirton 2010: 57). Mary is terribly hostile to house servants and makes farm laborers work harder, reduces their break times, and decreases their payments in case of disobedience. As the master's wife in charge of the farm, black laborers, mostly male ones, must obey her.

Mary's first masterly orders on the farm inaugurate the relationship between the white woman and the black men in general, and her conflict with Moses in particular – as "Involuntarily she lifted her whip and brought it down across his face in a vicious swinging blow" (Lessing, 1973: 146). The scene is striking enough as Moses describes the reason of his idleness in broken English in a "ludicrous manner": "I . . . want . . . water." And then suddenly smiles and opens his mouth and points his finger down his throat (ibid.: 146). Since "most white people think it is 'cheek' if a native speaks English," Mary's "inarticulate rage" whips Moses in the face (ibid.: 146). Moses' English is an act of mimicry whose mere purpose, accompanied by his pointing to his mouth, ridicules the white race. According to Ashcroft et al., the colonized mimic the colonizers against their expectations. Such "fluctuating relationship between mimicry and mockery" unsettles the colonial dominance (1998: 13), and undermines the colonizers' authority (Loomba, 2005: 149). Tensions then intensify between Mary and natives because they expect their master to be a man, not a woman.

While Mary's childhood plays "a traumatic role" in her behavior, and her mental state is continually deteriorating with social pressures (Büyü 89), she suffers from a sort of "tactile delirium", a sense of nausea to any touch by a man as Fanon defines the term (2008: 124). She "doesn't understand anything about sex or life" (Lessing and Ingersoll, 1994: 113). She feels "repelled by the thought of intimacies and scenes and contacts" (Lessing, 1973: 43); feels revolted when kissed (ibid.: 52), and has "a profound distaste for sex" (ibid.: 46) that makes her not a suitable wife for marital life with Dick. She also feels "nausea" when Moses touches her shoulders (ibid.: 186) that is a result of white women's "colonial fears" of rape by Negroes (Loomba, 2005: 139). Ironically, while Moses embodies the "colonial fears of African sexual prowess" (Roberts, 2003: 134), Mary suffers a lack of satisfactory sexual relationship with her husband.

This paradox leads Mary to develop an "intense emotional ambivalence" towards Moses (Georgescu et al. 2011: 27), and Moses turns into a projection of her repressed passions (ibid.: 29). Watching Moses washing himself, Mary's view is conveyed in a metaphorically sexual language: "Remembering that thick black neck with the lather frothing whitely on it, the powerful back stopping over the bucket, was like a goad to her" (Lessing, 1973: 177). "Thick black neck," "lather frothing whitely," and "goad" signify a threat of rape to the white woman. Lessing holds that the incident is on the model of a real scene which "was too directly sexual." The consequences of such observations develop within Mary, a woman with tactile delirium, the fear of rape by the black man.

Still keeping the white status quo, Mary treats her black servant as "an abstraction", "a machine without a soul" (Lessing, 1973: 188). But, unlike other natives, Moses calls her "madame" and follows "his desire to please her" to hear an approving word from her (ibid.: 190). In fact, in Fanon's words, the Negro wishes to be taken as white, and it is only a white woman who can do so by loving him and proving that he is worthy of white love. The Negro can thus be loved like a white man and becomes a white man (2008: 45). This requires that the Negro sleep with the white woman to enter "authentic" manhood (ibid.: 52). However, Mary's negrophobia is still a block to Moses' negritude, the common thing between them merely being the ambivalence of the space and double consciousness developing between them. As a white person, Mary feels the weakening of her control over her inferior and her increasing awareness of a sexual orientation towards him (Janik, 2002: 198). Moses' "powerful, broad-built body" enchants her (ibid.: 175), and she feels "helplessly in his power" (ibid.: 190).

Moses then enters Mary's life not only as a "symbol of color conflicts" but also as the embodiment of "a disruptive life force" which henceforward directs Mary's long-repressed emotions (Thorpe, 1978: 12). In other terms, the white woman's secret about the black man is "part of the ineffable." What she desires is her annihilation sexually; since the "delirium of orgasm" cannot be achieved in practice, the white woman avenges herself by drowning in "speculation" (Fanon, 2008: 131-132). That is why Mary habitually sits on the sofa speculating over what Moses does when he is tending the house. Further, Mary's nightmares and daydreaming infer psychological traumas. In those of her dreams in which Mary confuses her father with Moses, feelings of horror and incest are striking. In Freudian terms, the incestuous passion for her father is replaced with inclinations toward Moses, that is, the primary "incestuous taboo" is substituted by the "colonial taboo" (Georgescu et al. 2011: 29). Here the color bar, extremely internalized like the "infantile oedipal conflict", does not permit her to accept Moses openly (Aghazadeh, 2011: 117).

Breaking the color bar, nonetheless, Mary cracks "the formal pattern of black-and-white, mistress-and-servant" through her personal relation with Moses (Lessing, 1973: 177-178). Still more, the similar state of living of both of black slaves and poor whites like Mary and Dick develops a sense of equality with the white race in Moses. "The phrase 'poor whites' [...] caused disquiet [...], but there was certainly a race division. [...] 'Poor whites' were Afrikaners, never British" (ibid.: 11). Although Mary and Dick are "British, after all" (ibid.: 11), the initial law of settlers held that "Thou shalt not let your fellow whites sink lower than a certain point;" lest "the nigger will see he is as good as you are" (Lessing, 1973: 221). This colonial anxiety or "cultural neurosis" places Mary in a subordinate position and a neurotic state in which she cannot control her actions and speech (Aghazadeh, 2011: 116). On the other hand, Moses' first touch of Mary is a "skin-to-skin contact" that dismantles the racial boundary between them and threatens not merely Mary's identity but also the identity of the entire colonial settlers in the region (Georgescu et al. 2011: 36). Although she loathes any touch by him, she is comforted "by his voice firm and kind like a father commanding her" (Lessing, 1973: 187). Moses is able to calm her, against her racist feelings. This is most striking when Moses orders Mary to drink water. "Drink," he said simply, as if he were speaking to one of his own women; and she drank" (ibid.: 186).

However, the Negro cannot help remaining a "phobogenic object, a stimulus to anxiety"; "Negro-phobogenesis" is thus defined as the anxiety stimulated by the Negro (Fanon, 2008: 117). Mary develops such phobia, especially when she thinks of Moses touching her. As Fanon says, any physical contact is enough to evoke anxiety because it is the first step in the cycle of "touching, caresses—sexuality"

(2008: 120). Negrophobic women, who have mostly experienced unusual sex lives due to the lack of suitable partners of their own race, consider the Negro having powers lacking in them (ibid.: 122). Once Moses establishes his authority over Mary, her Negrophobia and Negro-phobogenesis grow tense; she seeks support from Dick “against the presence of the native” (Lessing, 1973: 187). And later, “It was a nightmare, the powerful black man always in the house with her, so that there was no escape from his presence. She was possessed by it, and Dick was hardly there to her” (ibid.: 206). Mary is pictured as Moses’ vulnerable victim while her husband is a mess.

Accordingly, Mary gradually develops “a fear of all physical intimacy” (Roberts, 2003: 134), or “tactile delirium” (Fanon, 2008: 124), specifically towards Moses. Such feeling causes Mary to finally find a safeguard against Moses behind Tony. Moreover, abandoning Moses for a vacation at the end of the story has already been made out. Moses, therefore, feels abandoned by the source of his illusory whiteness, the white woman. Such “abandonment neurosis” (Fanon, 2008: 52) accompanied by Moses’s trauma and inferiority complex, results in a “posttraumatic stress disorder” featured by the fact that the traumatic subject cannot effectively deal with the situation. Moses’ trauma thus ends up in murdering Mary (Kirton, 2010: 78), a cathartic act at the apex of his rage.

Moses’ ambivalent state of being is significant here. Bhabha defines ambivalence as “the complex mix of attraction and repulsion that characterizes the relationship between colonizer and colonized.” Ambivalence derives from the fact that the colonized is never absolutely against the colonizer. Thus, “complicity and resistance exist in a fluctuating relation within the colonial subject” (1994: 116). However, ambivalence dismantles the authority of the colonizer as the colonized mimic them against their expectations. Such oscillating condition between mockery and mimicry dismantles the colonial dominance (Ashcroft et al. 1998: 12-14). However, ambivalence does not merely indicate the traumatic state of the mind of the colonial subject but also the “workings of colonial authority” and “the dynamics of resistance” (Loomba, 2005: 149). Accordingly, the Negro should no longer submit to the dilemma “*turn white or disappear*,” he should try to actualize “a possibility of existence.” If he cannot deal with social problems because of his skin color, advising him to remain in his place is nonsense; but once he makes sense of his real motivations, he should rather perform an action or remain passive regarding the source his trauma (Fanon, 2008: 75). The final insult against Moses by Tony ignites the former’s sense of honor which is only achievable through an act of revenge. The Negro’s mission among the whites reaches its end when he is no more “palatable in a certain way” (ibid.: 135). Tony’s presence as a white man with a safe passion for Mary presupposes throwing Moses out as garbage,

ending his mission in sympathizing with Mary, and thus causing him to rise in defense of his honor than remain passive.

Double Effect Reasoning and Moses' Act of Murder: Revenge for Honor

Since "attempts at a hallucinatory whitening" (Fanon, 2008: 74), manifested by Moses trying to please the white lady in order for self-identification, fail him and he is dismissed, the black man revenges his honor. As a crime including a murder committed willingly by Moses, Moses' act of revenge can be discussed through DER for its permissibility or illegibility in defense of or against Moses, as the issue is interracial violence. For DER to permit an action with both good and evil aspects, four essential conditions should be actualized: "the act in itself is good or indifferent; the agent intends the good effect and not the evil effect; the good effect is not produced by the evil effect; and there is a proportionately grave reason for causing the evil effect" (Cavanaugh, 2006: 26).

Double effect considers "harmful effects that are regretfully intended as part of the agent's means" to be impermissible and "harmful effects that are regretfully foreseen as side effects of the agent's means" to be permissible (McIntyre, 2011: 12). According to Aristotle, some acts are wrong in nature, such as adultery, envy, theft, murder, among many, and the subject willingly doing them cannot be justified. Likewise, the first criterion in DER reflects the impermissibility of such acts (Cavanaugh, 2006: 27). In the second condition, the agent does not will any evil, "neither as his means nor as his end" (ibid.: 28). The third condition is taken as "redundant"; it confirms the fact that the agent may not will the evil effect as an end or as a means or, thus replicating the second condition (ibid.: 29-30). And the fourth condition compares "one's reasons for doing the good to one's reasons for avoiding the evil." Action requires the appropriate "gravity" of one's reasons for causing the good (ibid.: 31). As the third condition is redundant, in a simplified form, conditions turn into three: "an action independent of its evil effect is not intrinsically wrong; the agent intends the good and not the evil, neither as a means or as an end; the agent has "proportionately grave reasons" for his/her action, taking into account "relevant obligations, comparing the consequences," and regarding "the necessity of the evil," being cautious enough "to eliminate or mitigate it" (Cavanaugh, 2006: 36).

Moses' case is concerned with revenge and honor. Honor is morally grave, while murder is not. However, in the case of Moses and his traditional revenge/honor-based society, honor is attained only through murder/revenge. The "revenger is motivated by honor," and failure in exacting revenge will be shameful or brings dishonor (Kaufman, 2013: 110). As the chief value of pre-modern societies, honor

is an individual's "dignity or self-respect." Attacking an individual was attacking his/her honor, so honor was defended through "a physical confrontation with the wrongdoer." The side effects of revenge, even the cruelest ones, are thus rated as "secondary byproducts" and not as essential motivations in defending honor (ibid.: 121). Honor thus includes freedom as its central feature; a slave embodies dishonor while a free man personifies honor through showing courage against any threat of harm. Thus, "the supreme test of honor is courage" (ibid.: 124).

Kaufman talks about "revenge cultures" in which a victim or his relatives were supposed to revenge the wrongdoer, while in modern cultures, the legislative system judges for all (2013: 96-97). However, the complexities of social relations in some revenge or honor-based cultures make it hard for outsiders to make sense of the fact that these cultures cannot bear even "trivial insults." Such societies are somehow "insanely sensitive in the matter of honor" (Kaufman, 2013: 99). In revenge or honor-based cultures, the label of cowardice was not tolerating as far as it meant that one might not avenge a wrong against oneself. Thus, in pre-modern revenge systems insults and disrespect are taken as moral wrongs and it is moral to respond to them. The point is that systems are different "on just what wrongs count" (ibid.: 100). Therefore, the punishment of the white retributive legislation for a white person, like Charlie Slatter who kills a black man "in a fit of temper," is merely 30 pounds, while the penalty for a black man, like Moses, killing a white woman and unfairly accused of theft is hanging. Likewise, the penalty for dishonoring someone in the pre-modern black revenge system is the oppressor's life; Moses thus murders Mary to defend his honor as a black man defending his negritude.

Killing Mary is not accidental but intentional. But, according to DER, the question rises whether killing here is Moses' intention or his means to an end, his honor. The good end being the preservation or restoration of Moses' honor, Mary's murder becomes the bad side effect. Killing her is not the intentional means to save his honor, but saving his honor includes the evil side effect of her annihilation. It is impermissible to bring about her death intentionally. Rather, her murder is the foreseen side effect of retrieving back his honor. This is when revenge is called upon; Mary's death is the good effect itself, the bad effect being committing a homicide. Death of an oppressor white woman by an oppressed black man is the good effect for Moses as the suffered agent. Killing is thus a justifiable act for him to save his honor. If he wants to defend it, killing Mary is inevitable but not meant, and thus it seems permissible. Accordingly, as far as revenge against Mary is justifiable through Moses' mentality for the sake of his honor, the three conditions of DER manifested in this case are as such: Honor is morally and spiritually good independent of any evil effects; Moses intends the defense of his honor and not Mary's death neither as an end nor as a means; Moses has proportionately

grave reasons for murder, that is, his honor; addresses his obligations; reflects on the consequences; avoids unnecessary harm.

The first condition is concerned with Moses' motivation in murder. As something spiritual honor includes a more severe suffering than physical harms. Aquinas considers "scandal" "to be words or deeds that occasion another's spiritual ruin. Homicide harms another's corporeal life; scandal, his spiritual life. Accordingly, scandal harms another more gravely" (Cavanaugh, 2006: 14). That is why Moses decides to restore his honor against that scandal by the white race, since his failure in reviving his honor is a symptom of fear which is against his negritude.

The second condition holds that Moses does not intend Mary's death either as a means or as an end for the sake of his honor; it is only a side effect. "Intended" refers to ends and means, while 'foreseen' refers to side effects," means, side effects, and ends are all related to the agent and have ethical significances (Cavanaugh, 2006: 75). In other words, DER holds that the revenging agent can claim to foresee but not intend harm in permissible cases, while he cannot claim so in impermissible ones (ibid.: 85). Honor shall be restored and whatever happens in the conflict is a foreseen but not intended side effect. Although murder is wrong in itself, but the nature of the oppressor as that of a cruel racist who has dishonored a black man and dismissed him against his decency is not moral either. And it is necessary that the murder be looked upon through the black lens and not through that of the white mission in Africa. In the interracial struggle for defense and honor, such murders are inevitable.

Regarding the third condition, on the small scale, personal revenge includes "a strongly emotional component" intensified under "strong social pressures" (Kaufman, 2013: 97). Moses postpones Mary's murder as he does not kill her in the store when they are alone (Lessing, 1973: 247), or during the last day of Mary's life when Dick and Tony are out on the farm. Pressures on Moses reveal themselves in such static moments of his life as he does not act against Mary but merely hides and speculates until his full moon turns him into a murderer. Whether he has been waiting for the appropriate moment of revenge or overcoming his fear, what is evident is that speculation on revenge is on the run: "Though what thoughts of regret, or pity, or perhaps even wounded human affection were compounded with the satisfaction of his completed revenge, it is impossible to say" (Lessing, 1973: 256). Moreover, Moses is aware of the consequences of his action, his own punishment and no improvement in the condition of the black race. He also disdains from further harm to the white community as he lets Tony live in his sleep. DER excludes unnecessary harm or requires the lessening of any necessary harm, "proportioned to its end," and as Aquinas holds,

it is impermissible to use more-than-necessary violence (Cavanaugh, 2006: 33).

It is necessary here to quote Fanon that “to the identical degree to which [the colonizer] society creates difficulties for [the black individual], he will find himself thrust into a neurotic situation” (2008: 74). When the Negro contacts the white world, the weakness of the psychic structure of the Negro causes the collapse of his ego. He thus “stops behaving as an *actional* person.” His behavioral objective being the guise of the white man to achieve true white worth, the black man needs “self-esteem” (ibid.: 119). Fanon believes that “psychic trauma” occurs when the colonized realizes his otherness, that he can never achieve the desired whiteness and get rid of the devalued blackness. Bhabha, as Loomba understands him, expands this issue to suggest that “colonial identities” are always in a state of “flux and agony”, and that it is always with regard to the position of the Other that colonial ambitions are articulated (2005: 148). Dismissed from that desire by Tony’s presence, Moses, “to whom [Mary] had been disloyal, and at the bidding of the Englishman (Lessing, 1073: 254), develops what Germaine Guex calls “abandonment neurosis” (Fanon, 2008: 52).

Abandonment neurosis includes an “affective self-rejection” which “invariably brings the abandonment-neurotic to an extremely painful and obsessive feeling of exclusion, of having no place anywhere, of being superfluous everywhere in an affective sense.” The sense of otherness in such person infers “a shaky position” in which he/she is always likely to be refused (Guex, 1950: 35-36). The abandonment-neurotic

views everything in terms of himself. He has little capacity for disinterestedness: His aggressions and a constant need for vengeance inhibit his impulses. His retreat into himself does not allow him to have any positive experience that would compensate for his past. Hence the lack of self-esteem and therefore of affective security [...]; and as a result there is an overwhelming feeling of impotence in relation to life and to people, as well as a complete rejection of the feeling of responsibility. Others have betrayed him and thwarted him, and yet it is only from these others that he expects any improvement in his lot. (ibid.: 27–28)

As a “traumatic experience”, what befalls on Moses changes his “psychological, biological, and social equilibrium” in a way that the recollection of one specific event taints all other experiences, forcing him to merely reflect upon that experience and dismiss the present (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 1998: 488). Mary’s betrayal, as the

sum of all the cruelty he has suffered under colonization, is enough to enrage him toward murder. He has repressed his sufferings all through these years; they have become “latent forms of psychosis”, which reveal themselves as the consequences of a traumatic experience (Fanon, 2008: 62).

Intermingled with Moses’ neurosis is his native background. When “old tribal restrictions” among the Zulus and Matabele were abolished through Christianity, the natives with evil intentions but under those restrictions probably did what they desired in the newly gained freedom. Accordingly, the new evil is generally attributed to attempts at civilizing and Christianizing the natives during colonizers’ missionary endeavors which evaporated traditional boundaries. In African towns, there were men and women with Christian names leading bad lives. However, it was not clear whether they were real Christians or merely natives with Christian names. If they were Christians, being members of any mission and their probable dismissal “on account of their failings” were of real concern. If they were Christians and part of any mission, they were on the same level with people in England, where it was not supposed “that the failings of individuals prove the uselessness of Christianity” (Knight-Bruce 66-67).

Moses, as a mission boy, is a “decent” Negro whom Dick has brought into his household. He is wise enough to use the courtesy he has learned as a mission boy. One of the good aspects of mission-work in Africa was “the rapidity with which black heathen savages” distinguished between “indifferent white men,” who did not behave well, and the “missionaries” or those who tried to be fair to them (Knight-Bruce, 1985: 69). Missionaries had good servants who were in fact made to work well (ibid.: 71): they had to get up early, work consistently, and make much of time during the day. Although they were probably paid less than what was paid in European camps, natives preferred mission camps where they were “treated fairly” (ibid.: 72). As a mission boy and an educated Negro, Moses seems to have gone through all these experiences, as he works orderly in Dick’s house, and thus prefers fair treatment by his masters. He once forgave Mary after the whipping scene, but altogether forgiveness was unlikely ever observed “as a virtue” in African tribes (Knight-Bruce, 1985: 87). That is because the orientation to praise “strength” among natives made it difficult to teach them part of Christianity. Under the same conditions, natives preferred working for a white master who does not beat them than for a beating one, but they kept their admiration for the latter. “He represents strength—a chief’s characteristic; he is the greater chief of the two” (ibid.: 88). That is why Moses does not kill the strong Mary who whipped him in the face, the woman of strength as a powerful chief worthy of admiration, but he kills the weak Mary hiding behind a white newcomer. Accordingly, Moses’ act of murder is

permissible based on his own conception of betrayal and honor. Mary's getting away from the farm and her affectionate relationship with Tony ignite in Moses a sense of disloyalty from Mary. Thus, he sees Mary as an unfaithful mistress in his own manner and she has to pay for it with her blood.

To sum up, conventional Double-Effect principles emphasize the value of achieving the good end with the least possible harmful side effect (McIntyre, 2011: 11). The question here is whether murdering a white person by a black servant is justified. Because it is an interracial issue, it has certainly proponents and opponents. However, killing the oppressor white master is a good thing in the black eye, while the murder of a white woman by a black servant is terrible in the white eye. As Roberts says, Mary's body may stand for colonialism to be ruined by Africa (2003: 135). Thus, Moses becomes the prototypical African man for the whites to see and fear him (Lessing and Ingersoll, 1994: 100). However, Moses' submission after the murder solves the case. He commits a murder and defends it with his surrender, while he could easily escape the scene long before any one catches sight of Mary's body.

Moses' Act of Surrender

Moses finally reaches the decision to surrender himself at the end of his mental journey. Under Lobengula, as mentioned above, native criminals surrendered themselves willingly as there was no escape and it was in accordance with their courage and honor. "Over an ant-heap" is the place over which Moses is standing at the end of the story, as described in the first chapter of the novel, to represent his final state: traditional "impalement" or its white version "hanging", as he is going to be hanged for Mary's murder: "It was the tradition to face punishment" (Lessing, 1973: 14). But here seems to be another justification for his surrender not exclusively out of fidelity to his native tradition.

Moses revenges for honor which is his end and is worth fighting for. It is the essence of his negritude and defines the value of his pre-modern world; it is his dignity and self-respect. As a native, his honor and courage make the same word. Committing a crime, justified or not, does not allow him to escape. He must surrender to keep his tribal tradition, to keep the moral code of the late King Lobengula, to die with honor. As Kaufman says, in the pre-modern world and revenge or honor-based cultures, the assumption was that "no one could properly demonstrate his honor without his being willing to risk everything for it, including (indeed, especially) his life" (2013: 125). Moses' surrender is an act of negritude; by surrendering he is restoring his black roots. It is not out of fear from the white that

he surrenders but as a form of resistance and authenticity over the white master to reveal his own courage. Members of revenge or honor-based cultures had their own standards in categorizing harms which were to be revenged and the harshness required to do so (Kaufman, 2013: 100). Such cultures were ruled by “the principle of strict liability:” being responsible for a committed wrong, especially a death, either accidental or deliberate, justified or not (ibid.: 105). Accordingly, in the final scene of the novel, Moses most willingly and knowingly awaits the police and surrenders himself. In fact, “In the courage to risk one’s life in defense of one’s principles, honor masters the all-too-human fear of death and the more mundane pull of the desire for self-preservation” (Krause, 2002: 128). Moses knows his coming death but he still surrenders because of his honor.

Conclusion

Lessing seems to be criticizing England for its colonial policies and not even its lack of ability to teach true Christianity to Africans due to the maltreatment of Africans. Her novel suggests that races are unable to understand each other in full. This is mostly represented in the opening chapter when Tony Marston realizes that Moses will be hanged as he has murdered a white woman, without any sympathy for Moses. Tony is unable to understand the black race, since his white worldview is defected. And the fact is that Moses does not kill Mary after the whipping scene but after her betrayal and intimacy with Tony. This is a fact which should be investigated from the Moses’ own viewpoint towards life, which derives from his tribal belief regarding the defense of his honor which can merely be achieved through tribal revenge. Revenge is sometimes undertaken against an agent close to the aggressor. On the other hand, among pre-modern cultures, the presumed best form of revenge was punishing the aggressor face to face. On the other hand stands the corrupted picture of Christianity as shown to the natives. As a schoolboy trained in Christianity, Moses observes a white society against the pure Christian code of peace they are seemingly pursuing and trying to propagate. Moses’ revenge thus finds a broader scale of meaning than the mere murder of his oppressor. Metaphorically speaking, what Moses does is a two-edged sword of revenge: he kills the white woman, both as his oppressor and as the most notable attraction of the white race. Moses personally attacks the colonizer, face to face with its weak point, the white woman; hence, the “black peril”.

Moses’ revenge and surrender both signify his African honor and resistance against colonization. In such dilemma of love and hate, revenge and forgiveness, represented through Moses’ postponement of his revenge for at least one day after his dismissal by Tony and his subsequent surrender without resistance, Moses’

ambivalent state of living leads him to an act of murder and willing surrender which seem both justified on the grounds of his African honor and Double-Effect Reasoning, all rooted in his negritude and Christian trainings. Moses' crime of murder, though blasphemous under colonial Christianity which already condemns the black race because of their skin, reveals a code of honor in negritude and its defense; Moses wreaks the colonial oppression on the colonizers themselves still knowing that Mary will be sacrificed. Mary's death thus cannot be regarded as the result of a former lover's jealousy or the brutality of a black Negro. It is an honor-based murder/revenge. Moses' final heroically surrendering himself to further defend his African tribal traditions of punishment for a crime thus move in parallel lines with negritude and application of black ethics, a case study of South Rhodesia.

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THE 'ERASMUS GENERATION' AND TURKEY: THE EFFECT OF THE ERASMUS PROGRAMME ON PERCEPTIONS ABOUT TURKEY AND ITS EU MEMBERSHIP BID

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Abstract

The main research question of this study is how participation to Erasmus programme influences European students' perceptions of Turkey and its EU membership bid. The study evaluates the Erasmus programme's influence on student identities, particularly their European identity, and their perceptions about the compatibility of European and Turkish identity by analysing the responses of incoming Erasmus students at Bahçeşehir University (İstanbul) in Turkey to open-ended questionnaire surveys conducted at the beginning and end of the semesters between 2009 and 2011 to investigate the extent that the Erasmus programme can influence the perceptions of these students about Turkey. In addition, semi-structured in-depth interviews, conducted by the author with incoming Erasmus students at Bahçeşehir University at the end of the semesters between 2012 and 2014, were analysed qualitatively to evaluate the Erasmus programme's influence on the perceptions of these students about Turkey, Turkey's EU membership bid, their perceptions of the compatibility of European identity and Turkish identity and the role of the Erasmus experience in constructing a European identity in the young generation.

Keywords: *Turkey; European Union; Erasmus; European Identity and Prejudice.*

Introduction

Introduced in 1987, the Erasmus (European Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students) programme is one of the most visible practices of the EU influencing directly the lives of EU citizens, and usually considered one of the best components of EU policy. It is also one of the main instruments for constructing European identity.

Although education policy still remains mainly under the sovereignty of member states, the EU has tried to increase cooperation and coordination between them regarding higher education through the Bologna process. This has expanded to 47 countries, covering three million students. Russia and Turkey also participate in the Bologna process alongside EU member states (Aba 2013, 101). Through the Erasmus programme, it has encouraged interactions between students, professors and university officials. The EU's educational policy has tried to incorporate a European dimension into national and regional education systems (Brock and Tulasiewicz 1999).

Erasmus formed part of the EU's Lifelong Learning Programme, which had a budget of 3.1 billion Euros for 2007-2013. In 1987, 3,244 students from 11 countries participated in the programme, while by 2012-2013 these figures had risen to approximately 270,000 students from 33 countries. These included Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey, in addition to EU member states. Since it began in 1987-88, Erasmus, which is the largest such programme in the world, has provided over three million European students with the opportunity to go abroad and study at a higher education institution, while promoting the internationalisation of the European higher education system and contributed to its modernisation (Erasmus 2014, 5-6). It has also encouraged student, academic faculty and staff exchanges between Europe's universities (Papatsiba 2006, 99; cited in Mitchell 2012, 491). Spain sent the highest number of students abroad with 39,249 students, followed by France, Germany, Italy and Poland. The most popular destination for Erasmus students was Spain, which received 40,202 students, followed by Germany, France, the UK and Italy (Erasmus 2014, 7).

The motto of Erasmus programme is 'bringing students to Europe, bringing Europe to all students'. The idea is that bringing together students of different nationalities may enhance a sense of European identity among its participants and thereby creating European citizens (Prodi 2002; Figel 2006; Figel 2007; cited in Mitchell 2012, 491). Thus, the Erasmus programme has been promoted by the Commission as a means to increase 'European consciousness' among its

participants. It also helps European students to prepare themselves to work in an increasingly transnational economy (Mitchell 2012, 491). Youth exchanges in the EU have contributed to the goal of establishing 'ever-closer union of the peoples of Europe' which is the goal of the Rome Treaty. The Erasmus programme is one of the EU's main instruments for educational exchanges among the younger generations, including cultural exchanges, leading to the emergence of an 'Erasmus generation'. The programme was revised for 2014-2020 and renamed 'Erasmus +', incorporating the fields of education, training, youth and sport. One of the Bologna goals for 2020 is that at least 20% of all graduates from the European Higher Education Area should have spent a period of time studying or training abroad (Erasmus 2014, 6).

Erasmus students' experiences include learning about different cultures, meeting new people and being more independent, which influence their self-confidence and career plans, improves their academic knowledge, increases their opportunities to learn new foreign languages and improves their foreign language skills (Kropnik and Krzaklewska, 2006; cited in Mutlu et al. 2010). Student mobility is also thought to contribute to intercultural dialogue (Aba 2013, 107), while their perceptions about life, their social and political views can change more easily than those of older people by living in different societies and cultures. In this way, it hoped that the prejudices of younger people can be eliminated more easily than is possible with older generations.

Stereotypes are perceptions held about groups or individuals based on previously formed opinions (Samovar and Porter 1991; cited in Keles 2013, 1516), usually small pieces of information that help people to understand the world by categorizing people and situations that they encounter (Barna 1997; cited in Keles 2013, 1516). However, applied to individuals or different communities, stereotypes are often problematic because they are usually overgeneralized, simplistic or exaggerated. Stereotypes can also cause people to assume that a widely held belief is true, although it is not (Keles 2013, 1516). Personal inter-cultural contacts help people to overcome such prejudices and stereotypes about each other and bring them closer together (Sigalas 2009, 5). Since Erasmus students of different nationalities spend time together at the university, in dormitories, at Erasmus parties and while travelling together, they learn how to adapt to different cultures. Moreover, these social settings provide an appropriate context for eradicating prejudices and stereotypes (Mutlu et al. 2010, 39-42).

Several previous empirical studies indicate that Erasmus participants tend to identify themselves as European (King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003; Van Mol 2011). The potential of the influence of European mobility for promoting European identity

has been emphasized by transactionalists such as Karl Deutsch.¹ Deutsch et al. (1968), for example, argue that increased cross-border people mobility has a crucial influence on international integration and the emergence of a 'we-feeling' among peoples from different cultures. As they note, this is 'probably the most efficient and permanent method of gaining knowledge about human actions and values' (Deutsch et al. 1968, 170; cited in Sigalas 2009, 5). However, Connor (1972) criticised Deutsch for over-optimistically predicting that increased mobility and communication might lead to such a 'we-feeling' (cited in Sigalas 2009, 6). Currently, there is a debate about whether exchange programmes do create a European identity (King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003; Van Mol 2011), or whether those students who already feel European are more likely to participate in the Erasmus programme (Van Mol 2011; Wilson 2011).

Although Turkey has been associated with the EU since 1963 and was granted official candidate status at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, it is the least wanted candidate country. This is one of the main challenges regarding Turkey's integration with the EU; that member state public opinion is highly sceptical of Turkey's membership bid. Regarding European views, several historic prejudices and stereotypes about Turkey have negatively influenced EU citizens' perceptions about Turkey's membership bid, and this has been joined by rising Islamophobia in Europe, especially after September 11. Moreover, the integration problems of Turkish immigrants in several EU member states have increased prejudices about the cultural compatibility Turkish people and EU member states. Fortunately, increasing opportunities for exchange and participation in common projects can help overcome such prejudices and stereotypes. Turkey's drawn-out accession process has increased Euroscepticism in Turkish public opinion, especially following the stagnation of the negotiation process due to political factors, particularly the Cyprus issue and France's blocking of the process whose former President Sarkozy is against full membership of Turkey.

Turkey became 31st participating country in the Erasmus programme since 2004, since when it has been one of the most active participants, being involved in the SOCRATES, YOUTH and Leonardo de Vinci programmes. The Lifelong Learning Programme started in 2007, and includes COMENIUS for high schools, ERASMUS for higher education, LEONARDO DE VINCI for vocational education and training, and GRUNDTVIG for adult education. 129 Turkish higher education institutions hold the Erasmus University Charter, which enables them to take part in the programme. Between 2004 and 2010, Turkish Higher Education Institutions have

¹ For further detail, see K. Deutsch et al. (1968), *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

sent approximately 30,000 students abroad and received 9,000 students, while also sending 6,500 teaching staff abroad and hosting 4,300 (Studying in Turkey 2010).

The main research question of this study is how participation to Erasmus programme influences the perceptions of students about Turkey and its membership bid. It evaluates the Erasmus programme's influence on student identities, particularly their European identity, and their perceptions about the compatibility of European identity and Turkish identity. While there have been several previous studies of the role of the Erasmus programme in different participating countries, the literature concerning the influence of the Erasmus programme on incoming Erasmus students to Turkey, and particularly its influence on perceptions about Turkey, is very limited.

This article first explains how the EU's Erasmus programme developed and Turkey's participation in it. Secondly, in order to evaluate Erasmus programme's influence on the perceptions of incoming students about Turkey, it analyses responses to open-ended questionnaire surveys, conducted between 2009 and 2011 which were carried out at the beginning and end of the semesters with Erasmus students at Bahçeşehir University (İstanbul). The extent that the Erasmus programme was able to influence these students' perceptions about Turkey is analysed. The article then considers student responses from 14 semi-structured, in-depth interviews, conducted by the author between 2013 and 2014 with a random selection of incoming Erasmus students to Bahçeşehir University from the department of political science and international relations. A qualitative analysis was carried out to evaluate the programme's influence on the perceptions of these students about Turkey's EU membership bid, the compatibility of European and Turkish identity, and the role of the Erasmus experience in constructing a European identity in the younger generations.

A limitation of this study is that it was conducted in only one university in Istanbul, which is a foundation university based in the centre of Istanbul. To deepen this study's findings, further work should be extended to a greater variety of universities from Istanbul and other cities of Turkey to investigate more broadly the influence of the Erasmus programme on the perceptions of incoming Erasmus students visiting Turkey.

Erasmus Programme and Its Influence on the Perceptions of Students about Turkey and their European Identity

The highest level of student flow is from developing to developed countries because, if they gain international education experience, it is usually easier for them to find a job when they return to their home country. The countries receiving the highest number of students have been the USA and the UK, which are English speaking countries. However, with the rise of the developing world, particularly China and South Korea, there has been a decline in international student numbers in the USA and the UK (Aba 2013, 105).

The Erasmus programme aims to unite European societies by encouraging interactions between citizens of different European countries (Reilly 1993). Erasmus has never been just an education programme, as reflected in its official objectives stated in the Council decision of 1987. One of these is: 'To strengthen the interaction between citizens in different member states with a view to consolidating the concept of a People's Europe' (Council 1987, 21-22). Several scholars² also argue that the Erasmus experience may lead to emergence of a European identity.

According to Deutsch (cited in Sigalas 2010), high level international transactions over a period of time may lead to the formation of an integrated community of states and nations by allowing direct contact between people of different nationalities, which may lead to emergence of a 'we-feeling'. Fligstein (2008; cited in Demirkol 2013, 655) argues that with the influence of the interpersonal contact among people, they may start to see themselves more as Europeans and less as having only a national identity. Fligstein (2009, 133) argues that people who speak foreign languages and have travelled and lived in other European countries tend to have a stronger European identity than those who have not.

One of the goals of the Erasmus programme is to eradicate prejudices through student and academic faculty mobility, and by increasing interactions between European societies to unite them by increasing a European consciousness among EU citizens (Mutlu et al. 2010, 42). Not knowing the other is an influential factor in the emergence and maintenance of prejudices. Once people start communicating with others coming from different cultures and sharing experiences with them then prejudices can be partially eliminated. Breaking down prejudices leads to the emergence of tolerance and understanding (Mutlu et al. 2010, 39-40). As Sigalas (2006) argues, 'the more people socialise with each other, the more they trust

² For further detail, see N. Fligstein, *The EU, European Identity and the Future of Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; I. Petit, 'Mimicking History: The European Commission and Its Education Policy', *World Political Science Review*, Vol.3, 2007.

each other and the closer they feel'. The Erasmus students do not spend all their time at university and at the lectures; they also visit places in the host country and sometimes neighbouring countries; they have a chance to learn about the culture they are living in and they can improve their foreign language skills. Thus, Maiworm and Teichler (1995) found that the Erasmus experience increases knowledge of the host country's culture substantially, while Mitchell (2012, 497) reported that most Erasmus students find it easier to communicate with an 'international group' that includes other Erasmus students than with a 'native group' of host-country students.

In spite of its growth, the Erasmus programme still only has a modest reach. 3,000 students participated in 1987, increasing to 100,000 in 2000-2001 and more than 200,000 in 2009-2010, which is less than the target stated in the Lisbon Strategy of 10% of students in higher education. One factor is that there are still socio-economic challenges to student mobility, although a certain amount of funding is provided to help students with additional costs while studying abroad (Vossensteyn et al. 2010; cited in Mitchell 2012, 511). In addition, having weak or no foreign language skills also makes students less likely to study abroad (Mitchell 2012, 511).

In 2007, Erasmus became part of the 'Lifelong Learning Programme', which combines educational with vocational training programmes. In addition to EU member states, the Erasmus programme also includes Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Turkey.

As argued by Mitchell (2012, 499-511), the Erasmus programme has a transformative power over the participating students, who usually become more favourable of, and attached to the EU. Three-quarters stated that their experience of studying abroad made them feel more European. It has been shown that younger, better educated people have a greater tendency to identify as European than older, less educated people.³ After studying abroad, most Erasmus students stated that they became more interested in other European countries, other European cultures and in the EU, and felt more European. She also found that Erasmus students speak more foreign languages and speak them better than non-mobile students. Nevertheless, in spite of the growth of the Erasmus programme, only a minority of Europeans can benefit from it so its influence on the construction of a European identity is limited. According to Sigalas (2009), the Erasmus experience has helped British students develop a stronger attachment to Europe, and to realize that they have several things in common with those in continental Europe. 'When Erasmus students return back

³ For further detail, see J. Citrin and J. Sides, 'More Than Nationals: How Identity Choice Matters in the New Europe' in R. Herrman, T. Risse and M. Brewer (eds.), *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.

to their countries, they become ambassadors of European integration' (Wallström 2007, 4; cited in Oborune 2013, 194).

There is more Euroscepticism in the group of non-mobile students, who have not interacted with people from the European countries, than mobile students. Students who participate in Erasmus mostly have good foreign language skills, previous international exchange experience and a multicultural background. The programme has promoted the idea that 'we Europeans are all alike and foster trust and feel closer to Europeans'. However, the number of participating students is still very small in terms of the number needed to promote European identity. The Erasmus programme does not entail the loss of national identity as participating students usually have both a strong national and European identity (Oborune 2013, 193-194). That is, people may hold both a European identity and a national identity together.

According to the Erasmus Student Network (ESN) Surveys (2005, 2006) (cited in Krzaklewska and Krupnik 2008), Erasmus students become more open-minded and mobile as a result of staying abroad, and developed wide social networks abroad. They stated that they are better prepared for intercultural dialogue. As Krzaklewska and Krupnik (2008) argue, after their Erasmus experience, this may lead to a more tolerant and open society. However, Sigalas (2009) and Van Mol (2009) argue that students who participate in the Erasmus programme already have a European identity before joining the programme.

As well as experiencing other cultures, Aydın (2012) found that some participants emphasized how, during their Erasmus experience, they had opportunities to introduce their own culture to foreigners too. From research conducted at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, Poland, Mutlu et al. (2010, 39-42) found that changes in prejudices after the Erasmus experience were greater in Turkish students than EU students. They argue that this is because EU students already share more similar cultures to the host country so there is less change in their prejudices. For example, 88% of Turkish students agreed that, during the Erasmus programme, 'I abandoned my prejudices towards new things and people' but only 49.4% of EU students did. 76% of Turkish students agreed that 'I got away from my prejudices' while 45.5% of EU did. Similarly, the figures agreeing with 'I have learnt to live in different cultures' were 92% for Turkish students and 76.6% for EU students. Turkish students usually became more eager to learn foreign languages and make friends from other cultures after their Erasmus experience, although none of them were considering settling in any EU country, stating that they would rather visit EU countries as a tourist or student. These findings were supported by

Yağcı et al. (2007), who reported that a majority of students stated that they were more open to new cultures and differences after their Erasmus experience.

Mutlu (2011, 101) argues that the Erasmus experience usually contributes to students' personal development, particularly increasing their self-confidence, rather than academic development. Students usually refer to concepts such as discovering different cultures, new places and friendships, rather than concepts related with academic issues, such as courses, professors, university and library. She reports that students describe this process as enjoyable and productive. During their Erasmus experience, they enjoy discovering themselves more, as well as new places and cultures, making new friends and living in the 'European spirit'. Students can also introduce their own culture to their friends in the host country. She concludes that 'the students have left the majority of their prejudices behind through cross-cultural dialogue'. One of the key goals of the Erasmus programme is to remove prejudices through cross-cultural dialogue and to unite societies through increasing European consciousness. Mutlu (2011) argues that the Erasmus programme has been successful in reaching this goal.

In spite of the limited participation of European students in the Erasmus programme, especially because of the limited budget and lack of foreign language knowledge, it has had a crucial influence in increasing interactions between European societies and contributed to strengthening mutual understanding between different cultures.

Erasmus Programme and Its Influence on the Perceptions of Incoming Erasmus Students: The Case of Turkey

As a signatory country of the Bologna Declaration in 2001, Turkey has been trying to follow its requirements to integrate into the European higher education area. Through the process, Turkey has made crucial structural changes in its higher education system, although there are still many deficiencies in terms of implementation. The Erasmus programme allows European university students from various countries to study for one or two semesters at Turkish universities, and learn about Turkish society and culture. During their stay many of them have a chance to travel around Turkey, some of them learn Turkish, or at least start learning it.

The Turkish National Agency, which is one of the main organizations responsible for the implementation of the Erasmus programme and the Bologna reforms in Turkey, was established in 2002. Turkey's Erasmus programme was launched in 2003 (Aba 2013, 106).

Between 2007-2008 and 2010-2011 academic years, outgoing student mobility rates in 8 countries grew by more than 40%, with Turkey among them. Although many Turkish higher education students and academic staff have moved abroad for educational reasons, Turkey has not been a popular destination for foreign students. For example, in 2004, 1,142 Turkish students were sent abroad but only 299 Erasmus students came to study in Turkey. However, these figures rose to 10,095 and 4,288 respectively in 2010-2011 (European Commission 2012; cited in Aba 2013, 105).

Especially following the economic crisis in Europe, Europeans' interest in studying and working in Turkey has risen. The increasing number of foundation universities in Turkey, especially in major cities like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, many of which teach in English, has also made Turkey more attractive for Erasmus students.

Prejudice can be defined as unfair or intolerant attitudes towards another person or group because they belong to a specific religion, race or nationality (Samovar and Porter 1991; cited in Keles 2013, 1517). There are many historically formed prejudices and stereotypes about Turkey in European societies. The Erasmus programme provides several opportunities to learn more about the host country and its culture, which may help to eradicate the students' prejudices and stereotypes about that country. Demirkol (2013, 653) argues that educational mobility programs have a positive influence on the cultural integration. From studying Erasmus students in Turkey in 2011-2012 he found that they came to see Turkey 'as a part of the EU; they think Turkey's accession to the EU would favour the mutual comprehension of European and Muslim values, and a large majority of the students approve Turkey's accession to the EU' once Turkey complies with the EU's conditions.

The surveys were conducted by the author between 2009-2011 among the incoming Erasmus students at Bahçeşehir University in Istanbul, both at the beginning of the spring and autumn semesters and another survey was conducted at the end of these semesters with those incoming Erasmus students, who come from various departments. 53 Erasmus students were surveyed at the beginning of the two semesters in 2009-2011, originating from various countries, including Germany, Denmark, Latvia, Sweden, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Lithuania, Italy, Austria and Bulgaria. Most of the students who participated in both the surveys and the in-depth interviews were from Germany.

The responses indicated that most students chose Turkey, and particularly Istanbul, in order to discover a new different culture. Most of them had never been to

Turkey before and did not know so much about Turkey, having usually only gained basic knowledge from the internet. One of the Erasmus students from Lithuania stated: 'I knew very little about culture, food and people.' Some of them knew that, in 2010, Istanbul was a European capital of culture, and most of them were already interested in Turkey before they came. Nearly all had chosen Turkey in order to discover a different culture. Some chose Turkey, and particularly Istanbul, because some of their friends who had visited Turkey had recommended or else had come to Turkey on holiday. Some chose Istanbul, and particularly Bahçeşehir University, because the teaching language is English and they wanted to improve their level of English. Some of them stated that they expected to learn Turkish, and about the Turkish education system and Turkish politics. In addition to these, some of them stated that they expected to make new friends, to gain experience of studying abroad, to improve their vision and their knowledge in their fields of study, and to have fun.

When asked what they had known about Turkey before they came, some referred to Turkish history, particularly the Ottoman era. This prior knowledge was mostly based on the mass media or the comments of friends who had visited Turkey before. Citizens of EU countries who are of Turkish origin, especially German Turks, are usually interested in studying in Turkey as an Erasmus student. Some of these students stated that they had wanted to learn Turkish and about Turkish culture because they are living together with Turkish people. They also stated that they already knew something about Turkish culture because of the Turkish community in their country. One of the German students stated that 'there are many Turkish people in Germany but they live separately from parts of society. So it is a good chance to get used to Turkish culture.'

Another 17 students participated in the survey conducted at the end of the semesters in 2009-2011 at Bahçeşehir University. They were drawn from different departments and countries, including the Netherlands and Germany, with some being of Turkish origin, Italy, Spain, France, Bulgaria, Poland, Sweden and Denmark. All participating students were satisfied or very satisfied with their experience. They were mostly very satisfied with their stay in Turkey, particularly in Istanbul. One of the students from Italy defined Istanbul as a 'magic city' while another from Bulgaria stated that 'I fell in love with Istanbul. It is amazing, both a modern and ancient city.' A Danish student stated that 'I am quite certain that I will return to Istanbul again.' Regarding the positive aspects of their stay, they mentioned the people they had met from different countries, learning about a new, different culture, improving their level of English, travelling around during their stay, the Erasmus parties, personal growth and a good level of education. Most of them found Turkish people very

friendly. As one Polish Erasmus student stated, ‘after my stay I found Turkey more open, developed, friendly and a significant player in the 21st century’. Most of the students differentiated between Istanbul and the rest of Turkey, describing Istanbul as a large, crowded, interesting, exciting city, a melting pot, a meeting point between Europe and Asia.

During their Erasmus experience, students mostly socialised with their friends from the Erasmus programme, who come from different European countries, rather than their Turkish friends. In addition to other social factors, such as sharing a flat, participating in similar courses and Erasmus social activities, the language issue was another challenge for Erasmus students limiting communication with their Turkish friends.

The survey responses indicate that the Erasmus students usually do not focus on academic issues, expecting more to learn about a new culture and improve their language skills. They improved their cultural knowledge during their stay and usually reported stronger self-confidence. Some of them stated that there was a positive change in their perceptions about Turkey after their stay. One of the students from Netherlands commented that ‘I found Turkish people and culture much friendlier than I expected’. One of the students from Italy wrote that ‘I have to admit, before Erasmus, my perceptions about this country were really different’ while a French student stated that ‘I am surprised in a really good way’. One of the Erasmus students from Germany commented that ‘I was expecting to find Turks in Turkey more different. Here Turkish people are less conservative, more individualistic ... I did not have much contact with German Turks’. Another student from Germany stated that ‘I have a better idea about Turkey’s EU membership’. A student from Sweden stated that ‘there are changes in my perception of Turkey. I did not have a solid image of Turkey before I came but now I feel that I have a very positive experience of Turkish culture’. An Erasmus student from Spain stated that ‘my perceptions changed, also my family and visitor friends’ perceptions. I found Turkey and Istanbul a more open-minded and friendly society, which is not always the view that the media gives us’.

In addition to the surveys, in-depth interviews were conducted at Bahçeşehir University with incoming Erasmus students from various countries, including Germany, France, Spain, Greece and the Czech Republic. Most of the students who chose Turkey reported being interested in Turkey before they came; usually perceiving it as a country that is culturally different from most other European countries. Although only a minority of them had been to Turkey before, most of them were already interested in Turkey, especially Istanbul, before they came. In addition, English is mostly the teaching language at Turkish foundation

universities, which also influenced their choice. The Erasmus students who were interviewed mostly studied in the department of political science and international relations so they had mostly been already following Turkish politics and Turkey's EU membership bid. A high number of Erasmus students come from Germany, and they emphasized that they wanted to understand and learn about Turkish culture. One of the German Erasmus students stated that 'Germans usually know Turkey from the Turkish immigrants in Germany'. They expected that the Erasmus experience could help them to understand the culture of Turkish immigrants, which might help their communication and integration with them when they returned to Germany. Another German Erasmus student argued that 'German students usually prefer Turkey because they want to know more about Turkish culture and they mostly already have Turkish friends in Germany'.

Most of the interviewees emphasized that they would like to explore a new culture. Most of them stated that they had not known much about Turkey before they had come. Some stated that they knew about former Turkish Prime Minister and current President, R. Tayyip Erdogan, while a few mentioned Turkish singer, Tarkan, Turkish soap operas and Turkey's EU membership bid. During the interviews, which were conducted after the Gezi Park protests, most of the interviewees also mentioned these events. Many of them researched Turkey on the internet after being chosen as Erasmus students to study at a Turkish university. During their stay in Istanbul, most travelled to other cities in Turkey and some visited neighbouring countries. Most of the Erasmus students' family members or close friends visited them during their stay. In addition to the students, the Erasmus programme provides an opportunity for short visits to Turkey, to some family members and friends. In this way, the programme does not only influence the knowledge and perceptions of Erasmus students about the host country but also indirectly influences the perceptions of their friends and family members, although they are limited in number. One French student stated that 'my family was shocked when they learnt that I would come to Turkey. They accepted in the end. They visited me and they felt safe in Istanbul'. A Czech Erasmus student stated that 'a lot of people visited me here. Everybody was surprised and they change their view about Turkey after visiting me here. They were thinking that Turkey is so different'. She added that 'before I came, I was expecting Turkey more traditional too. Some cities are more conservative, but life is more European, especially in Istanbul. Erasmus is different than travelling in that country; while you are travelling you cannot see the life behind'. One of the Spanish Erasmus students stated that 'the people in Spain do not know about Turkey. My parents and friends came to visit me. My parents found it similar to Spain'. She added that 'we are the same in Greece, Italy, Turkey and Spain. Spain and Germany do not have any similarity. Istanbul is like Madrid and London. If you travel to the other parts of Turkey, it starts to change'.

The most frequently used adjectives about Turkey were: different culture, mixed, interesting, multicultural, unique, traditional, friendly. The most frequently used descriptions of Istanbul were open-minded, hospitable, different, multicultural, crowded and friendly people. Some Erasmus students stated that they started to learn Turkish a bit during their stay in Turkey. They mostly differentiated Istanbul and the rest of Turkey. One of the German students stated that 'Istanbul is definitely compatible with European identity.' One of the French students stated that 'I knew more about Istanbul, not so much about Turkey.' One of the German students stated that 'Istanbul is so different than Anatolia.' Another German student, who had a friend from eastern Turkey, visited eastern Turkey too, arguing that 'there is a big gap between the west and eastern parts of Turkey; they are more conservative in the east part'. She added that 'Turkey needs to minimise the gap between western and eastern parts of Turkey. If this gap were decreased, it would be easier to make changes in Turkey and it would be easier to be a member of the EU'. She also stated that 'before my Erasmus experience, I was thinking that Turkey is more conservative and not that open-minded. However, I saw that Turkey is not that different from our cultures. I found Turkey more open-minded than expected'. When she compared Turkish and German cultures, she stated that 'here it is more emotional, not so rational as in Germany; it would be good if it were so also in German or European culture. Also respect is very important here; not so important in my country'.

Some of the students argued that Turkey combines very controversial ideas within one country, in that religion and traditions are important for some segments of the society. Some of them reported that nationalism is very important in Turkey. In defining Turkish culture and identity, one of the German students stated that 'in Turkey there are so many different ways of life living together. Some of my Turkish friends are not different from my German friends.' Another German student stated that 'before I came, I thought that Turkey is too different than other European countries. People in my country usually had warned me about Turkey, that they will marry you, you will wear a veil'. One of the students from the Czech Republic stated that 'family is very important in Turkey; religion is one of the most important thing too'. She added that 'society is bound together, which is so nice; that is what we do not have in Europe. We are not like Turkey; we are more individualistic'.

The incoming Erasmus students do not have a common understanding of European identity, although most of them defined European identity on the basis of common values and norms. One of the students from Germany defined it as 'a lot of different cultures and languages, common history and shared values'. Another German Erasmus student defined it on the basis of 'Western values, democracy, human rights, solidarity and peace'. She defined her identity as 'more European than

German. I feel already European, now it is stronger'. After their Erasmus experience, some of them stated that they felt a bit more European. One of the French students stated that 'I defined my identity more as a French person; after the Erasmus experience I feel more European'. Most of them have primarily a regional or national identity before a European identity. One of the French students stated that 'when I am in France, I am from my region, when I am in Turkey, I feel more French'. She added that, after my Erasmus experience, 'I feel more French'. One of the German students stated that 'when I am in Germany, I have a strong regional identity'. A Spanish Erasmus student stated that 'I do not have a European identity, I have a Mediterranean identity'. One of the students from the Czech Republic stated that 'I was more negative about working or living abroad; I found it complicated.

However, after my Erasmus experience, I want to discover other cultures and I want to be abroad more'. One of the students from Germany stated that 'I am more open to strangers, more open-minded, losing fear of making new contacts and taking new challenges.'

A few of the students stated that they had already felt European before their Erasmus experience. One of the French Erasmus students stated that 'Erasmus is creating a kind of community. I feel more international'. A few stated that they primarily have a European identity. One Greek student, who mentioned that she is of Turkish origin, stated that, after her Erasmus experience, she feels more Turkish. One Spanish Erasmus student stated that 'I feel at home here', although she added that 'I feel more Spanish here; you miss language and food. I realize the things I like more about Spain'. She emphasized that 'I would like to travel more to have the best identity'. Thus, it seems that the Erasmus experience did not induce a major transformation towards having a European identity; rather, the students usually became more open-minded, more eager to travel and learn about different cultures, and to have more international experience. They were also starting to consider more doing masters in a foreign country or work in a foreign country after their Erasmus experience.

Affected by the recent debt crisis in their countries, the students from Greece and Spain were more sceptical about the EU project, even after their Erasmus experience. One Spanish Erasmus student stated that 'I was feeling a citizen of the world before Erasmus'. She added that 'if I am in Germany, I feel like a second class citizen; if I come to Istanbul, I feel European'. Especially after the economic crisis, some students were thinking about coming back to Turkey to do masters or to work for a certain period. A Spanish Erasmus student stated that 'in two years, I want to come back to Turkey again. I want to apply for a masters scholarship in Turkey.

I may work as a guide here.' Some of my former Erasmus students applied for a masters scholarship in Turkey. One former Spanish Erasmus student at Bahcesehir University, after finishing her masters degree in the UK, returned to Turkey, and is currently working for a company in Turkey after working there as an intern.

Regarding Turkey's EU membership, some argued that, if Turkey can meet the criteria and adopt the EU acquis, then it should become an EU member. Some of them criticised the EU's double standards towards Turkey. One of the German Erasmus students stated that 'Turkey is part of Europe. The long accession process of Turkey is not only Turkey's fault, also EU's fault.' Another German student stated that 'nationalism is important for Turkish people, which may be one of the challenges for Turkey while entering the EU'. Some of them mentioned the role of the rise in Islamophobia in Europe as one of the biggest challenges facing Turkey's EU membership bid. In addition, some mentioned the Cyprus issue as another challenge. On the other hand, most emphasised that democratisation and reform processes have to continue. One of the German students stated that 'most of Turkish society supports Western values. But Turkey has a lot of things to do for freedom of press, human rights and minority rights.' Another German Erasmus student stated that 'it is unfair to say Turkey can not be a member because the media is not free. Some countries in the EU, such as Hungary, have similar problems too.' One of the Erasmus students from the Czech Republic stated that 'before I was thinking that Turkey is so different, it would be much harder for Turkey to integrate to the EU. After Erasmus, I saw that they are not so different than us; they are really open-minded. Turkish people feel very excluded. If the boundaries are opened, Turkey and the EU can have better relations.' She added that 'after the economic crisis, Turkey does not really need the EU, especially in Istanbul. In the future, maybe it is better for Turkey to stay unique, rather than being part of the EU. I would prefer Turkey to stay aside, because I do not believe in the EU'. One of the German students argued that 'the EU can help Turkey in its transformation process and overcoming regional gaps'. Another German student stated that 'there is so much potential here; if there are some changes, Turkey can be a great member.'

Some of them emphasised Turkey's possible contributions to the EU if becomes a member state, particularly in terms of foreign policy. One of the German students stated that 'after my Erasmus experience, I started to understand Turkey-EU relations better. I am in favour of Turkey's EU membership, but I know that there are problems that are very hard to overcome. One of the biggest challenges for Turkey's accession is its size'. She added that 'if Turkey accedes, it will play a very important role'. Another German Erasmus student stated that 'if Turkey becomes a member of EU, Turkey has to decide which part of the world it should belong to'. As

a challenge facing Turkey's accession, she argued that 'if Turkey became a member, the EU would have new neighbours like Iran, Iraq, Syria, and I think it would be a big problem'. But she added that 'it would be interesting, if Europe were more open-minded, if it tried to integrate different cultures ... It would be good for each culture to learn from each other'. However, another German Erasmus student warned that 'if there were a referendum in Austria and France, it would be hard for Turkey to become a member of the EU'. One of the Erasmus students from France stated that 'if there will be a referendum, most of the French people will say no. French people are not ready, not only about Turkey; we are not so much in favour of the EU'. A Spanish Erasmus student stated that 'Turkey should do something in its own way. In the EU, Turkey will be second-class too'. A German Erasmus student claimed that 'if EU gave Turkey a more clear membership perspective, then Turkey would do more reforms. There is no real perspective, so there is no motivation to change'. She added that 'Turkish people are frustrated about the EU. They feel that they have done a lot already, but the EU is not fair to them'. One of the Erasmus students stated that 'the Gezi demonstrations are a good sign, because it shows that they want to have a change'. One of the French Erasmus students stated that 'the EU needs to have close relations with Turkey. Visa free travel is a good idea. Even for economic reasons, it is better for both Turkey and the EU'. Thus, during their stay in Turkey as an Erasmus student, particularly those who study in the department of political science and international relations, had a chance to learn more about the challenges and prospects of Turkey's EU membership bid.

Conclusion

Although Turkey began participating in the Bologna process and the Erasmus programme after EU member states, it has made great progress, with the number of students and academic staff involved increasing a lot since its introduction (Aba 2013, 108). Nevertheless, although numbers of incoming students have been rising in recent years, Turkey is still not a popular destination country for Erasmus students yet.

According to the surveys that were conducted at the beginning of the semester, Erasmus students' main reasons for choosing Turkey were discovering Turkish culture and Istanbul, which they found different and interesting. One of the students from Germany wrote that 'I chose Istanbul more than Turkey', and added that 'Istanbul is rich in terms of culture, history and life.' In addition, they usually reported coming to meet people from different countries and to make friends from different European countries, to improve their English, to learn Turkish, and to visit new places. Nearly all of them had not known much about Turkey before they

came, and most had not visited before. Most of them did not have a prejudice about Turkey before. When asked what they had known before they came, most mentioned knowing where Turkey is and parts of its history. Some heard recommendations about Turkey from friends who had participated in the Erasmus programme. The students were usually open-minded and eager to learn different cultures, having already been interested in Turkey, Turkish culture or different cultures before they had come. Most of them wanted to discover Turkish culture, which they found interesting and different from other European countries. Some of them expected to improve their level of English. They had heard more about Istanbul than the rest of Turkey. German students, in particular, emphasized that they would like to learn more about Turkish culture in order to understand Turkish immigrants in Germany better. Most of the German students chose Turkey to understand and learn more about Turkish culture due to the presence of the Turkish community in their country.

By the end of their stay, nearly all of them had enjoyed being in Istanbul. Nearly all of them found Turkish people hospitable and friendly. Thus, the Erasmus experience has a strong effect on the perceptions of the incoming students about Turkey. However, it has to be mentioned that most of them did not have a prejudice about Turkey and they would like to discover and understand a new culture. Although they had not known much about Turkey before arriving, they were mostly interested in learning different cultures. Although they mostly did not become more European after their Erasmus experience, they became more open-minded, and more interested in studying and working in different countries. Thus, the Erasmus programme has some ability to help overcome prejudices and stereotypes about Turkey, although it is limited. They mostly differentiated between Istanbul and the rest of Turkey, although some did not visit other areas. They found Istanbul exciting and similar to other European cities and European culture.

The Erasmus programme not only influences those who participate in the programme but also those who do not participate (Maiworm 2001). The family, relatives and friends of participating students sometimes visited them during their Erasmus stay. In addition, when Erasmus students go back to their countries, they share their experiences with their family and friends. This study found that most of the students' parents, even those who had prejudices about Turkey, visited their children and mostly liked Turkey, particularly Istanbul, which caused them to change their perceptions.

The Erasmus students tended to become more aware of the real challenges and contributions of Turkey's accession to the EU for both sides, especially the students

of political science and international relations and European Union studies. Most of them argued that Turkey can become a member if it continues the reform process.

There are some limitations in this study. Firstly, the research was conducted only at one university in Istanbul. Open-ended questionnaire surveys were conducted with different students at the beginning and end of the semesters, while in-depth interviews were conducted only at the end of the semester after their Erasmus experience. For future studies, it would be better to hold in-depth interviews both at the beginning and end of the semester with the same students because they might already have positive perceptions towards Turkey having chosen this country for their Erasmus programme. This research needs to be extended to different universities in different cities to further investigate the influence of the Erasmus programme on the perceptions of incoming students about Turkey.

Further research is needed concerning the prejudices of outgoing Turkish Erasmus students, and how their Erasmus experience influences their perceptions about the EU, European culture and the Erasmus programme, how their Erasmus experience changes their views of Turkey's EU membership bid, as well as their sense of European identity.

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POWER RELATIONS IN PARINOUSH SANI'EE'S *SAHM-E MAN (THE BOOK OF FATE)*: A NEW-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

This paper is an attempt to critically analyze Parinoush Sani'ee's *Sahm-e Man* (translated into English as *The Book of Fate*) from a New-historical perspective. Beginning from before the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and going forward through the reign of the Islamic Republic to the current years, the time-line of the story shows five decades of changing fortunes of Sani'ee's main character. Reading her book in the light of New-historicism, this paper tries to show how the story reflects Foucauldian notions of resistance, power relations, normalization, and self-formation in the five phases of Massoumeh's life. Considering Foucault's arguments on how power imposes ideology on the citizens, the paper also tries to reflect how it changes in each phase of Massoumeh's life and how it normalizes her to make her into a docile subject whom it can best control. Added to that, the paper tries to demonstrate her success in resisting the power and acquiring an ethical self through practicing a care for her 'self'. However, in spite of all her resistances to power and normalization, in the last phase of the story when the novel's discourse is more emotional, Massoumeh gives up resistance and accepts normalization, and for the sake of her children's satisfaction, rejects Saiid's proposal, and like most of the widows in her age, decides to live alone to the end of her life.

Keywords: *Sahm-e Man*; New-historicism; Normalization; Foucault and Power Relations.

Introduction

In "Historicism" (2006) Simon Malpas writes "Historicist criticism of literature and culture explores how the meaning of a text, idea or artifact is produced by the way of its relation to the wider historical context in which it is created or experienced" (p. 50). Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, new historicism has provided some of the most up-to-date issues of the modern life and the most applicable techniques of reading in literature and culture. Most of the advocates of this intellectual movement have themselves been the leading authorities in disciplines as different as psychology, sociology, philosophy, and therefore have had a variety of theoretical and political affiliations. However, about apparently similar texts they have often thought much differently. In addition, although Stephen Greenblatt, one of the most well-known exponents of New historicism, claims that it is "no doctrine at all" (Greenblatt, 1989:1), it has principles to which many of its proponents often appeal.

Its first principle is that it looks upon change not only as basic but inevitable also. It is liable to impinge upon a society's most fundamental beliefs about itself and always capable of transforming whatever appears fixed and stable in life. New historicists are interested in examining the processes of change and the construction of power systems in particular periods or cultures, and they attempt to analyze the structures of meaning on the basis of which they come to self-recognition. Therefore, a New-historical reader of a literary text assumes that its meaning is rooted from the historical context in which it is located, and that with the moving forward of history the text changes also. For a historicist critic a text is typically related to a wide range of social, cultural, political, and economic realities and so an isolated text has little meaning. Even the most natural issues like truth and justice along with the most obvious ideas like differences between man and woman can acquire different cultural meanings, and are likely to change in the future.

The approach of a New-historical critic to a text is not based upon the truth or falsity of its meaning. His approach is also not based upon if its mode of representation is more or less genuine than the contemporary modes. Rather, he sets out to determine how and to which degree the text has historically changed, to certify if its meanings are central to contemporary debates, and to examine the assumptions that lie behind what today are the established "frames of intelligibility"; that is, the natural way of thinking about the world and experiencing it. Therefore, the two-fold focus of a new-historical approach to literature lies in the heart of a criticism of history, literature, art, politics and identity.

The great aim for New-historical critics is not to discover universal truth or eternal verities, but rather to open such ideas up to critique by exploring the way in which they are products of specific historical circumstances and sources of political power and the means of control. New-historical critics have drawn three key premises from the work of Michel Foucault: (a) history is discontinuous, (b) a given period is better understood as a site of conflict between competing interests, and (c) a discourse is a unified whole and function of power. In this regard, they usually refer to Foucault's assertion when he says,

History is made up of different series of facts or dated events, which are juxtaposed to one another, follow one another, overlap and intersect, without one being able to reduce them to a linear schema, so that discontinuity has now become one of the basic elements of history (Foucault, 2002: 8).

He also argues that "power is not something that is acquired, seized or shared, something that one holds on or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations" (Foucault, 1984: 94). A best reflection of this argument can be observed in the societies with revolutionary experiences, where after the actual overthrow of a central power, the social relations of individuals and institutions determining the shape and structure of power still remain active to impose their own ideologies on each other and shape a new central power. In line with this, Foucault claims that "Power is everywhere not because it comes from everywhere ... it is the name that one attributes to complex strategically situations in a particular society" (1984:93). While the history of a nation may overlook these centers of power, its great literatures can detect and analyze them. According to Greenblatt, "The work of art is the product of a negotiation between a creator or a class of creators, equipped with a complex, communally shared repertoire of connections and institutions and practices of society" (1989:12). New-historicism tends to equip scholars with a fair view to reflect the hidden angles of relations in societies under discussion. Brook Thomas writes, "At this specific historical moment, the specific quality of literature may well be its historicity, a historicity that gives it the potential to develop the socio-historical awareness lacking in some of our students"(1987: 520). In "New Historicism" Hoover writes:

Robinson advocated in *The New History* of influencing the present, but with literature: A product of the past, forever capable of reproduction in the present, literature can help create a historical consciousness that reflects upon and judges our present situation, a reflection and judgment necessary if our students are to help determine what sort of future they will have (1992:358).

Tracing the New-historical concepts like experience and resistance in Sani'ee's novel, the present paper is to zoom on the analysis of her main character's resistance to the power. In other words, the central question of the present research is if Massoumeh, who in her patriarchal family is a daughter and a sister, and after her marriage, the wife of a Marxist activist and a prisoner, and also the mother of three inconsiderate children, can resist the established power in any phase of her life. If she can, how does she achieve this accomplishment, and what is the outcome of her resistance?

Massoumeh before Marriage

Foucault encourages us to practice liberty and provide ourselves with new forms of subjectivity through the application in our life the techniques of self-care. He urges us to think, act, and relate to ourselves differently from when we had no liberty and therefore were submissively programmed or managed. He maintains that "We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of (the) kind of individuality that has been imposed on us for several centuries.Liberty is a practice ... Liberty is what must be exercised" (1984: 239-56).

At the outset of the novel we realize that only the males have the right to make decisions, the right which is often at the expense of the females' freedom and individuality, for they have only to submit and be faithful to the males. And the tragedy becomes even more acute when a female thinks or behaves differently from a male authority. Foucault believes that self-caring is an outcome of freedom while freedom is itself reciprocally the result of our engagement in self-caring. Freedom is also both the ground for and the result of acting ethically. Foucault suggests that 'care of the self' is a possibility of resisting to anything that threatens our identities like normalization, for in freedom we can practice 'care for the self' through which we have a say in the formation of our selves. If the subjects are not involved in the construction of their own selves, they will be annihilated.

In Massoumeh's family, who moves from Qum to Tehran at the outset of the novel, the dominant discourse originates outstandingly from Qum, and so it is fundamentally religious. It is strongly patriarchal also. Under the influence of it, young females in family are more than often discouraged of going to school but to get married, early in their teens, to men whom they neither love nor even know. However, to neutralize this double-faced power that wants to normalize Massoumeh, she has her own policies and techniques of resistance. For example, she takes care for her 'self' by acts of meditation, by praying to God, and by crying before her father. These she does to beseech her father to allow her to continue her schooling.

And her techniques work well enough, for before long she is allowed to continue going to school. Therefore, the job Massoumeh does radically goes counter to the conventions of her society. Her progress at school is so rapid and encouraging that it excites her to solve her social and familial problems through a policy of resistance. In the novel we read,

Ahmad was so angry that he wanted to strangle me and used every excuse to beat me up. But I knew what was really eating away at him and so I kept quiet. My school was not that far from home, a fifteen-to twenty-minute walk. In the beginning Ahmad would secretly follow me, but I would wrap my chador¹ tightly around me and took care not to give him any excuse. Meanwhile, Mahmoud stopped talking to me altogether and completely ignored me (Sani'ee, 2013:5).

During the two years of her schooling, there is a constant display of power on the part of her family, her brothers in particular, to stop her doing it. Foucault claims that power is “the name for conditions of possibility for an action upon action” (1992: 131-2). This is what we see in the relation between Massoumeh and her family members during these years in the way her brothers and even her mother more than often discourage her from going to school and belittle her progress there. Massoumeh says,

I received excellent grades in my end-of-term exams, and the teachers praised me a lot. But at home no one would show any positive reaction to my grades. Mother didn't quite understand what I was telling her. Moahmood snapped, ‘So, what? What do you think you have achieved?’ and Father said, ‘Well, why didn't you become the top student in your class? (Sani'ee, 2013:13)

In “Foucault and the Study of Literature” Freundlieb asserts that Foucault has “treated discourses as the primary sites for the social production of knowledge and truth” (1995:319). Massoumeh is smart enough to soften her father's heart through her policy of kind and polite conduct. She makes him come to school, negotiate with her teachers, and register her name for a higher class in the next year. This is an ideal condition for her because of which she is so excited. However, this ideal condition is too short in time, because a short while afterwards Ali, her younger brother, detects her romantic relationship with Saiid and reports it to their family.

¹ An outer garment or open cloak worn by many Iranian women and female teenagers in public spaces or outdoors

This is the beginning of really tragic stages of her life. When they discover Said's love letters in her bag, they get sharply angry with her, imprison her at home and even punish her physically, and finally decide that she must get married before long. Through a neighbor, a young man proposes marriage to her. But up to now neither this young man has ever seen Massoumeh nor has Massoumeh met with or talked to him. However, her family hastily arranges her marriage to him. In this way, she is made into a docile subject who finds no possibility of resistance. More than one time she even tries to commit suicide to free herself from the pressure of these conditions. But all her attempts for taking suicide are futile. As it turns out, before long she finds herself the lawful wife of this man whom she neither loves nor even knows. Now she observes that all the ways of resistance are closed to her, and so she decides she must yield to her fate.

In his doctoral dissertation Taghizadeh claims that "Nietzsche and Foucault see experience as constructed by costumes, practices and institutions in which one lives and grows" (2008:350). He argues that these costumes and institutions historicize the self and experience, for "Self is not a given or a metaphysical essence that should be discovered, but is an identity that should be constructed" (2008: 350). Accordingly, and in the new conditions which are imposed on Massoumeh's life, she decides to construct a new self, to change herself to a new person. But for this purpose she firstly surrenders herself to her fate. In Sani'ee's novel we read,

I threw away the razor, I couldn't do that (suicide), like Ms. Parvin, I, too, should yield to my fate ... I buried Saeed's memory in the deepest nook of my heart and cried at his grave for hours, for I had to leave him and let the course of time make me cold and negligent and clear his memory from my mind. Will such a day come a day? (Sani'ee, 2000: 110)

Massoumeh's Married Life before Revolution

Massoumeh's husband is with a background of Marxist ideology. So, at the beginning of her married life she realizes that she has to cope with a life condition that is hugely different from her life before marriage. Primarily she feels both happy and secure. But soon afterwards she finds out that the new life contract is finally not to her good. In chapter two Hamid says,

Everyone should be free to do whatever s/he would like and thinks is due, marriage does not mean that you should interfere with your partner's activities, but spouses should support each other, shouldn't they? I nodded wholeheartedly and admitted the truth of his talks. As well, I had understood

him quite well: I also was not to interfere with his activities. So, this mutual understanding came to be the non-written agreement (law) of our married life. According to this agreement, I would enjoy a part of my human rights however finally it was not to my good (Sani'ee, 2000: 131).

Freundlieb affirms that Foucault “took the relativist view that discourses develop their own specific standards and criteria for acceptability of statements” (1995: 328). Hamid, her husband, is a Marxist intellectual and a political activist. Both in knowledge and experience he is superior to her. So in her new life too she finds herself bounded to a different authority that wants to normalize her, a kind of authority which firstly does not seem harmful or frightening. Massoumeh says,

Beside him I was walking comfortably, we talked with each other. He talked more than me. Sometimes he talked so formally. He talked to me like a teacher teaching a stupid pupil, but it was not unpleasant to me at all, for he was really knowledgeable (Sani'ee, 2000: 131).

Mephram and others claim that “we can learn a great deal about the power relations between characters by analyzing who is in control of a conversation, who speaks most, and for the longest amount of time” (2006: 10). Massoumeh is a born Moslem, whom we know as an advocate of the Islamic ideology of her time, because she never wholly accepts Hamid's ideas completely but tries to resist them while she also defends her own outlooks. Yet, the fact that after a passionate ideological debate with Hamid's friends, she miscarries the fetus in her womb can be taken as a symbolic step for rejecting many of her previous outlooks. She says, “My sadness was accompanied with the feeling of a painful sin, the bases of my beliefs had shaken, I was sad and hated those who had shaken them” (Sani'ee, 2000: 159).

In an online interview with the website “Navadhashtia”², Saniee, says “Hamid and his friends represent the young intellectuals who, at that period of time, were devoting their lives to Marxist activities against Shah's government” Coming to live with Hamid and Massoumeh, Shahrzad gives an opportunity to the latter to learn more about the Marxists' ideologies and the life style of Iranian Marxists; that is, how seriously they had to fight against Shah's regime, and how pitiful and painful the life condition was for an intellectual woman like Shahrzad as a political activist. In chapter 3 of the novel we read,

(Shahrzad): I feel jealous of you, you are a happy woman.

² Navadhashtia is an online Persian website for downloading books.

(Massoumeh): Who?! Me? Do you feel jealous of me?

(Shahrazad): Yes, maybe it's the first time I feel like this.

(Massoumeh): Surely you are joking, it is I who should feel jealous of you, I have always wished to be like you, for you are an extraordinary woman who is so knowledgeable, powerful, and able to make good decisions, I always think Hamid has always wished to have a wife like you, but you say ... Oh, no! Surely you are joking, the reality is that it is I who should feel jealous of you, but I do not find myself deserving even for jealousy to you, for it is like an ordinary guy should feel jealous to the Queen of England.

(Shahrazad): What stuff you say, I am nobody, you are much better and more perfect than me, too much a lady, a good and lovely wife, a kind and understanding mother, with such a great love for reading, learning, and self-sacrificing for your family (Saniee, 200: 237).

Freundlieb (1995) writes,

Literary criticism, particularly within a pedagogical context, could be regarded as working on the soul instead of on the body, and as part of an apparatus of ethical surveillance and normalization, including self-surveillance and self-fashioning, similar to that which operates in religious practices (330).

Bewildering for Sani'ee's main character are also the facts of Shahrazad's married life. Shahrazad often cares more diligently for herself than Massoumeh. But when the latter realizes that Shahrazad is, like herself, the victim of a cruel politico-ideological power structure, she becomes terribly shocked. When she finds more about Shahrazad's terrible life, about her strange love and marriage, and about her and her husband's horrible death, Massoumeh gains a stronger identity which makes her capable of facing the great problems of her future life.

The impact of Massoumeh's new identity can be observed in the style of her conduct when she advises her father that Mahmoud should not be allowed to make her sister Fati marry a man whom she does not love. Also, her kinsfolk suggest that instead of working for the expenses of her life she has to stay at home and receive them from themselves or even from her father-in-law. But when she decisively opposes with their suggestion, the impact of her new identity becomes even clearer.

Massoumeh's present life conditions are again critically bad, because she feels not only lonely but, due to her husband's anti-regime secret activities, embarrassed also. However, to alleviate the impact of these bad conditions, she uses other means

as well. A means which she uses is that in spite of the fact that her husband is primarily reluctant to become a father, she makes him become the father of two babies. In these conditions, her husband's long and repeated absences from home make her take the responsibilities of a married life alone to fulfill them without any complaint. Added to that, her maternal love and the care she takes for her children give her more energy and excitement to continue living. In chapter 2 we read,

Finally on one beautiful day in May I felt strong enough to make up my mind. So I told myself, 'I should get up, I am a mother and have responsibility toward my child. I should be strong and stand on my feet and help my son grow in a happy, healthy environment.' This decision changed everything and activated my inner joy (Sani'ee, 2000: 178).

This is another vindication of Foucault's theory that "Power is everywhere," and that power originates from within the subject. As is the case with Sani'ee's character in her maternal position, while her love for her children gives her the energy to tolerate her difficult life conditions and fight against depression and disappointment, it too controls her in her own way of pleasure and progress.

Sani'ee's main character uses still more policies to change herself to a stronger personality while she also attempts to vanish her fear of disappointment and loneliness. She continues her studies at the university to get a B.A. But it seems that life makes her really exhausted, because now she is the mother of two young children, she has the responsibilities of the wife of a political activist in prison, and she is a secretary in an organization where she has a full-time job. However, her husband's warm and encouraging words make her motivated enough to register at the university for the winter semester. In chapter 3 her husband tells her

You can do it, you are no longer the clumsy girl of ten or eleven years ago, but are a competent and hardworking woman who can change anything which is seemingly impossible into a possibility. I am really proud of you' (Sani'ee, 2000: 271-2).

Another crucial event in this period of Massoumeh's life is her father's death. When he was living, and after the imprisonment of her husband in particular, her father was so kind and supportive to her and her children. So, after his death she feels quite hopeless and frustrated. However, it is because of her children that she once again comes to make a proper decision. Returning home from the graveyard, Massoumeh asks her two sons; that is, Siamak and Mas'ud:

What you think we should do for the grandeur and respect of his memory? What does he expect us to do? And how should we live to make him satisfied with us? And so I understood myself that I should try to turn to the usual conditions of my life and to continue my habitual life while I will have his dear memory with myself until Doomsday (Sani'ee, 2000: 282).

At this stage of Sani'ee's story, the role of death as a controlling device in the hand of power is easily observable, for it is by death also that it controls and normalizes the subjects. Believing in the life after death, and to show respect to their newly died grandfather, Massoumeh and her children decide to continue their usual life that is the life of a normalized subject. So Foucault's idea in the positive role of power is confirmed once again.

The physical torture inflicted on Hamid in prison, his great will and strong belief in the Marxist ideology which excites him not to surrender to those tortures, in addition to Massoumeh's hard life and the hard lives of her children during their father's imprisonment all translate how intellectuals could resist the political regime of Pahlavi's corrupted power in that period.

In the Times of Revolution

In "Iran: The Spirit of A World without Spirit" (1988), Foucault focuses on the 1974 Iranian revolution in the times of the great upheaval. In the 1960s and 1970s there was a tendency in Iran to cast off all the rules and trappings of the bourgeois capitalist society. So, one can claim that there was a considerable sensibility against those oppressive regimes. In much earlier Marxist thinking, the overthrow of the state and the liberation of the working classes through (something like) a revolution were among the basic aims of many political activists. However, in "Truth and Power" Foucault maintains that "Revolution is not necessarily a simple freedom from oppression, a complete challenge to bourgeois power, and an overturning of power relations, since the State consists in the codification of a whole number of power relations" (1984:115). Yet, it seems that for Foucault revolution is not necessarily a practical challenge to the power and a way to freedom, because later in the same article he writes "the State consists in the condition of a whole number of power relations which render its functioning possible, and . . . revolution is a different type of codification of the same relations" (Foucault, 1984:122).

The changes happening in the social discourse around Massoumeh ground

the formation of new powers. The role of these powers in her life makes her resist in new ways, because to make herself and her children into ethical selves, she is to care not only for herself but for them also. In this process, the first and foremost event is the radical change in conduct of her brother Mahmoud's behavior to her. Now it is four years that Massoumeh's husband is in prison with Mahmoud having had almost no connection to her. But it is strange that he has newly sent some boxes of foodstuff like rice and oil to her. However, Massoumeh firstly considers them for charity and so firmly rejects them. In chapter 4 she tells Mahmoud on the phone: "Thank you, Brother, I mean, I surely can afford my life, and I do not like my children to grow on charity. Please send somebody to take these back" (Sani'ee, 2000: 287).

It is already four years that Massoumeh's husband is in prison, and the people around her, her colleagues at work for example, have often refused even to greet her warmly. However, soon she realizes the reason why recently they should be renewing their connections with her and her children. It is likely, more than ever before, that the political prisoners get free, because Iran is at the threshold of a (political) revolution. So, by renewing their connections with Massoumeh and her children, the people around her often imagine they can take advantage of Hamid's reputation to integrate themselves with the new revolutionary structure coming to power, because as an anti-Pahlavi regime activist in prison, Hamid, when freed from there, will be considered both a political pioneer and a social leader.

Then, her colleagues at work often show more respect to her. In a party meeting, one of them gives a formal exaggerated speech about her courage in political activities, and then asks her to be the representative of the party. But she rejects this offer also, claiming that what has been said about her is not true. In this phase of her life, honesty, moderation, and righteousness are surely her most practical policies for constructing her ethical self, while in the dominant discourse of the revolution it is likely that the people change the mode of their oral communication and their behavior to get better (social) positions.

But Massoumeh cannot cope with the present conditions, because on the one hand the effect of the Pahlavi Power structure is so huge upon her that she cannot resist. On the other hand, in its political and cultural discourse, the upcoming revolution shows very promising. Therefore, she decides to close her eyes upon her up-to-now continuous contest with her brothers, and instead to cooperate with them in their activities against the Pahlavi regime and so help pave the way for the revolution. Massoumeh says,

Mahmoud used to bring cassettes and manifestos, Ali to duplicate them, I to distribute them in the university and at

work; together with his classmates, Siamak used to attend the anti-regime street strikes, and Mas'ud to draw the picture of striking people in the streets" (Sani'ee, 2000: 291).

In another article: "What Are the Iranians Dreaming About?" Foucault writes, The situation in Iran can be understood as a great joust under traditional emblems, those of the king and the saint, the armed ruler and the destitute exile, the despot faced with the man who stands up bare-handed and is acclaimed by a people. This image has its own power, but it also speaks to a reality to which millions of dead have just subscribed (1979: 150).

However, even in such a clearly unequal field of rivalry, Massoumeh soon distinguishes the traces of a hidden power structure which is trying to impose its superiority upon the people and make them into tame subjects. Yet in a due time she decisively goes out of the reach of this power. She says,

I looked at Mahmoud with hatred, I wanted to say many things to him, but suddenly they started reciting elegies, and the crowd stood up mourning; I found a way through the mourning crowd, and while I was taking Siamak's hand with anger, I went out of the house. Mas'ud was running after me while he was holding the bottom edge of my chador, I wished to hit Siamak so much as to have made him dark and blue (Sani'ee, 2000: 296).

Therefore, the novel represents a thorough and rapid process of change in Iran. A feature of this process is that power is no longer the outcome of interaction between the subject on the one side and the situation (of the power) on the other side, but is the situation that one-sidedly imposes its discourse upon the subjects. Reading Massoumeh, this means the formation of new experiences in her mind due to which she often renews herself for integration to the new society. Her progress in renovation through gaining new knowledge well embodies Scott's idea about changes in the meaning of experience in the course of history. In an attempt to describe the historical changes of experience, Scott examines its meanings in the 18th and 19th centuries. Then he argues that in the 20th century its meaning considerably changed. He affirms that

....in the twentieth century experience was a "subjective witness" spontaneous, truthful, and trustworthy as it was, that the individuals consciously developed in themselves.

But later on, when it came to mean “influences external to individuals,” it was the influence of the social, political, and cultural realities over the people (Scott, 1991: 781).

Such realities included the prevailing conditions, institutions, and ideologies in which the people would pass their lives. At the threshold of the revolution in Iran, the life of Sani'ee's character is hugely influenced by such realities. On the other hand, these realities are out of her control. Thus, as she does her best to come to terms with them, the meaning of the experience changes for her, and so she starts to think in new modes. In this way, the course of Sani'ee's novel is the course of her character's renovation also, because her reader often finds her character in the business of renewing her conscious, and by doing this, integrating herself with the new conditions. In chapter Five Massoumeh says,

In our discussions he [Hamid] occasionally looked at me with amazement and said, ‘How vastly you have changed! How fully experienced and knowledgeable you look! You speak like a philosopher, a psychologist. Has the few years of university education changed you so much?’ With a kind of pride which I didn't want to hide, I answered, ‘No, life's obligation has made me so. I needed it, to find new and correct ways of life. I had the responsibility of my children also. There was no place for a mistake (Sani'ee, 2000: 319).

Social problems are often taken to have negative effects on the subjects; but in Foucauldian definitions they can be considered with positive effects of power on them. Foucault believes in power as productive; that is, in happy and fortunate outcomes of power which testifies, among other things, the production of “pleasure and freedom.” In “Truth and power” he says,

If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good what makes it accepted is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression” (qtd. in Rabinow, 1984: 61).

Massoumeh's prosperity in managing her life in the time of hardship, her

non-stop attempt to continue her education, as well as her success in helping her three children grow up well-educated as she always wished are evidences indicating the positive effects of power in the development of people's personalities.

The Aftermath of Revolution and Iran-Iraq War

In the post-revolution era, Massoumeh, with her husband in prison for the second time, is fired from her job. So, once again she has to earn her family's life with strenuous efforts. In order to retain her independence from 'others', she has to fight with poverty. Hamid's imprisonment and execution reminds the reader of Foucault's argument when he says "revolution is a different type of codification of the same relations" (1980:122).

Events in this period of Massoumeh's life signify that although under the impact of the revolution her society has positively changed, challenges of different kinds are still there in which she and other people who want to resist the power structure are simulated to engage. Hamid dies before his own father. After his father's death, his aunts and uncles sell the house in which his wife and children were living, which leaves them homeless. For Sani'ee's character, this is another field of struggle against the power which adds more to her independence. Still another great shock which Massoumeh receives is when she finds out that it is her own brother, Mahmoud, who reported about Siamak's political activities which led to his imprisonment. This can be inferred from Fluck's notion of "the circulation of a faceless power through the literary text in order to reverse existing hierarchies" (1994:42). To reflect on such hidden aspects of people's lives with huge impacts in shaping social and cultural history of a nation is something which can only be done in great literary works.

Mahoumd's abuse of Hamid's reputation as a political activist, added to Massoumeh's and Siamak's hard lives at the threshold of the revolution, and Mahmoud's betraying conduct toward them provide us with knowledge about the circulation of historical experience in literary texts, and historical experience makes it possible for us to recognize how such categories and subject-positions are constructed. This reconstructive status of experience in literature implies the potential rebirth of the individual, society, and history. But in the experience of literature, the agency of the history-making subjects (actors) is situational and positional rather than autonomous. In other words, these subjects are not self-sufficient but take their power through undertaking situational roles and by the relations they develop with others in that situation.

The hard work Massoumeh does to provide the expenses of Siamak's life and education in Germany, and the high risk she takes in illegally sending him there should be analyzed as a further field of resistance for her which is in need of still new policies. However, when she decides to say 'No' to Mr. Zargar's marriage proposal can be considered as another field of resistance against the power structure which indicates that her number one priority is her children's peaceful life. Historical experience also helps us better understand why the people around Massoumeh suddenly change their behavior towards her and why she should be angry with them while she faces their respectful behavior because she is the mother of a war captive. In chapter Eight the novel reads,

It was a long time I hadn't been to any military office. Although this time they highly respected me as the mother of a soldier lost in the war, but these respects too, like all the insulting talks I heard at the prison gates as the mother of a Mojahed or the wife of a Marxist, were so painful to me. None of them I couldn't tolerate (Sani'ee, 2000: 431).

Final Decision

As Foucault maintains, disciplinary power creates certain types of individuals: people who are ready to act according to the demands of power relations. The central technique of disciplinary power is constant surveillance. It takes hold of the mind by creating a psychological state of "conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power" (Foucault, 1984:201). Hence disciplinary power creates a type of individual who controls his/her own action to be in line with the very expectations of power relations; that is, a sort of self-awareness is developed by individuals that makes them act according to what power demands of them. Once again Massoumeh and her friend, Parvaneh, are placed on the 'same' side. But what they do this time supports an Iranian traditional subculture a dimension of which is an opposition between Iranian and European marriage traditions. Siamak and Lili, who have lived and studied in Germany, represent the European culture. An interesting point here is that the circulation of power has caused a change in their positions, while primarily they [Massoumeh and Parvaneh] used to oppose traditional ways of life and support new ways, this time they take side with the Western life styles to stand with their native cultural traditions. But this time, she acts like an educated middle-aged lady with a well-constructed personality. Thus, instead of the physical tortures applied by Massoumeh's family in the past times, now she partakes in calm and goal-oriented negotiations which slightly help her succeed in motivating Siamak and Lili establish their marriage according to traditional Iranian conventions which make them register their marriage before starting their marital life.

Her second son's marriage is still a further battlefield where she resists the powers of material life in the dominant discourse of time. The techniques she carefully uses to make Mas'ud postpone his marriage with Ladan, and her strong disagreement with him when he wants her to wear chador as Mr. Maghsoudi would like are examples of how skillfully this well-constructed experienced woman acts in resisting the normalizing discourse. The image of a perfect mother is seen in the way she helps her daughter, Shirin, find her ideal man with whom to marry. In the binary opposition of old generation/young generation, which is an aspect of the dominant discourse, and the knowledge she has gained through suffering in different stages of her life help her manage the struggle successfully and guide her children marry their ideal pairs. In the last paragraph of chapter Nine Massoumeh says,

I felt I had well done the whole of my duties in spite of all obstacles in my way, my children were all grown up, well-educated, and successful. I had put down a burden, but like on the after-exam days, I was empty and aimless. What had I to do now? Apparently, I had nothing else to do in the world (Sani'ee, 2000: 478).

The last chapter of the novel shows three decades after the time of the first one, but the argument of the story is again about the marriage of Saeed and Massoumeh, with them both and Parvaneh on the same side of the opposition. But in the circulation of power, it is her children who, on the other side of the opposition as they are, have the upper hand in controlling the power. Saeed and Massoumeh talk as in the following:

(Saiid): But Massoum, in this way we will be lost again.

(Massoumeh): I know, I'm sure about myself that will be lost, for me it's like a form of suicide, and it's not the first time I am taking suicide, but you know what is the most painful and killing for me?

(Saiid): No!

(Massoumeh): That in both periods of my life, my dearest kins, those who had the closest relations with me cause my death like this (Sani'ee, 2000: 527).

And finally, after a life-long struggle, she has to make an ultimate decision about her own life. However, this time she puts her weapon down, takes her hands up, and gives priority to the happiness of her children, for by saying a 'No' to Saiid who has proposed marriage to her, she, like most normalized widows in her age, selects to live alone for the rest of her life. Towards the end of the story, when Parvaneh tells Massoumeh she should take side with her children and go her own way, she says,

You know, I don't want it anymore, not because I can't do it, I can, but it is no longer interesting for me. I feel vanquished; it is as if nothing has changed in the past thirty years. In spite of my sufferings in all these years, I couldn't change anything even at my home (Sani'ee, 2000: 525).

The words which Sani'ee uses symbolically best reflect the fact that Massoumeh's decision is the result of her long-life experiences. Quite aware of the consequences of her decision, and looking up at the sky, she walks through the coming cold autumn. In the last page of the novel we hear her saying:

When I finally parted with Sa'iid, I came home walking. An autumn cold wind started blowing. I was very much tired. Loneliness was now a heavier load on me while my steps were weaker and less stable. I wrapped myself up in my black jacket, looked at the frowning sky and said 'Wow...! What a cold winter is waiting for us.' (Sani'ee, 2000:528)

Reading *Sahm-e Man (Book of Fate)* from a Foucauldian perspective, we better understand the hidden dimensions of the Iranian history in the past five decades. The life story of Massoumeh, Sani'ee's main character, reflects the life story of most common people in those decades. Another conspicuous feature of *Sahm-e Man* is that it opens to the readers a space of opposition like that which Lyotard calls "differend". *Differend* is, for Lyotard, "the unstable state of language wherein something which must be able to be put into phrases cannot yet be" (qtd. in Malpes, 2003:61). In a case of *differend*, the opposing parties cannot agree on a base or logic to settle their disputes. Ms. Parvin's life is perhaps a good case of *differend*. She is a lawfully married woman. Yet, unlawfully also she has some affairs with men. So she violates the ethical principles of her society. However, based on her own ethical principles she remains a kind and helpful friend to Massoumeh and her children. This leads us to believe that sometimes it is unfair to judge people's characters based on social norms.

Another example for a case of *differend* is the way Sani'ee's novel compares Massoumeh's life conditions before and after the revolution. As the wife of a political activist, before the revolution she is allowed to have a job and go to the university. However, although many times after the revolution she acknowledges that she has never believed in her husband's Marxist ideologies, she is fired both from her job and the university.

Conclusion

As the findings of the study show, brought up in a society which does not encourage her to practice self-creation, Massoumeh does her best to practice her ethics, which needs her great effort to resist many blocks of powers in different phases of her life, each block reflecting the dominant discourse of that phase. In most of her life struggles she may be seen as the underdog, but through the knowledge and experience which she gains in these struggles, she not only successfully cares for her 'self' but also sticks to her ethics and brings up her children as she wishes.

In the first phase of the story, despite the fact that her opportunist brothers do all those tortures and cruelties towards her in the name of Islam, she does not lose her faith in God and Islamic beliefs. In the second phase, when she has more freedom, although her husband's general knowledge, and his knowledge in the Marxist ideology in particular, is much superior to hers, instead of being absorbed to his ideology and becoming his deactivated follower, she works hard, according to an extensive reading program, to find out about his previous mistakes and remake her own lookout anew.

This process of self-caring (self-remaking) is true about her in the third phase of the novel also. When many social opportunities are likely to fall to her lot, and the simple-hearted people behave toward her really respectfully and with appreciation, instead of taking advantage from them like her brothers, she tries to help them understand the reality in which she believes. In the next phase, through her experiences and well-constructed self, and in spite of all her emotional and financial problems, she tries to make life at home warm and happy for her children. However, in the last phase of the novel we realize that she succumbs to the power structure, which is represented, this time, in her children's radically selfish requests; for she ultimately accepts to put their selfish requests into effect, which means to reject Saiid's marriage proposal and to live alone to the end of her life. So, she accepts to become a normalized subject and be the symbol of a perfectly-devoted mother of her age.

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HOW USEFUL ARE THE EPISTEMIC STRUCTURES OF 'CAPABILITIES' AND 'AFRIKOLOGY' IN ADDRESSING SOCIAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA?

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Abstract

In the crowded argumentative space of political philosophies, it is often alleged that Justice is the highest goal of political life. Yet for most folks in Africa it is injustice instead that continues to dominate political debate. This article uses the epistemology of Afrikology to advance the African cultural understanding of “equality” to argue that this is a crucial tenet in appreciating the interpretation that African communities give to the concept of justice and the subsequent social dislocation that can be found in the use of Amartya Kumar Sen’s *Capabilities* approach (1980; 1984; 1985; 1987; 1992; 1999) on the continent. Neo-liberal’s ‘personal jurisdiction’ particularity as universality is challenged throughout the explorative epistemological discussion between *Capabilities* and an emerging *Afrikology* (2011; 2012) position offered through the restorative scholarship of celebrated East African scholar Dani Wadada Nabudere.

Keywords: *Capabilities; Afrikology; Culture; Epistemology and Social Justice.*

Introduction

There is a general agreement in the crowded argumentative space of political philosophies that justice is the highest goal of political life. Yet for most communities in Africa it is injustice that instead continues to dominate the political debate. Furthermore, the linkage and interface between democracy and social justice in the continent remains such a heated subject. As such, questioning what constitutes social justice in contemporary societies in Africa is important, but even more so is the need to focus on how people perceive issues of social justice and injustice. One could indeed ask, as has Vivienne Taylor, is aspiring towards social justice a pipe dream because the contextual realities are so far removed from the vision that imbued struggles for liberation from political, economic, social, and cultural domination? Does the shadow of collective histories weigh so heavily that one cannot work towards achieving freedoms from forms of neo-colonialism and political and social domination? And has the promise of hard won liberation and national independence come to naught in contemporary Africa? (Taylor, 2012: 12). Better still, one may further ask, could a discourse on social justice catalyze assertions of the right to bring back social, community-wide concerns for development based on justice and sustainability into our contemporary struggles?

Injustice in Africa is as such an intuitive subject to start an explorative epistemological discussion on the Nobel laureate Indian economist Amartya Sen's influential *Capabilities* framework (Sen, 1980; 1984; 1985; 1987; 1992; 1999) together with an emerging restorative scholarship offered in renowned east African scholar Dani Nabudere's *Afrikology* (2011; 2012) epistemology. Specifically opposed to neo-liberal's 'personal jurisdiction' particularity as universality, this article uses the artillery of *Afrikology* to advance the African cultural understanding of "equality". We argue that this is a crucial tenet in appreciating the interpretation that African communities give to the concept of justice and the subsequent cultural dislocation that can be found in the use of Sen's *Capabilities* approach on the continent. We have found that although a large number of scholars and policy-makers (Nussbaum, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2008; Clark, 2008; Stark, 2009; Claassen, 2011; Qizibashi, 2013 etc) have engaged with Sen's ideas; virtually none have done so from the epistemological basis of *Afrikology*.

The Imperial Narrative

Since gaining political independence in the early 1960s, theories of political and social development have been presented to Africa as 'scientific' theories extracted from their social and historical conditions, implying that they represent

the only valid paradigm that cannot be criticized or refuted. According to Egyptian scholar Nasr Arif, these theories have received such widespread popularity that even the UN, as we shall see of Sen's Capabilities framework later, adopts them as its international blueprint for the so called developing countries. A critical and close reading of these theories, however, reveals that they are nothing but a set of ideological premises that reflect the Western experience. One common characteristic of these theories is to generalize their results to the entire world by eliminating their own specific characteristics and the historical conditions that underlie them (Arif, 2002: 1).

Professor Arif further contends that the net result of these theory-constructions for the 'developing world' is to declare it as underdeveloped, stagnant, irrational and reactionist. On the basis of these assumptions, they replace the traditional culture, value norms, and patterns of behavior by the Western value system. Therefore, any discussion of development, whether social, political or economic; entails an implicit, if not explicit, Western perspective on civilization, modernity and value systems. Arif claims that the ultimate goal of this set of theories is not to elevate the world, develop it economically, and raise the standards of living in various parts of the world as underdeveloped, make it dependent on western resources, and finally create a market from which the West can buy raw materials and to which it can then sell the end product which is, in turn, manufactured by the cheap labor power of this market (Arif, 2002: 2). The Egyptian scholar further warns that "there is no more effective way guaranteeing the dependency of the non-western world than convincing it that the western model of development is the only possible and valid path. This model is to be seen as a moving goal, and the more the poor countries try to attain it, the wider the gap between them and the West grows" (Arif, 2002: 2).

Afrikology

In Africa, Nabudere was well aware of Hartley Dean and Ruth Rodgers observation that "human society is axiomatically to be understood as an association of interdependent beings. And yet dependency in late-modern societies has become problematic" (Dean and Rodgers, 2004). In his epistemological work on Afrikology, Nabudere's philosophy persistently, and consistently, made proposals for a different moral approach to addressing, and possibly solving, some of the root causes of human conflicts across the world. He took suffering seriously as the basis of his idea of a global-level collective justice which, for him, raised the idea of 'alienation' and the ethics of community care to the level of global justice. The exemplary paradox of his works is that it sought to know tradition and understand its grounds on the one

hand and yet to strengthen it at the same time; it was necessary to know it in order to understand it, it would seem. He was convinced that indigenous knowledge systems were more realistic in treating nature as a transcendent reality with reverence and awe. Indigenous ways of living and knowing, according to Nabudere, were also useful in teaching about the crucial distinction between frugal subsistence and poverty. Agreeably, Swedish scholar Catherine Hoppers, an expert on indigenous knowledge systems, has observed elsewhere that “modernity has plenty to learn from African traditions” (Hoppers, 2008: 84).

In his 1997 article *Writing and Oral tradition in the Transmission of Knowledge* writer Doussou F. C. described the word *indigenous* as the root, something natural or innate (to). It is related to being an integral part of culture. By indigenous knowledge systems are meant the combination of knowledge systems encompassing technology, philosophy, social, economic, learning/educational, legal and governance systems. It is about the technologies such as looms, textile, jewellery and brass-work manufacture; and about technological knowledge in agriculture, fishing, forest resource exploitation, atmospheric management techniques, knowledge transmission systems (Doussou 1997: 309), architecture, medicine and pharmacology.

The Beninese philosopher Paulin Hountondji has added that these knowledge are rich and varied, ranging from soil and plant taxonomy, cultural and genetic information, animal and crop husbandry, medicine and pharmacology, ecology, climatology, zoology, music, arts, architecture, and many others (Hountondji, 1997). Their intrinsic efficiency and efficacy as tools for personal, societal and global development must therefore be identified and accredited as necessary. Professor Hountondji further contends that it is this recovery of indigenous knowledge, and the systems intricately woven around them that will enable the move towards a critical but resolute re-appropriation of the practical and cognitive heritage of millions of people around the continent and elsewhere in the world. It is, in turn, the re-appropriation of this heritage that may provide new clues and directions as to the visions of human society, human relations, sustainable development, poverty reduction and scientific development in the next millennium, all of which cannot be resolved using the existing ethos of the Western framework alone (Hountondji, 1997: 39).

Indeed, the first articulation of Afrikology declares that: “it is a true philosophy of knowledge and wisdom based on African cosmogonies. It is Afri- because it is inspired by the ideas originally produced from the Cradle of Humankind located in Africa. It is not Afrikology because it is African, but it is *Afri*-because it emanates

from the source of the Universal system of knowledge originating in Africa. The philosophic product is therefore not relativistic to Africa but universal in essence with its base in Africa. It is also – *(ko)logy* because it is based on the *logos*–the word, which was uttered to set in motion the Universe in its originality. It was from that word that human consciousness first emerged and it was from that consciousness that humanity emerged as thinking and acting agent with language from the word as the active cultural achievement (Wanda, 2013:2).

As such, the epistemological knowledge of Afrikology, according to Nabudere, flows directly from the need for Africans to redefine their world, which can enable them to advance their self-understanding and the world around them based on African cosmologies. “The issue of creating knowledge that promotes African self-understanding and a knowledge that can promote their transformation is not just an issue of methodologies” (Nabudere, 2011: 36). Nabudere has explained that the objective of imperialism was to capture the upper ground of knowing the natives in order to control their thinking and self-understanding. The objective was to reduce them to something “other” than them “self,” or the masters. Many of the academic disciplines were especially created to understand the natives for that purpose. In *Afrikology: Philosophy and Wholeness* (2011), one of his last books before his sudden death in November of the same year, he illustrated:

Afrikology is not African-centric or Afrocentric. It is a universal scientific epistemology that goes beyond Eurocentrism, or other ethnocentrism. It recognises all sources of knowledge as valid within their historical, cultural or social contexts and seeks to engage them into a dialogue that can lead to better knowledge for all. It recognises peoples’ traditions as a fundamental pillar in the creation of such cross-cultural understandings in which the Africans can stand out as having been the fore-bearers of much of what is called Greek or European heritage as fact of history that ought to be recognised, because from this fact alone, it can be shown that cross-cultural interactions has been a fact of historical reality (Nabudere, 2011: 92).

Afrikology draws its scientificity and uniqueness from the fact that it is based on an all-embracing philosophy of humankind originating in Egypt and updated by the lived experiences of all humanity, who still continue to draw on its deep-rooted wisdom. It is based on a philosophy that is conscious of itself, conscious of its own existence as thought.

Trusting on the criticality and intentionality of Afrikology's hermeneutics, we begin our discussion on Sen's Capabilities framework with none other than John Rawls. Over the years, there have been several attempts, most notably the welfarist and resourcist approaches among others that have endeavored to explain and redress poverty, violence and social injustices in Africa. The welfarist approach was unsatisfactory because it gave unreliable answers as to how peoples' satisfaction with their lives was measured. The rejection of the welfarist approach is similarly to be found in Marxist theories of exploitation, relating social judgments to the historical information that capital represents the product of past labour (Atkinson, 1998). As for the resourcist approach associated with the American political philosopher John Rawls' 1971 classic *A Theory of Justice* including those that went beyond Gross National Product (GNP) and looked at how much resources individuals had available to them, failed to take into account the fact that resources were not valuable in themselves, but only insofar as they enabled a person to function in certain ways. The resourcist approach was also not meant to tell us who was badly off in terms of either capabilities or welfare.

John Rawls – A Theory of Justice

Moreover, according to Rawls' position, 'justice' in a democratic society is said to refer in theory to two principles, which must primarily apply to "the basic structure of society" (Rawls, 1971: 259). The first of these principles is that each person must have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. The second principle of Rawls principles is that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged in such a way that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) generally attached to public or private positions and offices open to all. These two principles are said to govern the assignment of rights and duties and to regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages. They presuppose that the social structure of society can be divided into two or less distinct parts with related principles, the first principle applying to the one, the second to the other, and thereby distinguishing between those aspects of the social system that define and secure the equal liberties of citizenship and those that specify and establish social and economic inequalities:

The basic liberties of citizens are, roughly speaking, political liberty (the right to vote and be eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law. These liberties are all required to

be equal by the first principle, since citizens of a just society are to have the same basic rights (Rawls, 1971: 6061).

But as Nabudere cogently ponders, which kind of 'person' is Rawls referring to and in what kind of society does he/she live in? Nabudere thinks this is important especially in the context of an illiberal society that has been dominated by dictatorships or a regime of violence where the rule of law is consistently violated such as the case maybe in Africa. In such a situation, how can justice as defined by Rawls be realised yet without such a realisation, justice cannot be claimed to have been achieved? This, according to Nabudere, remains a dilemma for John Rawls' theory of justice since the social and economic system under which he is examining this dichotomy does not address the need to have a holistic approach to their realization (Nabudere, 2012: 6).

Development as Freedom

John Rawls' liberal resourcist insight has played a significant role in shaping Sen's Capabilities framework as attested by Sen's 1973 proposition for a "weak equity axiom". Rawls has as such, been a constant reference for Sen both in overcoming welfarism and in considering 'impartiality'. Although in his initial build up Sen's alternative welfarism became distinctively different to Rawls's liberal approach that was aimed at spelling out the normative principles of a just and democratic government, along with at least the outlines of an institutional and policy framework within which such political power should be exercised.

Professor Mozaffar Qizilbash has pointed out that the capabilities framework first developed in 1980 by Amartya Sen in his Tanner Lecture *Equality of What?* has been an ongoing development, refined throughout the years until its final maturity in Sen's later work published in 1999 as *Development as Freedom* and *The Idea of Justice* that followed ten years later in 2009. Over the years, other variations of the approach have also emerged. In particular, feminist philosopher Martha Nussbaum's version of the approach, that contains a distinct view in moral and political theory (Qizilbash 2013: 35).

In *Development as Freedom* Sen argued that development in all societies and particularly in countries outside the "First World," depends on the removal of "unfreedoms," and consequently that freedom is both a *constituent* of development and its consequence. He develops this idea in contrast to traditional theories that measured development in terms of income, arguing that income is a poor measure

of the quality of people's lives. He goes on to advance the idea that free agency is a prerequisite for development rather than the generation of wealth, as the traditional view of development had maintained. For Sen, to have a capacity is to have the *resources* and *opportunity* to achieve some self-set goal. A functioning is an achievement that realises a person's capabilities— it is what one actually does with a capacity one has. So every person has a capability set which contains alternative combinations of functionings. The measure of a person's freedom is defined by her capability set. What particular functions we value Sen leaves to “public understanding,” discussion and the workings of democratic institutions.

In his book *Resources, Values and Development*, although he provides further examples of intrinsically valuable capabilities such as being able to live long, escape avoidable morbidity, be well nourished, be able to read, write and communicate, take part in literary and scientific pursuits and so forth (Sen, 1984: 497), he at the same time refuses to endorse a unique list of capabilities as objectively correct for practical and strategic reasons (Sen, 1993: 47). Instead he has argued that the selection and weighting of capabilities depend on personal value judgments - which are partly influenced by the nature and purpose of the evaluative exercise. That aside, some commentators have praised him, pointing out that one of the chief strengths of his framework is that it is flexible enough and exhibits a considerable degree of internal pluralism, which allows researchers to develop and apply it in many different ways (Sabina Alkire, 2002: 8-11 and 28-30). Sen himself has also indicated that the Capabilities framework can be used to assess individual advantage in a range of different spaces. For example, the assessment of poverty might involve concentrating on a relatively small sub-set of basic capabilities.

Today the Capabilities framework continues to enjoy ostensible influence on the United Nations Development Programme. Most prominently, it provides the theoretical foundation for the development of the Human Development Index, which is a composite index of a country's performance in the dimension of income, education, and health. In Africa, as is the case elsewhere in the developing world, it has become an important policy measure of a country's level of development that is also increasingly used as the basis for aid allocation. In the 2000 report (UNDP, 2000: ch. 1), for example, Sen literally stamped his signature in the document advancing his argument that the process of human development is the enhancement of human capabilities. The established discourse evident in other parts of the report went on to argue that human development and the reduction of poverty require economic growth, not human empowerment. Poor countries, the report supposed, should avail themselves of the opportunities that capitalist globalization can provide. In later chapters of the *Human Development Report 2000* the term ‘human capital’ was

insinuated as if it were a synonym for Sen's notion of human capabilities.

That said, British economist Sir Anthony Barns Atkinson has deflated Sen's Capabilities bubble by summing it up in two different ways. Sir Atkinson pointed out that it is only concerned with the actual *chosen* functioning, or with the *options* that a person has the capability set (Sen and Foster, 1997). In illustration, Sir Atkinson goes on to give two examples of two people who are starving, one of whom lacks food, the other of whom is starving out of choice on account of religious beliefs. Sir Atkinson then argues that evaluation in terms of actual functioning (i.e. starvation in both cases) is closer to traditional welfare economics, being concerned with outcomes, but this does not capture the difference between the two people, which is that the second person could have made a different choice. The options approach raises in turn the issue as to how we evaluate the set of options: the degree of freedom of choice (Atkinson, 1998).

Despite its heuristic value, the foundations of the capabilities concept are essentially liberal. It therefore elides the fundamental and inherent contradictions of capitalism. As such, the concept of its 'equality' at a philosophical level and the meaning of equality in practice especially in Africa, continue to exhibit far and wide divergences especially in matters pertaining poverty and social justice. The mainstream understanding of the concept tends to dichotomise different understandings of justice without establishing coherent interlinkages and unities between them. This is especially so when it comes to the understanding of political and economic rights and to what extent principles of 'justice' could be said to exist between them. Nabudere has pointed out that the main reason behind the dichotomisation has been the attempt to impose the concept of 'justice,' as understood by Amartya Sen in *Freedom as Development*, which emerged in different historical and cultural contexts on different historical and cultural contexts without a hermeneutic dialogue (Nabudere, 2012: 6).

One of the greatest lessons of hermeneutics is that understanding is not only something that happens when people read texts or even when they consciously strive to gain intellectual access to social phenomena, but understanding happens all of the time in the life of all human beings (Paul Ricoeur 1986: 83–111). Understanding is part of the very fibre of human existence. It is a much larger phenomenon than a mental activity of conscious thinking – the latter is only a derived form of understanding. Understanding is most of the time and most originally situated on the pre-reflective level of human situatedness and interaction with the surroundings.

Traditional African Thought

African society, for instance, continues to suffer a rapture of crisis of thought and culture as a result of the encounter with Rawls liberalism and the manifestations of a *capabilities* mindset which centers on individualism. In liberalism it is the individual, considered as an entity, who matters. Therefore, anything associated with individuals – their rights, for example, must be a priority, and respected and cherished. African thought, on the other hand, respects individuality but abhors individualism. This attitude arises from the understanding that people are bounded to each other in a web of life. Since people are interconnected by life, what affects one affects all – we are many yet one. For the African, it is respect for life and community that is a priority. South African philosopher Mogobe Ramose has termed this African way of life as the foundation of the Ubuntu philosophy (Ramose, 2003: 382).

Traditional African thought defines personhood in terms of wholeness. The African concept of a person as wholeness does not deny human individuality as what French scholar Michel Foucault termed as an “ontological fact”, as an analytic finitude but ascribes ontological primacy to the community through which the human individual comes to know both himself and the world around him. On this reasoning, it can be said that there is a greater wholeness to which the single individual person belongs though in themselves, individuals must be seen as partial wholes (Foucault, 1970: 315). Therefore, the idea of holism is the starting point of the concept of a person. Professor Ramose has argued that consequently, the human person in African thought is definable in terms of a single characteristic to the exclusion of everything else. Thus the derivative concept of a person is apparently alien to traditional African thought. There is a difference between the holistic and the individualistic (derivative) conception of a person. The former accords primacy to wholeness while the latter emphasizes and accords primacy to the individualistic [partiality] conception (Ramose, 2005: 57).

How Equality Status is Acquired

In his 1984 article *Person and Community in African traditional Thought*, Nigerian Poet Ifeanyi Menkiti points out further that the African view of man denied that person can be defined by focusing on physical or psychological characteristics of the lone individual. Rather, man is defined of the communal world takes precedence over the reality of individual life histories, whatever they maybe. Professor Menkiti stresses that this primacy is meant to apply not only ontologically, but also in regards to epistemic accessibility. It is rootedness in an ongoing community that the individual also comes to know himself as a durable, more or less permanent fact of the world

(Mentikiti I, 1984: 171-172). In a word, traditional African thought emphasizes the primacy of the greater environing wholeness over that of human individuality.

Professor Ramose has made a conclusion that as far as the African world in concerned, human individuality is not a sufficient condition for being a person. According to Ramose, in order to be a person, the human individual must, according to traditional African thought, go through various community prescribed stages, and be part of a certain ceremonies and rituals. Only at the completion of all prescribed stages does the human individual acquire the status of a person. Prior to this, the individual is regarded as "it" to show that he or she is not yet incorporated into the body of persons.

In traditional African thought personhood is, therefore, acquired and not merely established by virtue of the fact of being a human. Like personhood, parenthood in traditional African thought is not established merely by the fact that a female being has given birth to a human being, rather "it is through an *imbeleko* sacrifice that social parenthood is established. At the same time the *Imbeleko* sacrifice to the ancestors establishes social babyhood as well (Ramose, 2005: 58)

Ramose's examples goes to show that personhood in traditional African thought, whatever angle it is looked at, is acquired. As such, it is during the process of attainment, that the community plays a crucial role as a catalyst and prescriber or norms, rights, entitlements that in turn informs how equality is conceived and perceived.

Connectively, from the African context, if we consider the revolutionary Enlightenment objectives of *égalité* (equality), *liberté* (freedom), *fraternité* (solidarity), Sen's Capabilities approach to equality is framed in terms of freedom, but not solidarity. It is a liberal- individualist approach and while ethical individualism need not necessarily imply methodological individualism (Burchardt, 2006) the priority is individual liberty, not social solidarity; the freedom to choose, not the need to belong. In the space of Capabilities the individual is one step removed; she is objectively distanced from the relations of power within which her identity and her life chances must be constituted. Within the space of capabilities there are three major issues which the individual cannot readily see and which are seldom clearly discussed. First and in any event, human beings cannot be free from their dependency upon other human beings (Dean, 2009: 267). Second and third, under capitalist social relations of production, individuals can be free neither from

hegemonic controls over their participation in the public realm, nor from the direct or indirect consequences of the exploitation of human labour.

Michel Foucault

We now turn our attention on Michel Foucault, the French philosopher whom until his death in 1984 was professor of History of Systems of Thought at the prestigious College de France. Foucault once described by a noted Frankfurt philosopher Jurgen Habermas as “a scholar striving for objectivity...and... the political vitality of the vulnerable, subjectively excitable, morally sensitive intellectual,” (Murphy, 1990: 126) was in a word, much like Nabudere one of the greatest thinkers of the second half of the 20th century. For us, the novelty that connects Nabudere and Foucault is their recognition of the imbrications of freedom and power. For both of these thinkers, freedom is no longer conceived as the absence of constraint, but as the utilization of the power which circulates in all relations, not least repressive ones, and which is productive as much as it is constraining. As such, the discussions of Foucault’s political thought and Nabudere’s restorative epistemology of Afrikology forces one to shift sites from the distinction between freedom and constraint, to the distinction between freedom-as-power and domination.

Freedom as Power

In a 1983 interview with Paul Rabinow discussing *Space, Power and Knowledge* Foucault argued that material changes cannot be used to explain changes in subjectivity. He pointed out that, for instance, when in the Middle Ages, Chimneys were first walled and placed inside, rather than outside, houses and interpersonal relations were also transformed. New interactions flourished around the Chimneys. “But the building of Chimneys is not enough to explain these changes – if, for instance different discourses and values had been circulating at the times then Chimneys would have produced different kinds of changes.”

Generalizing from this point of view, Foucault’s was arguing that highly valued abstract words such as ‘liberty’ and ‘rationality’ in the Western world, refer neither simply to ideas nor to practices but to sets of complex exchanges between the two. Pointing out further that, ‘practices’ of liberty and reason have been a much neglected sphere by social and cultural historians. This line of thought has an important consequence. It means, in a way, that community leaders and other social managers cannot guarantee that their input will secure liberty or rationality. Foucault was convinced that what mattered was the fit between the material

reorganization of space, life-practices, values and discourses. Only if the fit is right will social managers be able to augment what Foucault called “practices of liberty”. In this light, Foucault argued that scholars had a particular function to play when society was being modified and rationalized by managers and experts; they are to remain critical of nostalgias, utopian and overtly abstract thought. Foucault concluded his thought while responding to another question posed by Paul Rabinow, who had asked whether Foucault saw architectural projects as forces of liberation or resistance, to which he replied –

“I do not think that there is anything that is functionally- by its very nature –absolutely liberating. Liberty is a practice. So there may, in fact, always be a certain number of projects whose aim is to modify some constraints, to loosen, or even to break them, but none of these projects can, simply by its nature, assure that people will have liberty automatically, that it will be established by the project itself. The liberty of men is never assured by the institutions and laws that are intended to guarantee them. This is why almost all of these laws and institutions are quite capable of being turned around. Not because they are ambiguous, but simply because ‘liberty’ is what must be exercised”.

When we consider the problem of self-determination in this light, a more complex picture of Foucault’s approach to freedom emerges, with potentially interesting implications for the relevance of Foucault’s thought to questions of equality and social justice. I have felt it profitable to feature his views on freedom for purposes of highlighting the complexity involved in Nabudere’s own views on freedoms and the subsequent role that the Afrikology undertakes to defend and advance them. Foucault, as does Nabudere, seems to be urging us to be critical in our analysis and vigilant of our institutions. As one writer has put it, “Foucault taught us to always beware of the possibilities that our own institutional arrangements will encourage the rise of new destructive forces inimical to the possibilities of our being free” (Dumm, 1996: 153).

Given this more intricate account of power, Foucault’s political philosophy is widely thought to begin with the assumption that a subtler grasp of the forms of social control that constrain and shape the subject empowers the subject to resist these constraints more effectively. We learn from Foucault that the interrogation of power should not conclude with government, that is, with systems of law and legal or extra-legal forms of repression, but must extend to ‘governmentality’, meaning the modes of organizing knowledge and disciplining bodies that state apparatuses

may co-opt and employ in the production of inequalities and social injustices. Professor Nabudere's epistemological reasoning on Afrikology seems to be in concert with Foucault's ontological premise in that they both characterize ethics and equality as reflexive practices of freedom. Their ideas are primarily fuelled by an understanding that social justice reasoning is not or were not merely an economist or lawyer's desideratum; in that they were also a prerequisite for the legitimacy of the 'capable community'. In order to comprehend such a position, it is important to depart from the single measure of social (in)justice confined to Capabilities' Gini coefficient envelop. This consideration is central in our understanding of the social justice scene in the African context. Inspired by John Rawls's overtly normative liberal approach, Sen's Capabilities approach has effectively argued that the best way for governments to help the poor is to assign public resources to education and health services for them. Education and health are said to be keys to ending poverty because they enhance the market value of what the poor have to sell: themselves.

Professor Dean has indeed cautioned that it should no longer be viable to sing along the Capabilities bandwagon in spite of the official national and international agencies adoption of the language of capabilities while studiously ignoring key drivers of inequality and poverty. For all its attractions, the concept is in *itself* constrained. The 'space of capabilities' is abstracted from the 'space of commodities' and the 'space of functionings' in ways that necessarily constrain the critical purchase of the concept (Hartley Dean, 2009: 266). Elsewhere, South African scholar Vivienne Taylor, in her contribution to discourses on social justice in Africa, has argued that economic growth alone cannot structurally address issues of poverty, exclusion, and inequity in Africa. Strategies to ensure human development and social justice are also required, and they are required now, she argues, even in a context where a democratic deficit may mute demands for social justice (Taylor, 2012).

Professor Taylor has further pointed out in her study of East Africa that a critical analysis of the region's economic growth and the level of human development reflect the disjuncture between economic growth as an indication of development and the conditions of the people. "In the period between 2000 and 2010, East Africa's economy more than doubled in real terms, growing from US\$32 billion to US\$79 billion. If Rwanda continues to grow at an average of 7.7 percent, Tanzania at 6.8 percent, and Uganda at 7.2 percent, and Kenya, currently at 3.7 percent accelerates, these countries are set to reach middle-income status in another decade, that is, by 2022" (Taylor 2012: 13). That said, there is no evidence that the economic growth is commensurate to the quest for social justice in the region.

Furthermore, as pointed out by the late French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, though it may have an application within critical sociological analysis (Bourdieu, 1997: 46-58), as a metaphor in policy discourse the concept of human capital takes on a distinctly reductive economic meaning: individuals are constituted as actual or potential *economic* actors. Whether it represents a wilful corruption or a misunderstanding of the idea of human capabilities, the human capital approach continues to reflect essential elements of the economic and political orthodoxy once dubbed the 'Washington Consensus' - a consensus by which the ability of the poor to 'succeed' is construed too readily as a property or characteristic of individuals. Even within the context of the targets set by the Millennium Development Goals (UNDP, 2003) the recipe for tackling world poverty still favours the liberalization of trade and financial markets, the privatization and deregulation of economic production, flexible labour markets, low public spending and taxation, and selective social 'safety nets'.

Conclusion

Conclusively, Sen's capability framework continues to occupy a significant portion in the social sciences and humanities academic circuits. However, Capabilities are not the same as abilities. The term refers not simply to what people are able to do but to their freedom to lead the kind of lives they value, and have reason to value. As South African writer Paul Voice has noted elsewhere, what we can take from Sen is that whatever capacity is being targeted, the focus of attention is on individuals and their particular resources and opportunities. It is not possible to think of having a capacity in a merely formal sense. Having a capacity means that it can be exercised by a particular individual. Having a "right to participate in the political process" without the corresponding capacity in the robust sense that Sen means it - having both sufficient resources and genuine opportunities makes no sense. Thus the distinction between liberty and the "worth of liberty" likewise makes no sense (Paul Voice, 2004: 205). Indeed the aporia at the heart of the capability concept is the notion of the things to do and be that the individual values and has reason to value. By implication, the individual must have 'good' reason to value such things. But the question of "who is to determine what constitutes good reason" is largely left unanswered.

Capabilities framework as a theory of social justice is grounded in the cosmopolitanism philosophy which believes in global justice without consideration of local cultural boundaries of human beings, for instance, the moral standing of African communities. Therefore, it has been victimizing to those who do not conform to its list of expectations. Over time Africa has been the subject of much

focus because of its location in the global economy and its ‘peripheral’ geopolitical status. Its social, economic, and political context has as such been shaped by multiple forces external and internal to the continent.

Unlike Sen’s Capabilities which promotes the supremacy of the individual, we have attempted to demonstrate how Nabudere’s Afrikology centred on African hermeneutics, promotes equity and fairness. The historical experience, which African communities have gone through under colonialism and post-colonialism proves that Africans have consistently used their cultural heritage to survive the impositions of colonialism under different guises. Although the colonialists were able to use some aspects of African customs and traditions in order to enforce their colonial rule, this did not succeed in subduing the people. One significant contribution of Afrikology to the study of social justice, as we have demonstrated, is its persuasion to the academic understanding of social change in Africa is its capacity to explode often victimizing approaches in exchange for a much more balanced understanding of the local processes at work in Africa.

This is what Guinea-Bissau’s Amilcar Cabral called the “practice of freedom” resulting from emancipation where the practice of freedom becomes the lived actuality of the formerly colonised people since it represents the triumph of the people over colonialism and the tyrannies of post-colonial rule inherited from it. To this end, emancipatory knowledge in the African context aims at two things: firstly, to identify problems that impact negatively on peoples’ lives arising out of the colonial and post-colonial experience; secondly, to identify tools, which can resolve those problems and contradictions in a positive manner. In short, emancipatory knowledge offered through the restorative epistemology of Afrikology is a liberating and humanising process (Nabudere, 2004) reconciling “man with himself.” This applies to all human action and Afrikology therefore contributes to a new worldview that can enable humanity to move beyond the constraints of the modern crisis of reason to a new world in which development learning structures play a constructive rather than a destructive role.

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